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ABSTRACT 
Nigeria's political economy has straddled the ideological divide between socialism and 
capitalism. The country producesoil,andatsome point in its existence, it embarked on 
robust state involvement in the economy. This was marked by the acquisition, or 
establishment,of numerous state enterprises. Over the years, the performance of these 
enterprises was found to be dismal, and as part of the overall reform of the economy, 
Nigeria has joined the global trend toward reduction indirect state ownership of 
enterprises. Indeed, it has embarked on massive divestment of state interests in once 
publicly owned firms. Besides the universal rationale of efficiency, one of the objectives 
of the privatization exercise in Nigeria is the attraction and retention of foreign 
investments. This work examines the direct and indirect linkage between the 
government's divestiture of its interests in firms, on the one hand, and foreign 
investments in the country ,on the other hand. 
The study is divided into seven chapters. Chapter 1 reviews the political and economic 
history of Nigeria, to set the background and context that necessitated the introduction of 
the reform package of which privatization is just an aspect. {;hapter 2 isa discussion of 
various natures of state involvement in an economy. This ranges from mere regulation to 
active participation. The Chapter discusses the competing . conceptual and ideological 
theories and tries to situate the Nigerian experience within the broader conceptual 
dichotomies of capitalism, socialism and the via media of mixed economy. Chapter 3 is 
an eXamination of the meaning and rationales for privatization of state owned enterprises 
generally and the Nigerian attempts in particular. Nigeria's privatization program is an 
v 
ongoing exercise. Yet two distinct attempts are identifiable: one which started in 1988 
and the reinvigoration of the exercise, albeit with new constitutive frameworks, in 1999. 
Thus, Chapters 4 and 5 review the legal and institutional frameworks for these two 
exercises. Chapter t; deals with foreign investments in Nigeria. The discussion 
encapsulates the pros Ed cons of foreign investments, especially in Nigeria. Chapter 7 
explores the direct and indirect linkages, between the privatization program in Nigeria 
and foreign investments in the country. This is particularly apposite because one of the 
touted objectives of the privatization exercise is the attraction of foreign investments. A 
conclusion foHows. The work finds that although foreign investments appear to have 
been indirectly boosted by the privatization exercise, foreign investors initially did not 
show interest in direct acquisition of the shares and other interests being relinquished by 
the government, but that that attitude has been changing gradually. 
Vl 
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CHAPTER 1 
A POLITICAL ECONOMY OF NIGERIA 
I. INTRODUCTION 
To set the overall context and background for this thesis, this chapter will review 
the political and economic history of Nigeria up to the present time. It is realized 
that such history is of itself so broad and indeed might constitute a full- fledged 
study. And, in actuality, there is a plethora of works devoted just to such history. 1 
Thus, the attempt here will be to set the broad outlines of the historical experiences 
of Nigeria emphasizing those aspects that significantly give a sufficient 
background to a work such as this. 
Nigeria is a complex sovereign nation situated in the western part of sub-Saharan 
Africa, and has a total land area of 923,768 square kilometers. With An estimated 
population of about 130 million people, Nigeria is the country with most blacks in 
the world? It is also the most populated country in Africa and one of the most well 
I 
See for example FOLORUNSHO AFODUNRINBI, POLITICAL HISTORY OF NIGERIA (New Millenium ~unications, 2000); ALAN BURNS, HISTORY OF NIGERIA (Allen and Unwin, London, 1972); K.O. DIKE, 
ANDpE AND POLITICS IN THE NIGER DELTA, 1830-1885: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE ECONOMIC 
OLITICAL HISTORY OF NIGERIA (Claredon Press, Oxford, 1966) 
2 S~:~~' Ifemesia, Nigeria: The Country of the Niger Area, in BONIFACE I. OBICHERE (ED), STUDIES IN 
u Hl.cRN NIGERIAN HISTORY, 21 (Frank Cass Publishers, London, 1982) \ 
known developing countries,3 It is bordered by the Atlantic Ocean to the south and 
by Niger Republic to the north. Its western neighbor is Benin Republic, part of the 
population of which is said to have an affmity with, or indeed to have come from, 
the Yorubas, a major group in Nigeria. To the east, Nigeria is flanked by Chad and 
the Cameroon.4 It has two main climactic seasons,s the rainy and dry seasons, 
although the intensity of the seasons varies with the particular geographic part of 
the country. The rainy season is usually more intense in the south than it is in the 
north. The situation is reversed with the dry season, which is usually more 
intensive in the north than in the south. It is endowed with many rivers and 
waterways; the two most prominent ones are the Rivers Niger6 and Benue. Its 
peoples are multifarious and diverse. It is claimed that there are over 250 ethnic 
groups and languages in the country.7 As a result, there is hardly anyone defming 
culture applicable to Nigerians. In contemporary times, the two dominant religions 
of Christianity and Islam co-exist with different forms of traditional religion, by 
3 
See TOYIN FALOLA, CULTURE AND CUSTOMS OF NIGERIA, 1 (Greenwood Publishing, Westport, CT, 
USA, 2002) 
4 Ibid at2 
~ O~ NJOKU) ECONOMIC HISTORY OF NIGERIA, 19TH AND 20TH CENTURIES, 6 (Magnet Business 
nterpnses) Enugu) Nigeria, 2001) 
~It is ~ought that the country's name was derived from this river. But see Ifemesia supra note 2 at 21-23) for a 
W:USSl.O~ of the academic and linguistic controversy on the source of the name Nigeria. Lady Lugard is credited 
commg that name but some argue that the name had already been used in materials to which Lady Lugard had 
access before she allegedly coined it. 
7 Ibid at 4. 
2 
.; which is meant a belief or faith system indigenous to the people before the advent 
of westerners or other foreigners. This has been a major source of friction and 
tension, with occasional, and sometimes violent, clashes occurring between the two 
major religions of Islam and Christianity. Some parts of the country practiced 
farming, other parts fishing, while others are known more for cattle rearing. 
So pronounced are the differences, and lack of homogeneity, that it is an accepted 
notion that Nigeria is a creation of the British. Scholars8 and politicians alike are 
prone to start a discussion of Nigeria by reference to the momentous action taken 
by the British in 1914. It was in that year that the British colonial administration 
under the leadership of then Governor General, Lord Lugard, unified the southern 
and northern protectorates of Nigeria, to in essence form what is present day 
Nigeria. Hitherto that unification, popularly known as the amalgamation of 
northern and southern Nigeria, either protectorate had existed as a separate entity 
with its own governor general. Indeed, Lord Lugard, the architect of the 
amalgamation, in 1914, was on his second tour of duty, having served for six years, 
from 1900, as the high commissioner for northern Nigeria, and returning in 1912 to 
set in motion the process for the unification of Nigeria. Critics of the amalgamation 
accuse Lugard of bias towards the north and of attempting to institute a northern 
8 s~~or example, Hassan A. Saliu and J.O. Durojaiye. Background and Overview of Chapters, in HASSAN A. 
no . ~ED!, ISSUES IN CONTEMPORARY POLITICAL ECONOMY OF NIGERIA, 1 (Sally & Associates, 
no. Nlgena, 1999) (asserting that: ''the emergence of Nigeria in its modem sense can be traced to colonialism." 
3 
· "j hegemony over the south. Lugard apparently was not impressed by the developing 
elites of the south but, instead, admired the laid back attitude of the north. Had 
.\ Lugard not been changed as the governor general in 1918, it is speculated that he 
would have moved the capital of Nigeria from Lagos, the most cosmopolitan city 
) : ~ , • .' 1 
"J : 
in Nigeria then, and located in the south, to Kaduna situated in the north.9 
Ade Ajayi would seem to allude to this preferential disposition on the part of 
Lugard, when he observes that Lugard gave two reasons for pressing for 
amalgamation. "First, Northern Nigeria needed to pool her resources with Southern 
Nigeria. For, while the administration in the North was still dependent on Colonial 
Office grants to balance its budget, the South with a better-developed overseas 
trade was able to exist on its customs and excise duties. Secondly, if the trade of 
the North was to expand rapidly, she needed an outlet to the sea which was open all 
the year round, in contrast to the River Niger on which traffic was seasonal."}O 
Whatever the merits, it seems clear that the merger was prompted by a desire on 
the part of the British for easy access for trading and economic purposes to the 
entirety of the geographical entity now called Nigeria. It is arguable that that 
10 
J.F. ADE AJA YI, MILESTONES IN NIGERIAN mSTORY, 27 (Longman, New Edition, 1980) 
4 
prejudice, in favor of the north, has been maintained by postcolonial rulers. I I 
Historic as the amalgamation was, it did not wean the peoples of Nigeria of their 
profound attachment to their ethnic roots as is demonstrated by constant tensions 
and cleavages. Nor did the early leaders have any illusion that it would. The British 
ii government's reason for the unification was economic not pOlitical. 12 In fact, it has 
been noted that the British, out of immense concern with exploitation kept the 
ethnic nationalities as further apart as possible, and that this was so 
notwithstanding the celebrated amalgamation of the Northern and Southern 
protectorates. 13 If the colonial powers were not interested in real integration 
amongst the people, the early post colonial leaders did not seem persuaded of the 
existence any such real unity either. Nor are the people themselves. It has been 
claimed that: 
"the fact is that Nigerians individually and collectively tend not to 
have allegiance to the state imposed by the British in 1914. On an 
abstract level, Nigerians identify with the geographical entity mapped 
11 
See KELEcm AMIHE KALU, ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND NIGERIAN FOREIGN POLICY, 
~~ ~ellen Press, New York, 2000) (asserting, " ... the practice of robbing the south to pay the north, once 
~titutlonahzed, has remained a vexing issue. The same practice is at the root of the current strategy for economic 
~lopment, manifested either in the form of economic diplomacy or as structural adjustment policies, within 
C ch the political and economic interests of the northern oligarchy are protected by the military establishment. 
ont~mporary economic and political policies in Nigeria will be shown to parallel those of the colonial era, 
espectally with respect to development, debt, and funding policies." 
12 
J..F. ~ AlA VI, supra note 10 at 23 (asserting that: "the British were Dot seeking to unifY Nigeria. They were 
~ religIOUS or pol!tical reformers seeking an empire where new religious or political principles could be enforced. 
de ~ were essentially traders from abroad anxious to establish a situation favourable for the growth and 
ve opment of their trade.") 
13 Sal' 
1U and Durojaiye, supra note 8 at p.l 
5 
out by the British, but concretely, seem unwilling to associate with the 
idea of Nigeria. Perhaps the key reason is that the founding fathers of 
Nigeria are foreigners. Hence most Nigerians irrespective of their 
nationalistic claims, have a tendency to first identify with their 
ancestral roots before identifying themselves as Nigerians." 14 
Similarly some of the nationalist leaders have been quoted to openly doubt the 
reality of the unity of Nigeria. Perhaps, the most famous statement in this regard is 
that credited to the late sage and Yoruba icon, Chief Obafemi Awolowo, who was 
the leader of one of the early political parties to have emerged on the Nigerian 
scene, the Action Group. He is quoted to have said that "Nigeria is not a nation. It 
is a mere geographic expression.,,15 His counterpart in the north, Sir Abubakar 
Tafawa Balewa, who led the Northern Peoples Congress, is said to have seen 
Nigerian unity as only a matter of intention, stating that "since the amalgamation 
of the North and the South provinces in 1914, Nigeria had existed as one country 
on paper... It is still far from being united. Nigerian unity is only a British 
intention for the country.,,16 
14 u~CHI AMIHE KALU, ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND NIGERIA'S FOREIGN POLICY, 39 (Edwin 
.ynalen Press, Ltd, New York, 20(0) 
15 1b'd AI. at 41 (quo~ing OBAFEMI AWOLOWO, PATH TO. NIGERIAN FREEDo.M); See also Jefrey Herbst and s:ibayo Olukoshl, Nigeria: Economic and Political Reforms at Cross Purposes, in STEPHAN HAGGARD AND 
E ViN B. WEBB (ED), VOTING FOR REFORM (DEMOCRACY, POLITICAL LIBERALIZATION, AND ~g=c ADJUSTMENT), 453, 454 (published for the World Bank, Oxford University Press, 1994) (citing 
1987) A. JOSEPH, DEMOCRACY AND PREBANDALISM IN NIGERIA, 184 (Cambridge University Press, 
k·· 2S~U, SUpra note 11 at P.41 (citing Ayeni Olugbenga, Which Way forward, West Africa, Feb 14-20, 1994 P. 
6 
However some argue that prior to the advent of the colonialists, the people 
inhabiting what is now called Nigeria interacted and communicated, even if they 
did not have a common government. Such communication was enabled by the 
many waterways existing in the territory of Nigeria and by the absence major 
mountains. 17 Yet, others aver that though amalgamation was an act of the British, it 
was guided, and to a large extent dictated, by existing unities, geographical, 
commercial and cultural. 18 Whatever the merits of amalgamation, it is clear that it 
did not erase any ethnic or other sectional cleavages. Those divisions, which persist 
today, underscore the fact that though formally enunciated as one entity in 1914, 
Nigeria's history, per force, involves the distinct histories of the several peoples 
that make up the country, an issue to which we now turn. 
ll. PRE - COLONIAL IDSTORY OF NIGERIA 
It is of course not always easy to determine how far back any historical study of 
any people can easily go. That dilemma is the more manifest when the place to be 
17 
ONWUKA NJOKU, supra note 5 at 6.7 
18 
th ~E AJAYI, supra notelO at 27. The eminent historian considers amalgamation a positive and asserts, at p. 28; (o1~ we are ~ere~ore fo~~te in Nigeri~ ~at by and large the. British were drawn to recognize these unities and to 
. «QW tb.em In thel)" l.legottl~tIQIJ.s for ~qqij.IJH.itou lJud IJmlJlglJID.a.Jtou" 
7 
.. ) 
studied was not always within the radar of early historians. "The early political 
history of Nigeria's states, large and small, is very complex, and full of 
obscurities.,,19 Evidence abounds of the existence, in what is present day Nigeria, 
of indigenous societies during prehistoric times.2o Such evidence includes the 
finding of brass items in Bida, Be-Ife and Benin, bronze in Igbo-Ukwu, terra cotta 
animals in Bomo and terra cotta heads in Nok.21 Similarly, people lived in Nigeria, 
during both the stone and metal ages.22 Pre-colonial Nigeria was made up of many 
states. Some were large, some were small. Besides, even before the advent of the 
British, the contours of these states continued to change both from internal and 
external factors. Isichei argues that "in some areas, where the celebrated kingdoms 
developed, a change seems to have taken place which often follows a similar 
pattern, whereby a mUltiplicity of small-scale states, whose 'priest kings' were 
sometimes rulers of little territories, and sometimes linked with vocational guilds, 
19 
ELIZABETH ISICHEI, A mSTORY OF NIGERIA (WITH CONTRIBUTION BY PETER DCHE ISICHEI), 
129 (Longman, London, Lagos, New York, 1983) 
20 
TOYlN FALOLA, mSTORY OF NIGERIA. 37 (Greenwood Publishing group, Inc., Westport ,CT, USA, 1999); 
The Library of Congress documents that the earliest known example of a fossil skeleton with Negroid features, 
per?aps 10,000 years old, was found in neru in western Nigeria and attest to the antiquity of habiitation in the 
region. See (visited 03/07/07) 
21 
tb F:Ola, supra note 20 at 37; The skilled artisans and ironworkers of the Nok were said to have flourished between 
e ourth century B.C and second century A.D. See (visited 03/07/07) 
2l "810 
sub ne age refers to the period associated with hunter-gatherers who roamed the area in search of food and 
Sees;qatuently made a transition to agriculture." The metal age began with iron, and later copper, brass, and bronze." 
ola, Supra note 20 at 37-38 
8 
gave way to unified kingdoms. The creation of a kingdom is often linked with an 
invasion from outside- but the invader need not come from far away.,,23 
A. THE YORUBA KINGDOMS 
The Yorubas occupy the western part of Nigeria and speak a language called 
Yoruba. They trace their origin to a common progenitor known as Oduduwa. Myth 
has it that Oduduwa founded the city oflIe-Ife. To this day the Yorubas regard that 
city as the center of their history and tradition. The origin of other cities is traced to 
IIe-Ife as it is claimed that Oduduwa dispatched his sons to establish the other 
cities such as Oyo, Ibadan and others. Remarkably, about the fifteenth century, 
some of these new cities surpassed lIe Ife in both political and economic powers, 
with the result that Ile-Ife's relevance assumed only a spiritual dimension. Actually, 
this would seem to be case even in contemporary times. Most of the other Yoruba 
cities are larger and more developed than IIe-Ife. But in matters of tradition, IIe-Ife 
enjoys a pride of place and its traditional ruler, the Ooni, is regarded not just as the 
traditional ruler of the city but also as the traditional head of all Yorubas since he 
occupies the stool of their progenitor, Oduduwa. 
23 
ISIClIEI, supra note 19 at 129 
9 
Of all the cities founded by the children of Oduduwa, Oyo became the most 
powerfue4 and was headed by a traditional ruler called Alafin who was assisted by 
a council of state called Oyo Mesi. It achieved substantial military victories 
resulting in the extension of its empire further north to Nupe and Borgu and even 
parts of what is now the Republic of Benin, Nigeria's neighbors to the west.25 
Although, the Binis, to the east of the Yoruba kingdoms, are not strictly considered 
Yorubas, they have an affinity to Ile-Ife. Like the Yorubas, their traditional rulers 
are called Obas.26 It is said that because of internal quarrels amongst the Binis, 
Oduduwa sent someone to rule them, and the practice endured. Today it is claimed 
that the Oba of Benin (the modem name) descended from Ile-Ife. 
B. THE NORTHERN KINGDOMS 
The history of pre-colonial northern Nigeria is the history of the Hausas, Fulani's 
and that of the other peoples who live in that region. The dominant pre-colonial 
24 
Faiola, supra note 20 at 20 
15 Ibid 
16 
e!alOla notes that ?riginaIly Benin's rulers were known as Ogiso. Then a dynasty was established by a certain 
.·1 lII .... raka, Who, accordmg to tradition, was influenced by the Yoruba and chose the title of Oba (king). See FaIola, 
.'"1' note 20 At 2 I 
10 
.tD,em4~;:; were the ]{anem Borou, the Hausa and later the Sokoto Caliphate. The 
J{aDeIll BorI1u empire in the north east part of Nigeria and existed partlY outside 
the territory that constitutes present day Nigeria. The Hausas existed more or less 
in the center and were for a long time ruled by the Songhai Empire, which had 
stretched from Senegal and the Gambia, in the west, all the way into Hausa land 
including Kebbi, Katsina and Gobir. It was not until the sixteenth century when the 
songhai empire collapsed following an invasion by an army from Morocco, that 
the !Jausa states became independent, that is became free from Songhai's 
domination. About the same time Boroo reached its zenith, and also benefited from 
the fall of the Songhai empire by being the uncontested power in northern Nigeria. 
A severe drought and famine in the middle of the eighteenth century combined 
with internal agitations and rivalries to weaken the Borno empire and set the stage 
for the Islamic jihad mounted by a cleric, Usman dan Fodio and the creation of the 
Sokoto Caliphate in the nineteenth century. 27 
11 
c. THEIGBOS 
A majority who are Igbos populates the eastern part of Nigeria. The unique feature 
of the history of the Igbos is the notion that prior to the advent of the colonialists 
they were a stateless society. This simply means that in contrast to the Yorubas and 
the Hausas and Fulanis, in respect of which certain organizational features had 
been documented at, what may fairly be said to be, a macro level, the Igbos ''were 
divided into small mainly patrilineal clans, each with its own founding ancestor. 
Hundreds of villages existed not as members of one Igbo kingdom, but as 
autonomous units, each with its own government.,,28 There was of course mutual 
cooperation among the various families and clans. Government existed at the level 
of these families and clans. Disputes and serious matters were settled by the elders 
or by age grades.29 
28 
FaIOla, supra note 20 at 44 
29 ~tiaaUyge grade is an association of people born within a particular period usually between one to two years. 
, members of a particular age grade are usually age mates. 
12 
ro. THE ADVENT OF THE BRITISH 
As noted earlier, Britain colonized Nigeria and ruled the country for about six 
.,! decades.30 However, the first Europeans that happened on the Nigerian scene were 
the portuguese, who arrived about the fifteenth century and concentrated on 
trading and missionary work. They had no territorial desires and restricted 
themselves to fortified trading stations.3l In the sixteenth century, the British, 
" French and the Dutch began to compete with the Portuguese and the focus shifted 
to the dehumanizing and immoral trade in slaves.32 The British continued to place 
emphasis on trade but was willing to use force and intimidation to protect its 
trading interests. Principally, it used the instrumentality of a trading company 
known as the Royal Niger Company to carry out both its trading and quasi-
governmental activities. Territorial annexation intensified in the nineteenth century. 
Lagos became a colony in 1861. In the late 1880s, the British intervened in what 
had been a sixteen-year war among the Yorubas and took over the area. Similarly, 
the British conquered Benin in 1897. Meanwhile there had been strong competition 
from the other Europeans, the French and the Dutch for more participation in the 
30 l~rotn 1900 to 1960; this was the period that of formal colonization. Certainly British coercion started way before 
and, some would argue that, it did not end with the independence proclamation of 1960. 
31 
Faiola, SUpra note 20 at 50 
32 Ibid 
13 
, < r'" 
"spoils" of their exploration in Nigeria. The Berlin Conference of 1885 has become 
infamous for its brazen and obscene agenda: the so·called partition of Africa. In 
their nineteenth century wisdom, the conferees, in consequence of their 
distribution, allotted Nigeria to Britain to exploit, under the so-called principle of 
dual mandate. Britain was still not interested in formally acknowledging the 
annexation of Nigeria as a colony even though to all intents and purposes, it was 
maximally exploiting it. But it needed an assurance that the despoliation of the 
country would be its, to the exclusion of the other Europeans. While the conference 
acknowledged Britain's claims to a sphere of influence in Nigeria, it stipulated that 
only effective occupation would secure full international recognition. Britain 
therefore took steps to effectively occupy Nigeria. It formed the Oil Rivers 
Protectorate, which covered the Niger Delta area up to Calabar. The British 
Consulate General relocated to Calabar.33 This protectorate would later become the 
Niger Coast Protectorate34 and be expanded to include the areas from Calabar to 
the Lagos colony. This was followed by the occupation of the entire south. The 
north became a protectorate in 1900.35 The two protectorates were each headed by 
a higher commissioner until the amalgamation in 1914, when they came under the 
administration of one governor general. An alternative theory is that British 
33 
Thus CaIabar is sometimes regarded as the first capital of Nigeria. 
34 Thi 
S was in 1894. 
35 
Lord Lugard became its high commissioner. 
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annexation and occupation of Nigeria was accentuated by the need to stop slave 
trade, following its abolition by the British Parliament in 1807. 
IV. COLONIAL ADMINISTRATION 
Following amalgamation, Nigeria was administered as one entity.36 As early as 
1922 there had been agitations for greater involvement of Nigerians in its affairs. 
Herbert Macauley, often referred to as the father of Nigerian nationalism, founded 
his Nigerian National Democratic Party in 1922. That same year the Clifford 
Constitution, named after the then governor general, introduced a legislative 
council and a limited measure of elections into the council. Another major 
development was in 1946 with the introduction of the Richards Constitution of that 
year. That constitution introduced the concept of regionalism. A federal principle 
was introduced in 1951 and 1954 with the Macpherson Constitution and the 
Lyttleton Constitution respectively. All this while, there had been strong agitations, 
led by nationalist leaders, for independence. The independence Constitution of 
-36Tbis thro was through the principle of indirect rule, by which the colonial administrators administered the colony 
We ugh ~e local and already existing traditional institutions. That system was fairly successful in the north and 
aU: ~hich had established traditional authorities. In the east where there were no preexisting centralized 
the .o~ the c?lonial authorities create what they called warrant chiefs, and tried to rule through these chiefs, but 
an :' rule m this part was acclaimed to be a failure. There was also the Nigerian Council, which was touted as 
~entyue for the appointed members to express their opinions on the issues affecting governance but was in 
merely adVisory. 
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1960 granted independence to Nigeria even though the colonial link was not 
completely severed. The Queen of England remained head of the country. These 
links were completely cut in 1963 when Nigeria became a republic. 
v. COLONIAL ADMINISTRATION AND TIIE ECONOMY 
If Nigeria was born in 1914, it follows that its economy, at least that aspect that 
relates to the corporate entity, is of recent origin. But as we have seen, people lived 
and functioned in the territory now called Nigeria before the coming of the 
, .. ', Europeans. These folks carried out economic activities although not at modern 
large scale or macro economic level. Agriculture was by far the most pervasive of 
the economic pursuits of the Nigerian peoples in the nineteenth century. 37 This 
was so in almost all parts of the country, even though the kind of agriculture 
... : practiced varied from part to part, depending on climate. In some parts farming in 
the nature of cultivation of crops, was the mainstay. Other parts, such as the Fulani 
of the north, engaged in animal rearing, while those with proximity to rivers were 
mainly fishers. The large number of waterways available facilitated trading. 
»~--------------~N\yUKA NJOKU, ECONOMIC HISTORY OF NIGERIA 19TH AND 20TH CENTURIES, 9 (Magnet Business 
. tpnses, MUgu, Nigeria, 2001) 
16 
"J 
Initially, such trading was of the form of trade by barter, whereby an individual 
brought goods, which they wanted to sell, and exchanged the goods with another 
person having an item, which the first individual wanted.38 The concept of money 
developed . later. 
The parts of pre-colonial Nigeria, which had centralized administrations, like the 
old Yoruba kingdoms and the empires in the north, had various systems of paying 
tributes to the kings or rulers. That would equate modern system of taxation. In the 
other parts without centralized systems, communal efforts were usually pooled to 
address communal concerns. This could range from occasional levies or other 
impositions on adults or households to a requirement of participation in communal 
labor to address any needs requiring such labor. 
The very nature of colonialism is that of exploitation. As we have seen, the British 
interest in Nigeria, nay Africa, was primarily commercial. Therefore, its focus was 
in running the colony in such a way as to maximize the realization of its interests. 
-
-1Ibis ~"Us ~ cumbersome as it required double coincidence of needs, that is to say that a person desiring to sell did 
J :,,!......:e to ~d another person in need of that which the frrst person wanted to sell, but rather another who not 
--~ such Item but also had in their possession an item which the first person wanted so that they could ~_etbe items. 
17 
The economy was essentially dependent and a surrogate of the British economy.39 
According to Edame, "the output of the country were wholly primary products and 
mainly agriculture. These included cotton, rubber, palm oil, and tin, columbite and 
coal. The bulk of these were exported to Britain while the country with its vast land 
area and teeming population provided a virile market for British goods.',4O Thus, 
the thrust of the colonial economic approach was the development of Nigeria both 
as a source of raw materials for overseas use and as a market for finished products 
from abroad. This parasitic approach was reflected in the economic policies of the 
colonial administration, during the colonial era. 
It has been argued that the colonial administration adopted a cavalier attitude 
towards development policy formulation in genera1.41 From amalgamation, in 
1914, it took the colonial administration until 1945 to prepare a development plan 
for the colony. When it finally did so, after the Second World War and while 
nationalistic stirrings had begun, it produced a document that has been severely 
39 ~.E.~AME, DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS AND PLANNING IN NIGERIA, 242 (Harmony Books, Benin 
-&?' NIgeria, 2001) 
-40 ,~,~~~AME, supra note 39 at 242; A.C. EYIUCHE, THEORY AND METHODOLOGY OF DEVELOPMENT 
;~l:lNG IN.DEVELOPING ECONOMIES (NIGERIA PLANNING EXPERIENCE 1945-2000),242 (Maurice 
\L Ction SefVIces, Enugu, Nigeria, 2000) 
41-
'btoSe: N.I.lkpeze, C.C. Soludo and N.N. Elekwa, Nigeria: The Political Economy of the Policy Process, Policy 
~ 'ce and Implementation, in CHARLES SOLUOO, MICHAEL OGBU AND HA-JOON CHANG (ED), THE 
V!:rPressCS OF TRADE AND INDUSTRIAL POLICY IN AFRICA FORCED CONSENSUS? Chapter 13 (Africa 
. , Trenton, NJ, 2004) 
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criticized as not really being a plan.42 In 1945 the British prepared the Ten-Year 
Plan of Development and Welfare for Nigeria, 1946-55.43 The plan was initiated as 
a result of a request by the British Colonial Office in London, which had wanted 
such plans from the colonies to assist it in disbursing the colonial development and 
welfare funds.44 That plan was to be funded by twenty-three million pounds 
sterling from the United Kingdom government and twenty-six million pounds 
sterling from Nigeria itself. It was supposed to last ten years but was broken into 5-
year sub-periods owing to rapid structural changes being then experienced in 
Nigeria. Even so, it was terminated in 1954, following the introduction of the 
concept of regionalism and that of regional autonomy. Each region launched its 
own development plan.45 Its central objective was the improvement of the socio-
economic well being of Nigerians.46 "That was to be accomplished through the 
provision of physical facilities such as roads, telecommunications, water supply, 
42 
See KALu, supra note 11 at 57 
43 
Go00vernment of Nigeria, A Ten Year Development Plan o/Development and Welfare/or Nigeria, 1946-5)(Lagos, 
¥ernment Printer, 1946) 
44 F.C~C.E. EYlUCHE, THEORY AND METHODOLOGY OF DEVELOPMENT PLANNING IN DEVELOPING 
Ni ~OMIES (NIGERIA PLANNING EXPERIENCE 1945-2000), 53 (Maurice Production Services, Enugu, 
1et1a, 2000) 
4$ 
EYIuCHE, supra note 40 at 55 
4G 
I<ALu supra note 11 at 55 
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hospitals and general improvement in the ability of the people to feed themselves-
through increased agricultural research and yields.,,47 
The colonial economic plan, as reflected in the Development and Welfare Plan, has 
been criticized on many grounds. First, as in most colonial policies, it was prepared 
by foreigners, notably senior colonial government officials, and suffered the defect 
that characterized most of such alien policies: It did not reflect the experiences and 
aspirations of the people. Similarly, it did not benefit from any data essential to a 
plan of that magnitude. Secondly, its treatment of industrialization was poor. 
Indeed, it seems that the drafters were loath to the idea of industrialization of the 
colony. It seemed to scoff at the notion of an industrial Nigeria, when it stated: 
"Due regard will be given to the possibilities of industrialization 
where conditions warrant it, and where such production can be carried 
out economically and at reasonably competitive prices. It is not 
assumed, however, that Nigeria will become an industrial country as 
with its large population and area a great deal of its future must rest in 
agricultural develofment in its widest sense, and the improvement of 
village industries.4 
The tenor of the document was anti industrialization, thus underscoring the fact 
that it merely furthered the dual colonial interests of finding a source of raw 
-47'KAL 
U supra note 11 at 55; EYIUCHE, supra note 40 at 54 
.. 
!QuOted in KALU, supra note 11 at 56 
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materials for foreign industries and a market for the fInished products of those 
industries. Perhaps, it could be argued that given the state of both educational and 
technological development at the time, Nigeria could not rapidly transform into an 
industrial colossus. Yet, the whole reason for a development plan should have been 
to document the aspirations of the people and focus their attention towards a goal. 
It would not have been overly ambitious at the time for Nigeria to aspire to become 
industrialized. The Development Plan instead of promoting this worthy goal 
dampened the zeal. 
Thirdly, part of the funding for the Plan was to be sourced through loans in the 
London market. 49 Again, this benefIted the colonial powers more than it did the 
people of Nigeria, and is also criticized as the genesis of the culture, which seems 
to have taken hold, for the government to always borrow for development plans. so 
Fourthly, and more importantly, the Plan is criticized as being no plan at all but 
merely a collection of projects, which had not been coordinated or related to any 
-~~-----------­oft: •• l(ALu, supra note II at 58 
SOiKALU supra note II at 58 
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overall economlC targets51 , and the selection of which did not involve the 
• 52 populatIOn. 
Before the introduction of the next Plan the colonial administration requested the 
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (as the World Bank was 
then known) to undertake a mission "to assess the resources available for future 
development, to study the possibilities for development in the major sectors of the 
economy and to make recommendations for practical steps to be taken, including 
the timing and co-ordination of developmental activities.,,53 The mission made up 
of ten full time members and five part time members spent about three months in 
Nigeria and retired to the Bank's headquarters to write their report. 54 Even though 
in this case, there was an attempt to understand and reflect the situation of Nigeria, 
the mission's report and the resulting five-year Development and Welfare Plan, 
1955-6255, still suffered from the same problem of inadequate Nigerian input. None 
-
'1 Anene Nnoli, K.O. Orji and Aforka C. Ibe, Development Planning in Nigeria, in AFORKA C. mE (ED), ~~OMIC PROBLEMS OF NIGERIA, 56 (Sellyoak Int. Coy., Awka, Nigeria, 2002); Ikpeze, Soludo and 
- .. a, supra note 41 
~~ ... 
52 
",£YruCHE, Supra note 40 at 54 
·Jc: . 
t4See 
.. ' The Economic Development of Nigeria, vii (a publication of the World Bank, 1955/01/01) 
1,4 ltSid at Vii 
Plan Was initially to end in 1960 but was extended to 1962 
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of the fifteen members of the mission was Nigerian.56 The Plan has thus been 
sitnilarly dismissed as not well articulated. 57 
VI. POST INDEPENDENCE AND ECONOMY 
With independence in 1960, the reins of governance and of the economic destiny 
was bestowed on Nigerians, even though they inherited, from Britain, an economy 
that has been described as primitive, agrarian and import-consumer dependent. 58 
The contest for political leadership in Nigeria has been exceptionally fierce, 
turbulent and even violent at times. This has affected the economy a lot. Indeed, 
the country fought a civil war from 1966 to 1970, which war obviously impacted 
the economy in adverse ways. The recurring decimal of loyalty to ethnicity, which 
has, more than anything else, militated both against national cohesion and 
economic development, reared its ugly head early in post independence Nigeria. In 
~act, the World Bank Mission, which had visited Nigeria in 1953, had warned of 
tb~ dangers that undue emphasis on regionalism could pose to development when 
4e The Chief f Mi . . 
.'U . ? SSlon was from the Netherlands. The other members were from AustralIa, France, Italy, Turkey, 
wortcfated Kingdom and the United States. See The Economic Development of Nigeria, vii (A publication of the fi, ank, 1955/01/01) 
supra note 40 at 64-66 
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they said that "while agreeing that political decentralization is necessary in a 
.. , country as heterogeneous as Nigeria, we caution that regionalization carried too 
far, as for example by exaggerated emphasis on the particular good of anyone 
region, may retard development of Nigeria as a whole."s9 A conspectus of the 
Nigerian political economy would reveal that this fear has been borne out. And not 
only that, it is arguable that the Nigerian enterprise, as an amalgam of diverse 
peoples, is proving unworkable. 
At independence the country adopted the Westminster model of democracy. The 
Prime Minister60 was from the northern part of the country. The Governor 
Genera16t, who was essentially the British Queen's representative62, was from the 
East, While the leader of the opposition63 came from the west. Thus was enunciated 
a pattern and an economy ever sensitive to, indeed driven by, ethnic tensions. 
~()netheless, the first republic set about governing. It initiated the First National 
!levelopment Plan, 1962-1968. Significantly, this development plan was 
iattoduced without the necessary population data obtainable from a census. The 
I 
Economic Development of Nigeria 22 (A World Bank Publication, 1955/01101) 
~bakar .Tafuwa Balewa, who was the leader of the Northern Peoples Congress, which had won the most 
o seats m the legislature. 
Azikiwe, the leader of the National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons . 
. situation changed in 1963 when the country became a republic and the Queen ceased to be its head. 
Awolowo, leader of Action Group 
24 
attempt to conduct a census in 1963 and the conduct of elections in 1964 are 
regarded as the immediate precursors to the crisis of the 1960s. Since electoral 
constituencies, and consequently allocation of federal resources, were to be based 
on population, politicians were alleged to have manipulated the count in their areas 
to maximize, some would say, inflate the official population figures in their areas. 
Besides, in a polity characterized by predominant allegiance to tribe, and where 
there was no political party with broad national following, every party and every 
politician had the practical incentive to inflate the number of people in their 
respective areas of influence. 
The First National development Plan, 1962-1968, paid attention to industrialization 
and enunciated an open door policy which enabled Nigeria to enter into 
tnultilateral trade agreements with other countries.64 It accorded priority to 
agriculture, industry and technical training and has been described as the first effort 
taorelate planning to national development goalS.65 Even if the plan would have 
Ushered in a viable economy, and whatever gains were made, it was distorted by 
civil war, which raged from 1967 to1970. The ethnic tensions came to a head 
a coup, the leaders of which were mainly from the Eastern and 
supra note 40 at 89-90 
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Midwestern parts of the country. Although the coup was aborted and it was 
revealed that the coupists intended to wipe out the leadership of the country, it 
happened that the actual victims were mainly from the north.66 This prompted a 
counter coup, led by soldiers from the north, against eastern officers67, and a 
pogrom on the easterners who were in the north. In consequence, the easterners no 
longer felt safe in Nigeria and decided to secede from the union. The central 
authority declared war on the east in order to prevent the secession. The war lasted 
; ... ; . until 1970 when the east surrendered. 
The war's end was followed by the program of reconciliation, rehabilitation and 
reconstruction, which was, embarked upon by the federal government, now under 
the leadership of a military head of state68 from the middle part of the country, 
known as the middle belt. The program aimed at reintegrating the east into 
mainstream Nigeria and also rebuilding the infrastructure, which had been 
destroyed by the war. There was introduced, another development plan, known as 
the Second National development Plan, 1970-74. It was unique in the sense that it 
-:~~ Prime Minister, Tafawa Balewa, a northerner, and the Premier of Northern Nigeria, Sir Ahmadu Bello, both 
~·111 the coup. 
M,~ 61 ••. 
.. .. GeneraI
d 
Aguiyi. Ironsi, the Military Head of State, who had taken over the reins of government following the first 
an Who haded from the east died in this coup. 
Yakubu Gowon 
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was prepared by Nigerian economists and planners and ninety per cent of the total 
finance was expected to be generated internally. 
VII. THE OIL BOOM AND THE CRISIS OF THE 1980S 
The era 1970-1980 was the most prosperous for Nigeria. It was at the same time a 
period in which Nigeria was at its most profligate. Prior to 1970, agriculture was 
the leading sector of the Nigerian economy providing seventy per cent employment 
of the population and accounting for eighty per cent of government revenue. 69 
Nigeria was also a major exporter of agricultural commodities such as cocoa and 
rubber.70 Then, the oil boom came. That boom has been attributed to the Arab 
Israeli war in1973, following which Arab countries imposed an oil embargo.71 
Demand for Nigerian oil, which had been discovered in 1956, rose dramatically 
and the country was awash in oil money. Agricultural exports, as a percentage of 
total exports, decreased from 73 per cent in 1962 to 1 per cent in 1981, with oil 
'~OBADAN AND FRANK DINOWO, ESSAYS ON NIGERAN ECONOMY, 83 (Mindex Publishing Coy., ~ Nigeria, 2000); See also Emmanuel E. UmebaIi, Nigerian Economy: An Overview, in UMEBALI AND 
!Iii:, ,NIGERIAN ECONOMY: ISSUES AND TRENDS, 1 (Acafor Books, Enugu, Nigeria, 1992) 
'l,OBADAN 
, ", , AND DINOWO, supra note 69 at 83 
supra note 11 at 64 
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accounting for more than 93 per cent of exports between 1973 and 1981.72 Oil also 
accounted for 7S per cent of government revenue rising from 26.3 percent in 
This development marked the onset of one malaise, and exacerbated an already 
existing condition, in the Nigerian economy. These were respectively, what have 
been termed the Dutch disease on the one hand and the rentier system or 
clientelism on the other. It has been noted that "oil is often not the blessing it 
appears to be: it provides great opportunities, but the very nature of the industry 
also makes these almost impossible to grasp and induces growing structural strains. 
A particular property of oil is that it casts a smokescreen over a country's real 
problems. Symptoms such as foreign exchange problems and fiscal inadequacies 
are temporarily concealed.,,74 In a clear manifestation of the Dutch disease75, the 
12 Herbst and Olukoshi, supra note 15 at 458 
,73 OBADAN AND DIMOWO, supra note 69 at 83 
.1~ S ~'etr ee N.I. Ikpeze, C.C. Soludo and N.N. Elekwa, supra note 41. (Quoting Seers, D. 1981. "The Life Cycle of a 
oleum Economy and its Implications for Development," Research for Development, Vol. 1, No.1) 
'lsQ t~h disease is an economic concept that tries to explain the seeming relationship between the exploitation of 
~ reso~ces ~d a decline in the manufacturing sector. The theory is that an increase in revenues from natural 
.
1Iern1\ ~ Wlll demdustrialise a nation's economy by raising the exchange rate, which makes the manufacturing 
~i""r ess competitive." See , (Visited 03125/07) 
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government shifted attention from agriculture to mostly services.76 Obadan and 
I)in1Owo contend that the new found wealth brought with it fundamental changes 
in the attitude of the government towards the economy.77 Spending became 
ratnpant and was given additional impetus by the reconstruction program being 
undertaken after the civil war. The era witnessed a proliferation of public sector 
institutions and enterprises while private sector fmns depended largely on imported 
inputs.78 The head State was quoted to have said that Nigeria's problem was not 
money, but rather how to spend money.79 And the powers that were, devised all 
kinds of ways to spend it, fortified in their Dutch courage that the oil wells were 
not running dry anytime soon, and that the world's demand for oil would not abate. 
The story is told of how government imported bags of cement, which had to stay at 
76 See Nigerian Structural Adjustment Program, Policies, Implementation, and Impact, vii (World Bank Report No 
130S3-UNI, May 13, 1994) 
17 These changes were: (i) the economy became heavily dependent on crude oil and spawned all kinds of investment 
in social, physical and economic infrastructure. There was no incentive to increase domestic revenue mobilization; 
(it) deficit budgets became the order of the day as state governments embarked on spending, with the federal 
~overnment readily fmancing these; (iii) state and federal governments embarked on white elephant projects; (iv) 
mvestment activities were largely urban based and emphasized social and economic infrastructure without adequate 
incentives for private sector participation. This adversely affected the productive sectors such as agriculture; (v) 
JI!Olif~tion of firms which largely depended on imported inputs; (vi) emergence of widespread imbalances and 
_mons with the dependence on oil exposing the country to external shocks; (vii) competitiveness of agriculture 
;: erode~ by over valued exchange rate! inadequate pricing policies, rural-urban migration and neglect arising 
In th~ 011 boom syndrome; (viii) the structure of policy incentives and controls encouraged import oriented 
. ,:.' ~on and consumption pattern with little incentives for non oil exports; (iXO the public sector, assisted by the 
l3enan Enterprise Promotion Decrees 1972 and 1977, became the prime mover of the economy through huge 
:,estments in social, physical and economic infrastructure. See OBADAN AND DIMOWO, supra note 69 at 83-
'18 ~ Aham Anyanwu, The Nigerian Economy Under the Structural Adjustment Programme, in EMMANUEL 
En ALI AND EPHRAIM MADU (ED), NIGERIA ECONOMY; ISSUES AND TRENDS, 5 (Acafor Books, 
. Ugu, Nigeria, 1992) 
79 
See F ALOLA, supra note 3 at 143 
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the port for more than one year before they could be unloaded. Meanwhile, the 
... :0 government continued to pay demurrage. While waiting for the unloading, the 
. ". . i.: cement turned into crystals and had to be thrown away.80 Within the same period, 
the government launched the Third National development Plan, 1975-1980, with a 
projected capital expenditure of 53.6 billion naira reflecting an increase of more 
than 1600 per cent over the Second National Development Plan, which had 
provided for a capital expenditure of3.2 billion naira. 
Political Scientists teach that people go into politics in order to control the 
machinery of government and influence its policies. In every society, such control 
to some extent entails influencing the allocation and distribution of state resources. 
In most advanced economies, individuals hardly seek political office for the reason 
of making money. Indeed, public servants are reputed not to be paid as well as 
those in comparable positions in the private sector. This is not so with the Nigerian 
scenario. The colonial administrators could have been servants of Her Majesty in 
Britain, but certainly were no servants of the people of Nigeria. They were, of 
g':i 
course, not elected by them and not answerable to them. Thus, the legacy 
(}(, 
tIUeathed to Nigerian leaders was not one of service to the people but rather that 
~'an image of leaders and government officials as maximum rulers and exploiters 
note 20 at 148-149 
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answerable to no one. The malady of corruption reared its head almost 
irnlllediately independence was obtained. The plotters of the abortive coup in 1966 
alluded to this cankerworm. They claimed that their action was aimed at the 
eradication of "ten per centers".SI The oil boom aggravated the problem of 
corruption and fed the rentier economy. A rentier economy has been described as 
one "whose major source of revenue does not arise from taxation on productive 
activities - agriculture, industry, services - undertaken by its economically active 
population. Instead, the rentier state lives by collecting a convenient income from 
sources into which it invests little or nothing. Rent comes in without opportunity 
costs, and if it comes in as centralized as in the case of oil, it is even more 
convenient from the treasury's point of view."s2 The oil boom distorted the 
incentive structure and destroyed the traditional link between industry and 
government.S3 The state was pre-occupied with distributive politics rather than a 
systematic program of wealth creation and hence, did not take seriously the issue 
of providing an enabling environment for industrialization"s4 or other more 
at Referring to the fraudulent practice whereby government officials demanded that a prospective awardee of a 
government contract should pay them ten per cent of the contract price for their own personal use and enrichment. 
82 
OOAxWel Hamiet-Sievers, Reforming the Rentier State: Some Thoughts on NEEDS, in SAM AMADI AND FRANCIS 
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productive sector. Politics or access to power became the quickest way to get rich 
and the contest for power has remained fierce and occasionally deadly. Even 
industrialists who could have driven the development of the private sector became 
caught up in the pursuit of access to the oil rent. Nearly all businessmen were in 
politics and nearly all politicians were in business.85 It was also during the decade 
from 1971 to 1980 that Nigeria embarked upon the limited nationalization of some 
foreign companies86 and the bureaucracy positioned itself to extract maximum 
rents from the exercise.87 The boom did not last long. By the 1980s the country had 
been thrown into economic crisis from which it is still trying to rise. 
In just under a decade, following the oil boom, the economy took a downturn. It is 
said that the first shock in the Nigerian economy was witnessed around 1977 and 
1978, during the first regime of Olusegun Obasanjo, but the government 
ameliorated it by introducing austerity measures and these measures coupled with 
the recovery of the world oil market ensured that Obasanjo handed a healthy 
',l economy to Shehu Shagari, who became the President of the country in 1979.88 
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lkpeze et al supra note 41 
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t'llGERIA ECONOMY: ISSUES AND TRENDS, 5,6 (Acafor Books, Enugu, Nigeria, 1972) 
32 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
The civilian administration of Shagari became even more unrestrained, than the 
militarY administration before it, in spending. That administration also marked the 
adoption of the presidential system of government, which by its very nature is 
more expensive. Dispensation of political patronage became the order of day. The 
Fourth National Development Plan, 1981-1985, was expected to be funded from 
revenue generated from the export of crude oil. 89 In 1981, there came a glut in the 
world oil market, which significantly reduced the country's earnings from oil. As a 
result, the government had to borrow money from private sources to finance the 
development plan.9O Instead of the shortfall occasioning a reduction in spending, 
the government paid no heed. Besides, elections were to be conducted in 1983, and 
the ruling party was prepared to share the oil rent in whatever manner that would 
ensure its return for a second term. Even then, signs of the recession were evident, 
as there was a scarcity of essential commodities. The government had difficulty 
raising enough money for basic government needs.91 But the administration 
attributed the problem to hoarding, "world wide" recession and the collapse in the 
international oil market. 92 Successive administrations have since been struggling to 
-
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the problem. The response of the Shagari administration was to pass the 
'~:OIlUIUAJ' Stabilization (Temporary Provisions) Act 1982. The Act introduced 
_ ..... _._"', measures by aiming to reduce public expenditures and curtailing imports. 
Act remained a statement of intention only. Governmental actions did not 
Actual expenditures continued to exceed projected 
expenditures. 93 The international fmancial market became dubious about Nigeria's 
credibility. 94 Its negotiation with International Monetary Fund (IMP) was 
., stalemated because Nigeria refused some of the conditionalities imposed by the 
IMF.95 A combination of the worsening economic condition and the farce that was 
the 1983 election96 gave the restive military the pretext, if it needed one, to 
intervene once more in the political process. A few months after winning, some 
,. would say stealing, its second term, the Shagari government was overthrown by a 
military junta led by Muhammed Buhari. 
Buhari's regime continued the austerity measures imposed by its predecessors, but 
made little headway with the international agencies. It also rejected the IMP 
t" 
Conditionalities. However, it tried to combat the cankerworm of corruption, by 
it· 
Herbst and Olukoshi, supra note 15 at 462 
l1lbid at 463 
election was characterized by allegations of massive rigging and other voting fraud. 
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launching a social program which it dubbed "War Against Indiscipline" or "WAr', 
for short. The Buhari administration lasted only twenty months, and so it is 
difficult to assess the extent to which its social crusade succeeded, but it is 
generally agreed that for the short time, it was the only real attack on clientelism in 
" Nigeria. Notwithstanding that, the economic conditions did not improve much. 
This and the excessively autocratic nature of the government generated a lot of 
dismay amongst the populace. In August 1985, another group of military officers, 
led by Ibrahim Babangida, cashed in on the disenchantment and wrested power 
from the Buhari government. 
VIII The Babangida Administration: A Readmission into the International 
Economic Fold 
Those who contend that the oil boom was a curse mostly point to the phenomenon 
of the Dutch disease to which we have already alluded. Another downside of that 
~!a is that its collapse led to the exclusion of Nigeria from the international 
::UCial fold. Shagari's government sought a facility from the IMF but did not get 
because of its rejection of the conditionalities attached. Buhari's government 
tried to get a much-needed fmancial shot in the arm from the multilateral 
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agencies to no avail. Nigeria practically became a pariah in international financial 
circles. 
It would seem that the Babangida administration, from the out set, was determined 
to reinstate Nigeria into the friendly, or unfriendly, international fmancial 
community, led by the IMF and the World Bank. The sticking points in prior 
administrations' efforts to get assistance from the IMF and other financial 
institutions had been the conditions, which the IMF imposed on such assistance. 
Most of these conditions were not palatable to a generality of the people, informed 
or uninformed. Ironically, although Babangida's government came to power by 
force of arms, it wanted to differentiate itself from its immediate predecessor, 
which had been seen as insensitive and overly dictatorial, even for a military 
administration. Where it was thought that the Buhari government did not consult 
or listen to the people, Babangida wanted to have a semblance of consultation. And 
so it happened that the vexed economic issue, of whether or not to take the IMF 
loan with its conditionalities, was thrown open, for debate, to the people of Nigeria 
to be coordinated by a committee set up by the government. 97 Three options were 
said to face the nation: (i) continue with the austerity measures which had not had 
--"a:---------
erbst and Olukoshi, supra note 15 at 472 
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much impact; (ii) adopt a structural adjustment program and take an IMF loan; or 
. " .: (iii) adopt a Nigerian variant of structural adjustment program, whatever that 
means. A field day ensued and opinions were expressed from all nooks and comers 
of the country, again some informed and some uninformed, but it was not difficult 
to fathom that the preponderance of the opinions was that of rejection of the IMP 
loan. The committee accordingly recommended a rejection of the IMF loan. The 
government interpreted the rejection of the IMP loan as an acceptance of option iii 
(the adoption of a local variant of structural adjustment). It did not seem to matter 
that the so called local variant entailed almost all the conditionalities associated 
with the IMP loan. Nigerians had spoken and the government pretended to be 
listening. It also did not matter that the IMF and the other multilateral agencies 
were now impressed and therefore willing to work with the government. In 1986 
the government formally announced the adoption of a comprehensive structural 
adjustment program (SAP) in cooperation with the World Bank and with IMP 
clearance98, thus removing any illusions about the real ownership of the program. 
But by then the nation had been sufficiently mollified by the perceived populism of 
-
'its government or was no longer interested in the complexities. Babangida also 
_·"a.lL~;;U a new method of development planning, called the rolling plan. Each plan 
and Olukoshi, Ibid at 476 
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was for a two-year period but was reviewed at the end of each year and then 
extended or rolled over for another two years. 
The main strategy of SAP included: the adoption of realistic exchange rate policy 
coupled with liberalization of the external trade and payment system; the adoption 
of appropriate pricing policies in all sectors with greater reliance on market forces 
and reduction in complex administration controls; and further rationalization and 
restructuring of public expenditure and custom tariffs.99 One of the specific 
objectives of SAP was to lessen the dominance of productive investments in the 
public sector, improve the sector's efficiency and intensify the growth potential of 
the private sector. toO It was in furtherance of this objective that the government 
embarked on privatization and commercialization of public enterprises 101 , which is 
" 
the theme of this work. Subsequent administrations have continued with the 
privatization program originally begun by the Babangida administration. Thus, the 
. }~ ~) 
-
., 
H,~ Anyanwu, supra note 78 at 6 
tf» ~ ~ers include: (i) restructure and diversify the productive base of the economy in order to reduce dependence on ~il sector and on imports; (ii) achieve fiscal and balance of payment viability over the period; and (iii) lay the 
ec
for a sustainable non inflationary or minimum inflationary growth. See Anyanwu, supra note 78 at 6 (quoting 
ntral Bank: of Nigeria Annual report and Statement of Accounts (December 1986 P.lO)) 
The Buhari administration had rejected the idea of fundamentally changing the pattern of ownership of 
parastatals and public enterprises even though it was prepared to reduce grants to them. See Herbst and 
supra note 15 at 469 
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privatization program is an offshoot of the SAP and in essence is a reversal of part 
of the profligacy of the oil boom era . 
. ;; 1 IX. THE CURRENT SITUATION 
The Babangida administration stepped aside in 1993 and was replaced by a short-
lived interim administration,102 which itself was replaced by another military 
administration headed by Sani Abacha, who later died in office and was replaced 
by yet another military general, Abdulsalam Abubakar, who organized elections in 
1999 and handed over to Olusegun Obasanjo who had earlier retired from the 
military. These administrations essentially continued with the reform efforts boldly 
initiated by the Babangida administration and indeed intensified the privatization 
component of the reform efforts. A notable development during these post 
Babangida administrations, is the upsurge in the agitation for resource allocation. 
The crude oil, which Nigeria exports, comes mainly from the Niger Delta part of 
the country. However, the resource is appropriated by the Federal government, 
. Which under a formula that has varied over time allocates part of the proceeds to 
,the states. The people of the Niger Delta began to feel deprived and to view the 
by ChiefEmest Shonekan who had been appointed by the Babangida government 
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allocation to them as insufficient since they consider their part of the country as the 
goose that lays the golden egg. The issue was recently addressed by the highest 
court in the country, the Supreme Court of Nigeria. lo3 Yet, the agitation shows no 
sign of abating and has at times turned violent and deadly. 
CONCLUSION 
Nigeria's political and economic history has been one of struggle, internal strife 
and crisis. It was welded together by the colonial over lords and has managed to 
remain together happily or unhappily. For the most part, the economy has been 
dominated by the state, principally because of the existence of a precious natural 
resource: oil. Political authority has guaranteed access to the enonttous rent from 
this resource. Such rent has not always been used frugally but instead has often 
been pillaged for personal and sometimes sectional interests, which have not 
always augured well for the betterment of the country as a whole. Such 
mismanagement resulted in a serious economic crisis, which has lasted more than a 
<l~er of a century. Various governments have approached the problem in 
ways. Finally, international financial assistance was sought and with it the 
s"'2ttorney General Federation v Attorney General Abia State & 0 thers, S.C. 28/2001, judgment delivered 
, 002 
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itnposition of several conditions. In line with the neo-liberal economic tendencies 
of the international financial institutions, these conditions require the 
disengagement of the state from active participation in the economy except to set 
.• ,j regulations and perform other functions that are inherently governmental in nature. 
Nigeria is trying to implement the reforms, one of which is the pursuit of 
privatization of state owned enterprises. 
.' ,'j 
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CHAPTER 2 
NATURE OF STATE PARTICIPATION IN THE ECONOMY 
INTRODUCTION 
Having reviewed the political and economIC history of Nigeria, as a 
background and context to the need for privatization of state owned 
enterprises, it is pertinent to explore the ideological tensions surrounding 
government involvement in the economy. The age-old controversy has been 
between advocates of robust state control of the economy, represented by the 
socialist school of thought, and the liberal school, which champions 
capitalism as the appropriate economic model. In between these is via 
medium of mixed economy. The following discussion attempts to analyze 
Nigeria's experience and to examine the conventional wisdom that Nigeria 
operates a mixed economy. One manifestation of Third World states' 
involvement in the economy is the prevalence of government owned 
enterprises. The discussion will then segue into a consideration of the origins 
of state or public enterprises in Nigeria and the rationales or objectives for 
them. 
42 
I. eAPIT ALISM 
The earliest and still extant most popular economic model is capitalism. I It 
may also be known as the liberal economic model. It is a system in which 
the means of production are mostly privately owned. By privately owned is 
meant that the means of production are not owned by the government or the 
community at large. Thus, this admits of corporate and other forms of 
business alignments. 
Capitalism is perhaps the most dominant economic model. It is at once the 
foremost and the most enduring model. In essence, it relegates the function 
of the state to provision of security and other duties that are inherently 
governmental. To Adam Smith, the father of capitalism and free market, the 
role of the state should be minimal, first because the unrestrained pursuit of 
individual interests will yield the greatest good to society, and second, 
because the state is an instrument of organized self-serving groupS.2 In a 
sense, capitalism preaches individual liberty believing that the healthy 
rivalry among individuals would augur well for the society. The so-called 
I 
See generally on capitalism, and on this subsection, 
10,2007) (visited April 
2 
See JOHN F. E. OHIORHENUAN, CAPITAL AND THE STATE IN NIGERIA, xvii (Greenwood Press, 
WestponCT, 1989) citing SMITH 17761910 THE WEALTH OF NATIONS, London: J.M. Dent) 
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theory of the "invisible hand", propounded by Adam Smith, posits that 
society is served by the tension among individuals and that the market is the 
most efficient and fairest arbitrator of resources. According to Adam Smith: 
Every individual endeavours to employ his capital so that its produce 
may be of greatest value. He generally neither intends to promote the 
public interest, nor knows how much he is promoting it. He intends 
only his own security, only his own gain. And he is in this led by an 
invisible 'hand' to promote an end which was no part of his 
intention. By pursuing his own interest he frequently promotes that 
of the society more effectually than when he really intends to 
promote it.3 
Such individuals should have unrestrained liberty to participate in the 
economy according to their abilities. Adherents of the free market economy 
attribute much of the global economic progress of the 19th century and the 
post World War II to the liberal trade system.4 Proponents argue that one of 
the greatest strengths of capitalism is its ability to self coordinate the 
complex system of wants and to assign appropriate values to goods without 
the intervention of outside forces. Transactions between buyers and sellers 
result in a price system and the price of any commodity is a measure of its 
value. Furthermore, the profit motive encourages hard work and 
entrepreneurship. There is also the attempt to link capitalism to democracy. 
3 
ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS (1776) (Quoted in TONY CLEAVER, 
UNDERSTANDING WORLD ECONOMY 13 (Routledge, London, UK, 2002) 
4 n.~. N. GAMBO, in M.E. AKOR (ED), READINGS IN CONTEMPORARY ECONOMIC ISSUES, 38 
VVlono Expressions, Jos, 1995) 
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It is believed that a country cannot really be democratic if it is not practicing 
the economic model of capitalism. How can individuals be truly free if they 
are not the ultimate arbiters of their best economic interests? Most 
democratic states are capitalist, but there have also been capitalist states that 
were not fully democratic, and the existence of the latter group would seem 
to call into question the claimed capitalism - democracy linkage. 
Capitalism as an economic model is sometimes equated with liberal 
economic theories. Yet, there are several variants of liberal economics and 
various advocates or proponents of such model. The common thread that 
runs through all of them is the primacy of the individual in the economy, 
with the state playing only a regulatory role, for "all forms of economic 
liberalism are inextricably committed to the market and price mechanism as 
the most efficient means of organising domestic and international economic 
relations. ,,5 As already mentioned, Adam Smith was the founding father of 
the capitalism doctrine. He propounded the theory in the course of his 
critique of mercantilism, the model then prevailing in Britain and Europe. 
The concept entailed a strong state, which sought to maximize its trading 
and economic interests especially against other states. He advocated the 
~-----------------
Gambo, supra note 4 at 39 
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centrality of individual liberty in the economy and accepted the laissez -
faire approach, which allowed the individual unfettered participation in the 
economy. 
David Ricardo took the principle of capitalism a step further. He argued that 
it is profitable for two parties to trade even if one of the parties is more 
efficient than the other in every type of economic production. This was the 
origin of the concept of comparative advantage. Thus society is better served 
where that state devotes its efforts towards the production of the particular 
goods in which it is most efficient.6 
The gulf between absolute doctrines and reality has always posed an 
impediment in the evaluation of political and economic doctrines. In its 
purest form, capitalism does not brook state interference. But, in reality an 
economy can hardly be left wholly to the invisible hand of the market. There 
is only so much that the market can organize. This apparent limitation was 
underscored by the great depression of the 1930s. The massive 
unemployment of that period called into question the plaudits, which 
proponents had heaped on capitalism and threatened to undercut the theory. 
6--------See note 1 
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John Maynard Keynes thus tried to ameliorate the absoluteness of capitalism 
by advocating that it was consistent with capitalism for the state to intervene 
in the economy especially to create jobs.7 To him, state intervention was not 
only inevitable but also desirable for capitalism to triumph and operate 
efficientll. In other words, it is the duty of the state and it is consistent with 
capitalism for the state to "pump prime" or jump-start the economy to avoid 
recession. The state can do this by cutting taxes and increasing governmental 
borrowing and spending during an economic downturn. His variant of 
capitalism is referred to as "welfare capitalism". It would seem that Keynes' 
version of capitalism is not easily distinguishable from the so-called "mixed 
economy" paradigm. 
On the heels of the Keynesian theory of capitalism is the neoclassical school 
of economic thought or the Chicago school represented by Milton 
Friedman.9 This school is distinguished by its adherence to the purest form 
of capitalism. Proponents argued that market economies are inherently stable 
if left to themselves and that depressions result only from governmental 
intervention. In contradistinction to Keynes, who would have the 
-------------------
7 ibid 
8 
Gambo, supra note 4 p. 41 
9 
See note I 
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government intervene in order that capitalism might function efficiently, 
Friedman and his supporters argued that the great depression resulted, not 
from the absence of governmental interference, but in fact because of the 
intervention of the Federal Reserve in the United States. 
Although dominant, capitalism has not been without criticism. Some argue 
that capitalism and free market are not synonymous and that they are in fact 
contradictory. The fulcrum of capitalism is that one individual, freely and 
voluntarily, trades with another. However, the distortions inherent in a 
capitalist economy effectively fall on one party. Anarchists are at the 
forefront of this criticism and are irked by the protection, which the very 
state that capitalism would rather exclude, afforded to individuals who own 
property. Because those who do not own property or goods have no other 
recourse, they are forced to enter into transactions with those who own. 
Thus, some argue that the decision to do so is not really free but rather 
forced. Similarly, critics rebut the perceived benefit, of incentive to work 
hard, by noting that the protection of property rights, which forces those who 
do not have such rights to buy the use of the property, discourages 
productive activities, since the property owners are led to rent seeking. In 
other words, they rely on the rents they receive, and this is a disincentive to 
48 
engage In productive activities. And this would not be ideal for any 
economy. Furthermore, capitalism is criticized on the basis that it sometimes 
leads to market failures. The optimal situation is one in which there is 
perfect competition. This capitalist utopia is not easy to attain, and 
frequently markets fail or become distorted resulting in monopolies, 
oligopolies and other anti competitive structures. The consequence is that 
resources are not efficiently allocated. 
The more prevalent critique of capitalism is that it engenders exploitation. 
This criticism emanates mostly from the left. Capitalism is founded on 
entrepreneurship, which relies mostly on labor to prosper. Thus, capitalists 
are accused of exploiting labor and not paying proper wages. However, 
proponents argue that employers and employees usually agree on the wages 
to be paid and that both parties freely enter into the transaction. But the 
others counter that because of the differing bargaining powers, the so-called 
"consent of the employees" is a farce. It is also argued that the excessive 
individualism inherent in capitalism is not fair because individuals are not 
equally endowed. Some may be privileged either by birth, inheritance or 
even natural talents. Yet they have to compete with the less advantaged 
49 
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ones. In most cases the privileged do better and the disadvantaged are 
usually worse off. This leads to social ills such as crimes. 
II. SOCIALISM 
Socialism is an economic, philosophical as well as political model. lO As an 
economic model, it advocates that the means of production and distribution 
be controlled by the people as a whole, represented by the state or the 
community. Socialism's center of gravity is the community. It views the 
individual as antithetic of the community, and the pursuit of individual 
interests as necessarily inconsistent with the common good. According to Le 
Bon: 
Socialism is certainly a reaction of the collectivity against the 
individual: a return to the past. Individualism and collectivism are, in 
their general essentials two opposing forces, which tend, if not to 
annihilate, at least to paralyse one another. In this struggle between 
the generally conflicting interests of the individual and those of the 
aggregate lies the true philosophic problem of socialism. The 
individual who is sufficiently strong to count only on his own 
intelligence and initiative, and is therefore highly capable of making 
headway, finds himself face to face with the masses, feeble in 
initiative and intelligence, but to whom their number gives might, 
the only upholder of right. The interests of the two opposing parties 
are conflicting. 11 
10'-----------------
See generally on socialism, and on this part, (Visited April 10, 
GUSTAVE LEBON, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF SOCIALISM,13-14 (Kitchener, Ontario, Canada, 2001) 
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Hence, whilst capitalists view competition among individuals as healthy, 
socialists see competition as unhealthy. Socialism is deeply suspicious of 
unbounded individual participation in the economy. It proceeds from the 
notion that economic resources are fmite and the unrestrained acquisition by 
one individual implies the corresponding diminution of the resources 
available to others. Thus, to ensure equity and equality, the state or the 
community has to arbitrate the allocation of these scarce resources according 
to individual needs. In another sense, socialism acknowledges the inherent 
disparity in abilities, intelligence and other natural endowments, and is an 
attempt to repair this imbalance. Its distinguishing feature is that it would 
assign to the state the fundamental obligation of effecting such repair. The 
state is thus to redress the imbalance of destiny by redistributing wealth.12 
And it can confiscate resources before redistributing them. 13 
Socialism was initially developed in the context of a critique of capitalism. 
Although the term was first applied to the idea in the late 1920s, the origin 
of socialism is generally traced to the French Revolution of 1789. 
According to Muravchik: 
12 
LE BON supra note 11 at 28 
13 
LE BON supra note 11 at 28 
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The manger in which socialism was born was the French Revolution, 
with its emphasis on equality, its profound anticlericalism and its 
promise that all things could be made anew. Amidst the chiliastic 
confusion of serial upheavals, one impassioned visionary, 
'Gracchus' Babeuf, proposed that the way to give substance to the 
slogan 'liberty, equality, fraternity' was to collectivize all 
rty ,,14 prope . 
Following the Revolution, certain thinkers, notably Babeuf, began to 
espouse the idea of a common ownership of the means of production. It is 
pertinent to note that from the beginning, socialism and its advocates were 
viewed with skepticism and were in fact persecuted. Maybe it was not 
persecution, as opponents would note that the means which some of the 
early advocates adopted were mainly disruptive and in certain cases 
downright criminal. For instance Babeuf and his group were accused of what 
was termed Conspiracy of the Equals, an enterprise, which was alleged to 
have included the plan to use violence to achieve their objective of 
communal ownership. 
Robert Owen and his disciples are credited with commg the term 
"socialism". And they also practically experimented the idea by establishing 
communal living in the nature of what were termed Villages of Unity and 
Cooperation. These did not prove particularly successful. Then, the famous 
14~----------------
(E lOSHUA MURAVCIDK, HEAVEN ON EARTH: THE RISE AND FALL OF SOCIALISM, 10 
nCOuuter Books, San Francisco, 2003) 
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duo of Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels stepped in to provide the idea with 
an intellectual backing and to canvass it as a crusade. Indeed, modem 
socialism has almost become synonymous with Marxism. They championed 
a brand of socialism that they regarded as scientific socialism. To Marx: and 
Engels, private property was theft. The class struggle was acute. Capital 
accumulation was destroying the middle class and enriching the wealthy; 
thus continuing to impoverish the poor. Marx: and Engels predicted that this 
dynamic of capitalism would ultimately result in two stark classes: the very 
rich and paupers. In the end, this tension or class struggle would lead to a 
social revolution in which the proletariat would rise against the wealthy. 
Such revolution would illustrate the contradiction inherent in capitalism, and 
would also correct the social distortion. 15 They considered this prognosis 
both scientific and historical. 
Several commentators note that many years after the passing of the most 
popular ideologues of socialism, their prediction of the implosion of 
capitalism has yet to materialize, and several more commentators have spent 
more time modifying or rather reinterpreting the prediction. On the contrary, 
15 
Ml1RAvcHIK supra note 14 at 70 and 95 
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countries, which have experimented with socialism, have had to abandon the 
idea in favor of a more liberal economic model. 
Just like capitalism, there are variants of socialism. At its extreme are 
anarchists who view both capitalism and the state as inseparable and as 
equally to be despised. While Marx and Engels predicted that revolution was 
inevitable, Eduard Bernstein seemed to deny such inevitability but rather 
noted that moderate socialism evidenced by "the growth of trade unions and 
democracy had vitiated the raw powers of capitalists and had ameliorated 
capitalism." 16 
Nonetheless, in the 20th Century, several countries operated systems that 
were described as socialist. These ranged from China, the Soviet Union to 
many countries of Eastern Europe and some Third World countries. It seems 
to be a universal verdict though that these countries have not faired well 
economically, and towards the end of the 20th Century they began to take 
steps to abandon the system of central or state command of the economy in 
favor of a market driven one. The most pronounced departure was of course 
16 
MDRA VCHIK supra not~ 14 at 107 
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in the Soviet Union, which had been the poster child of 20th Century 
socialism. 
The concept of socialism has been subjected to several criticisms. The most 
important critique is that collectivism inherent in socialism serves as a 
disincentive to hard work. John Stuart Mills asserts that: 
It is the common error of Socialists to overlook the natural indolence 
of mankind; their tendency to be passive, to be the slaves of habit, to 
persist indefinitely in a course once chosen. Let them once attain any 
state of existence which they consider tolerable, and the danger to be 
apprehended is that they will thenceforth stagnate; will not exert 
themselves to improve, and by letting their faculties rust, will lose 
even the energy required to preserve them from deterioration. 
Competition may not be the best conceivable stimulus, but it is at 
present a necessary one, and no one can foresee the time when it will 
not be indispensable to progress. I7 
Where one is guaranteed the provision of the necessities of life and is not at 
liberty to seek other luxuries, his incentive to work is most likely to be 
reduced. Socialists, however, argue that the propensity to laxity is checked 
by peer pressure. But critics note that even though peer pressure may work 
in a setting of a small group where the members know one another, its 
effectiveness is doubtful in a group such as country. 
17 
JOHN STUART MILL, THE PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY (Book IV, Chapter 7, 1848) 
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Similar to the criticism of disincentive to work is the argument that 
competition, which is the catalyst for development, is stifled or non-existent 
in a socialist society. This leads to stagnation of the economy. It is also 
contended that socialism is usually coupled with fixed prices. This distorts 
the standard for measuring the value of goods and services and transmits 
misleading information. Capitalists see price as a reflection of the value and 
relative scarcity of any commodity. Thus, the price of any item is an indirect 
communication to the market as to the relative scarcity of such item and 
participants in the market guide themselves accordingly_ But in a socialist 
system, the price might not bear any relation to the relative scarcity or value 
of a commodity. This may lead to chaos and distortion. 
Socialism is further pilloried on the ground that it breeds dictatorship and 
human rights abuses. Essentially, the state runs all aspects of individuals' 
lives. The state might forcibly confiscate the resources hitherto belonging to 
indiViduals and then micromanage their daily activities. This results in 
absolute dictatorship.I8 It is also argued that the historical experience of 
socialism does not really recommend the system because the few countries 
that have tried the economic model have had to abandon it. 
-------------------
18 ~ee. FRIEDRICH HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM, (Routledge, 2001) (arguing that the road to 
SOciabsm leads society to totalitarianism) 
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HI. MIXED ECONOMY 
The liberal, or capitalist, and the command, or socialist, divide represents 
two opposites, which in reality seldom exist. The tendency has been to 
characterize an economy as capitalist or as liberal if it manifests more of the 
core principles associated with that economic model, and to characterize it 
as socialist if it has more of the attributes of the latter model. Otherwise, 
what is more common is that a system would contain features of both 
economic models. Mixed economy is the concept that is ascribed to that 
system which cannot easily be pigeonholed into capitalist or socialist mold. 
Consequently, mixed economy is a form of default classification. No 
wonder, it lacks both the philosophical and ideological underpinnings and 
finesse of either capitalism or socialism. In the same vein, it is shorn of the 
passionate advocacy and advocates that have ensured the intellectual 
vibrancy and following associated with both capitalism and socialism. Yet, 
for all intents and purposes, mixed economy is not only more realistic than 
the other two models but also more sensible. An absolute divorce of the state 
from the economy is neither possible nor desirable and a complete control 
by the state of the means of production is not only unworkable but also 
57 
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inimical to the wholesomeness of the polity. Both the state and the 
individual have roles to play. 
An economy is generally described as mixed if it admits of both individual 
enterprise and government intervention in limited respects. Sometimes, too, 
government enterprises coexist and compete with private enterprises. 
N. NIGERIA: WHAT ECONOMIC MODEL? 
It appears to be an accepted notion that pre-independent Nigeria's economy 
was mercantilist. Perhaps, a better way to put it is that Britain's economic 
attitude towards its colonies, including Nigeria, was mercantilist. 19 This is 
not surprising. The motive for the colonization was exploitation and 
consequently Britain could adopt only the mercantilist model in the colonies, 
even though its own Adam Smith had criticized that economic model as far 
back as 1776. Nigeria was a colony conquered and dominated to provide 
both a source of raw materials and a market for British and European goods. 
19---------KE~ECHI AMIHE KALD, ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND NIGERIA'S FOREIGN POLICY, 36 tWin Mellon Press, Ltd., New York, 2000) (noting that mercantilism (or state managed capitalism) rather 
free markets characterized British overseas expansionism before the outbreak of the war) 
58 
t"":' 
'~: ..... ; 
,"">0:' 
-.-':Ill 
<: 
111;0,;10" 
".;all! l1li:'".,,, 
The controversy is how to characterize the economic framework of post-
colonial Nigeria. A cursory examination would reveal that the economy has 
manifested attributes of capitalism as well as some features of socialism and 
can justifiably be described as a mixed economy. Although the country 
became independent and obtained self rule, economic independence is a 
different matter. Many believe that colonialism was simply replaced by 
neocolonialism especially in the economic field. Tyokase argues that: 
The giant strides of capitalism in Nigeria have been possible because 
of the class character of the leadership. The national leadership, a 
child of colonialism and bourgeois in character did not seek to make 
a break with the exploitative nature of the political economy; instead 
driven by the zeal to reap from the spoils of the struggle for 
independence, they had no interest in abandoning an economic 
system which guaranteed their economic priviledges [sic].20 
According to Tyokase, these privileged classes have increased their power 
by the use of funds to build private financial empires and by joining foreign 
firms and multinational corporations as junior partners? I No doubt, post-
colonial Nigeria has exhibited attributes of capitalism. Besides the fact that it 
20 
C.T. Tyokase, The Political Economy of Feudalism, Capitalism and Socialism, in S.A. ADESINA, S.S. 
OGBONNA, R.A ADETORO AND C.T TYOKASE (ED), REFLECTIONS ON THE POLITICAL 
:CONOMY OF NIGERIA, 20 (Goad Educational Publishers, Abeokuta, Nigeria, 1999); See also AKIN 
ADAHUNSI, TECHNOLOGY AND THE DEVELOPMENT PROCESS: PROBLEMS AND 
PR.OSPECTS IN NIGERIA, 9 (Ahmadu Bello University Press, Ltd, 1992) (asserting that "Experience 
over the past three decades would thus suggest that for all practical purpose the major capitalist institutions 
.. the World bank, the IMF and their powerful parent bodies like the OECD, and EEC have in the main 
SI1Clce~ded in keeping the developing countries within the capitalist system - albeit as dependent neo-
CO oruaI states." 
TyOkase, supra note 20 at 20-21 
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was a legacy bequeathed by the colonialists, such predisposition has been 
strengthened by the paternalistic assistance from the West and the 
multilateral agencies over which the West maintains enormous control. To 
quote Fadahunsi, "in almost all countries of the Third World that have to 
deal with the World Bank and the IMF the deference with which officials 
from these institutions are held is such that they very often dictate policy 
options - especially to technocrats in the Ministries of Finance (Treasury) 
and the Central BankS.,,22 Cynics note that sometimes the neocolonial 
control assumes a life and death dimension.23 Such control over Third World 
economic direction was an integral part of the Cold War, as the pre-colonial 
scramble for partition of Africa was replaced by the post colonial struggle 
between the West and the Soviet Union to steer the newly independent 
countries towards capitalism or socialism, respectively. In most cases the 
22 
FADAHUNSI supra note 20 at 9 
23 
See for example Uzodinma Nwala, The Poverty of Ideology in Nigerian Development, in OKWUDIBA 
NNOLI (ED), PATH TO NIGERIAN DEVELOPMENT, 151, 161 (Codesria, Dakar, Senegal, 1981) 
(citing a 1961 statement attributed to the then Minister of Economic Development, Mallam Waziri Ibrahim, 
as fOllows : "Certain measures have been taken to introduce a socialist philosophy of economic planning in 
Certain neighbouring countries and this has resulted in the imperialists sabotaging the country. Imperialists 
have got various means of defending their monopoly. They have got their newspapers and television, and 
they go to any extent to tell lies. They can say or write any amount of untruths to discredit us. If we want 
really to set about improving our economy in any particular ways, they may say we are communists. They 
~ make our countrymen to suspect our moves. If they do not succeed by false propaganda, by calling us 
I sorts of names, if they fail to make us unpopular in order to win their case, they can arrange 
::SSinat!on. They can do it by poison or by setting our own people against us. They can go to any extent 
C out diSCrimination.") The writer also noted that the same Minister went on to assert that the charismatic 
ongolese leader Patrice Lumumba was killed because he was a real nationalist who wanted use the 
resources of the Congo for the welfare of the Congolese people as a whole. 
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West offered to help Third World countries in formulating their 
development plans all in an effort to prevent them from going socialist. 
Indeed, in 1979 by a constitution of that year, the country chose a mixed 
economy model. The drafters of that constitution considered the various 
economic models but chose the mixed economy model because of several 
factors.24 Principally, they thought that the mixed economy model was more 
consistent with the traditional ways of the Nigerian people. Besides, they felt 
it was more universal and more flexible and would better accommodate the 
state of the Nigerian nation. It would, however, seem that advocates of a 
more leftist or socialist tilt to the Nigerian economy reject the mixed 
economy model and see such description of the Nigerian economy as no 
more than a mask for what they consider unabashed capitalist mode of 
24 The reasons which the Constitution Drafting Committee gave for preferring a mixed economy were as 
follows: (i) traditionally Nigeria's ideology is and has always been a mixed economy; (2) Mixed economy 
would give a high degree of operational flexibility; (3) in point of fact the traditional Nigerian economy is 
'socialist' in certain areas while permitting individual incentive and private ownership in other areas; (4) a 
sharp distinction must be established between the ultimate goals of the state and the stages through which 
!he sate must pass in order to effectively attain those goals; (5) the pragmatic and feasible goal of the state 
IS ~~ ~ek to enhance individual welfare by providing jobs and better education, housing and health 
facilities thus raising the standard ofliving; (6)that goal is more readily attainable under a system of private 
inv,estlnent and individual entrepreneurship and this cannot be pursued simultaneously with extreme forms 
of ~co.me equalization; (7) Socialism is foreign to Nigeria and relies on paid bureaucrats of the state while 
~ltahsm depends on private entrepreneurs; Nigeria did not have the required technically trained 
. UI'eau~ts; (8) the record of socialislD in agriculture and housing is not as good as its record in heavy 
, ~es and not as good as that of capitalist West; (9) mixed economy is best because public sector plays 
~~ading role in setting prices and in mitigating the harsher effects of private competition. See Inyang 
g, Myths and Fallacies in Nigerian Development. in OKWUDIDA NNOLI (ED), PATII TO 
- ..... ~l'I DEVELOPMENT, 49, 51-52 (Codesria, Dakar, Senegal, 1981) (citing Report of the 
Drafting Committee containing the Draft Vol. 1, Section 3.7-2, p. xiii (Lagos: Federal 
ofInformation, 1976) 
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production.25 Reacting to the argument that mixed economy accords with 
the traditions of the peoples of Nigeria, Eteng argues that in no sense did the 
subsistence economies that existed before the advent of the colonialists 
exhibit characteristics of the consumptionist capitalist prototype now 
prevailing in Nigeria.26 He further contended that to designate Nigerian pre-
colonial economies as "capitalist" simply because there existed some kind of 
exchange in some kind of market based on some kind of medium of 
exchange is, therefore, to portray gross and inexcusable ignorance of the 
nature of the capitalist system.27 He further observed that "scientific 
socialism and capitalism are mutually exclusive categories; their synthesis 
into either a mixed economy or a neo welfarism is, therefore, a historical 
impossibility.28 He and his colleagues would rather view the Nigerian 
economy through the prism of classic Marxist class analysis. Thus, to 
25 
See Uzodinma Nwala, The Poverty of Ideology in Nigerian Development, in OKWUDIBA NNOLI (ED), 
PATH TO NIGERIA DEVELOPMENT, supra note 23, at 151 and 163 (stating that "the objective realities 
clearly show that 'mixed economy' is another name for capitalism.") See also T. Uzodinma Nwala, 
Ideological Dependency and the Problem of Autonomy in Nigeria, Paper read during the Workshop on 
Dependency and Underdevelopment in West Africa, organized by the Institute of African Studies, 
University of Nigeria, Nsukka, April 1978 and (cited in Uzodinma Nwala, The Poverty of Ideology in 
Nigeria Development, 163) (asserting that "the state or public sector which is regarded by the mixed 
economy theoreticians as the socialist sector is in fact established to promote private accumulation of the 
capitalist class. It is not run on socialist principles. Thus the so-called 'state enterprises' and institutions 
such as the railway, the telecommunication, the airways, mining, civil service, the army, the police, the 
public Works, etc., do not serve the interest of labour but rather serve the interest of capital. Furthermore, 
they are operated mainly by private contractors and managed by members and clients of the bourgeois 
class.") 
26 
Eteng, supra note 24 at 57 
27 
Eteng Supra note 24 at 58 
28 
Eteng supra note 24 at 64 
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Onitnode, "in Nigeria's recent history, three dominant classes have waged 
dialectical struggles that were often overt and visible, and sometimes latent 
and imperceptible. These are the imperialist bourgeoisie centered around the 
British in Nigeria, the Nigerian petty bourgeoisie which emerged as a ruling 
group after 1960, and the toiling class of workers, peasants, petty artisans, 
petty- market women and others.,,29 The colonial period witnessed the 
struggle between the imperialist bourgeoisie on the one hand, and the latter 
two classes jointly on the other hand. Post-colonial Nigeria has been marked 
by a two-cornered struggle, one between the former imperialists and the 
Nigerian bourgeoisie, and another struggle between the Nigerian bourgeoisie 
and the masses. The Nigerian bourgeoisie would always seek the help of 
either the imperialists or the masses as its particular interests and the 
particular struggle might require. 
Although, the class contradictions and struggles are present in Nigeria, it is 
doubtful if a socialist economy is the panacea. First, the history of that 
29 
P Bade Onimode, Class struggle as a reality of Nigerian Development, in OKWUDIBA NNOLI (ED), 
~~ TO NIGERIAN DEVELOPMENT, 166, 188 (Cordesria, Dakar, Senegal, 1981); He classified :tgenan petty bourgeoisie into four groups, namely (1) the bureaucratic bourgeoisie which is made up of 
Ose who control decision making and the bureaucracy in government and the corporations; (2) the 
~mprador bourgeoisie which is made made up of local indigenous agents and intennediaries of the 
tmP~rialist importers; (3) the professional bourgeoisie made up of professionals like doctors, lawyers, 
engme~rs, accountants, management executives etc; and (4) middle or lower salaried sector in the public 
and pnvate sector, who according to Onimode, should be closer to the masses but tend more toward the 
petty bourgeOiSie because of the hope to to join that class. See Onimode PP. 172-173 
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ideology has not been very impressive. As we have seen, countries that 
adopted the socialist model have had to abandon it for a market-oriented 
economy. Socialism has remained a utopia, and the reality of its application 
has been different from its almost transcendental rhetorics. Second, whilst 
undiluted capitalism might not be the traditional heritage of the people of 
Nigeria, neither is socialism. From time immemorial, traditional African 
societies admittedly were communal in outlook. This does not mean that all 
resources were pooled together, to be managed by a common administration. 
Each individual or family had its own household but every one came to the 
aid of those in need. Granted some factors of production, like land, were 
communally owned.30 The essence of the communal ownership was not that 
any proceeds from the cultivation of the land were contributed to a common 
purse. Rather, while the ownership was vested in the cotrununity, the 
usufruct could lie in any member of the community who could cultivate the 
land for their own personal benefit. 
;------------------
IanSdee Amodu Tijani v The Secretary, Southern Provinces (Holding that in traditional Nigerian society, 
belonged to the village, community or the family and not to the individual) 
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The mixed economy model is not only the reality of the Nigerian economl l , 
but also the desirable model. At the risk of reductionism, mixed economy 
simply means the availability at the same time of the features of both the 
contending ideologies of socialism and capitalism. The Nigerian scenario 
reveals an admixture of the characteristics of both. The Constitution 
recognizes the right of every citizen of Nigeria to acquire and own 
immovable property.32 Almost as a counterpoint, there is also provision in 
the laws of the country, which vest the ownership of all land in a State of the 
Federation of Nigeria in the Governor of that State to hold for the benefit of 
the people.33 This is a classic illustration of the tension between the 
individualism of capitalism and the communality of socialism. Similarly, the 
right to moveable property is also recognized, even though, just like the right 
to immovable property, such right may be compulsorily acquired provided 
31 Osaheni Victor Iyayi, Foreign Investors' Perceptions of Nigerian Public Policy on Foreign Investment, 
11" (ph,d Dissertation submitted to the Golden Gate University, San Francisco, 1988, on file in the Golden 
Gate University Library); See also ALISON A. A YIDA, REFLECTIONS ON NIGERIAN 
DEVELOPMENT, 168 (Malthouse Press Ltd., and Heinemann Educational Books (Nig) Ltd, 1987) (noting 
that Nigeria operates a mixed economy with well entrenched private sector); and PETER OLA YIWOLA, 
PETROLEUM AND STRUCTURAL CHANGE IN A DEVELOPING COUNTRY: THE CASE OF 
NIGERIA, (Praeger, NY, 1987); Emeka Ezeife, Nigeria, in ADEBAYO ADEDEn (ED), 
INDIGENIZATION OF AFRICAN ECONOMIES, 164, 171 (Hutchinson and Co. Ltd., London, 1981) 
(noting that even though the Second National Development Plan, 1970-1974, had called for the state to be 
the "commanding heights" of the economy, the situation changed with the Nigerian Enterprises Promotion 
Decrees 1972 and 1977. Under the decrees three models were considered: private sector led model, public 
sector led model and mixed model. Nigeria chose the mixed model.) 
32 See Section 43 of the 1999 Constitution of Nigeria. 
33 S . 
ternectlon 1 of the Land Use Act provides: Subject to the provisions of this Act, all land comprised in the 
. be tory. of each State in the Federation are hereby vested in the Governor of that State and such land shall 
til held m trust and administered for the use of the and common benefit of all Nigerians in accordance with 
e provisions of this Act. 
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compensation is paid and other conditions are met.34 Similarly, other forms 
of individual rights are on the books. On the other hand, as will later be 
shown, government has been heavily involved in the economy, owning its 
own enterprises and in some respects joining as partners with the private 
sector in other enterprises. The same Constitution also contains what are 
called fundamental objectives and directive principles of state policy, which 
essentially urge the State to harness the resources and operate the economy 
for the common good. Section 16 provides as follows: 
(1) The State shall, within the context of the ideals and objectives for 
which provisions are made in this Constitution: 
harness the resources of the nation and promote national 
prosperity and an efficient, dynamic and self-reliant economy; 
control the national economy in such manner as to secure the 
maximum welfare, freedom and happiness of every citizen on the 
basis of social justice and equality of status and opportunity; 
without prejudice to its right to operate or participate in areas of 
the economy, other than the major sectors of the economy, manage 
and operate the major sectors of the economy; 
without prejudice to the right of any person to participate in areas 
of the economy within the major sector of the economy, protect the 
right of every citizen to engage in any economic activities outside 
the major sectors of the economy. 
The State shall direct its policy towards ensuring: 
the promotion of a planned and balanced economic development 
that the material resources of the nation are harnessed and 
distributed as best as possible to serve the common good; 
that the economic system is not operated in such a manner as to 
permit the concentration of wealth or the means of production and 
exchange in the hands of few individuals or of a group; and 
-~s--·--------------
. ectron 44 of the Constitution 
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that suitable and adequate shelter, suitable and adequate food, 
reasonable national minimum living wage, old age care and 
pensions, and unemployment, sick benefits and welfare of the 
disabled are provided for all citizens. 
In Section 17, the State social order is founded on ideals of Freedom, 
Equality and Justice. Every citizen shall have equality of rights, obligations 
and opportunities before the law.35 The exploitation of human or natural 
resources 10 any form whatsoever for reasons other than the good of the 
community shall be prevented.36 Similar pro-socialist prescriptions are 
contained in other parts of the Constitution.37 However, these provisions are 
3$ Section 17(2)(a) 
36 Section 17(2)( d) 
" For instance section 17(3) provides: 
"The State shall direct its policy towards ensuring that-
all citizens, without discrimination on any group whatsoever, have the opportunity for securing 
adequate means of livelihood as well as adequate opportunity to secure suitable employment; 
conditions of work are just and humane, and that there are adequate facilities for leisure and for social, 
religious and cultural life; 
the health, safety and welfare of all persons in employment are safeguarded and not endangered or 
abused; 
there are adequate medical and health facilities for all persons: 
there is equal pay for equal work without discrimination on account of sex, or on any other ground 
whatsoever; 
.' children, young persons and the age are protected against any exploitation whatsoever, and against 
lD.oral and material neglect; 
provision is made for public assistance in deserving cases or other conditions of need; and 
the evolution and promotion of family life is encouraged." Similarly, Section 18 provides: 
Government shall direct its policy towards ensuring that there are equal and adequate educational 
OPPOrtunities at all levels. 
Government shall promote science and technology 
Government shall strive to eradicate illiteracy; and to this end Government shall as and when 
. provide 
..•.. free, compulsory and universal primary education; 
free secondary education; 
free university education; and 
free adult literacy programme. 
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not enforceable, and therefore even though they empower the government to 
robustly participate in the economy for the common good, no one has ever 
rnaintained an action in court to compel the government to do so. 
V. PUBLIC ENTERPRISES IN NIGERIA 
Much of the Nigerian state's participation in the context of the mixed 
economy paradigm has been through the instrumentality of State Owned 
Enterprises (SOE). A certain ambiguity or confusion attends any attempt to 
define a public enterprise or SOE. This stems from the imprecision with 
which SOEs are viewed. Some see them as business entities albeit owned by 
the government, while others view them from the perspective of the social 
functions, which they sometimes perform. Ayodele, who offers the latter 
definition, sees public enterprises as: 
"business enterprises effected with public interests, bear intimate 
connection with the process of transportation, other socioeconomic 
services and distribution; are under obligation to afford their 
facilities to the public generally upon demand at fair and non 
68 
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discriminatory rates, enjoy, in large measure, an independence and 
freedom from business competition brought about by their 
acquisition of monopolistic status or by grant of a franchise or 
certificate from the state placing them in this position.,,3& 
On the other hand, Tanzi sees public enterprises as "organizations whose 
primary function is the production and sale of goods and/or services and in 
which government or other government controlled agencies have an 
ownership state [ sic] that is sufficient to ensure their control over the 
enterprises regardless of how actively that control is exercised.,,39 
Zeckhauser and Murray Hom see them as business enterprises owned by 
government.40 On the other hand, a private enterprise is one, which is 
privately owned and controlled by the market. 41 Public enterprises have 
38 Sesan Ayodele, Public Enterprises Reforms in Nigeria, in I.B. BELLO-IMAM, A.A. ADUBI AND A.A. 
FAJINGBESI (EDs), PERSPECTIVES ON NATIONAL ECONOMIC MANAGEMENT AND 
~MlNISTRATION IN NIGERIA, 128 (NCEMA, Ibadan, 2004) 
See AyodeJe, supra note 38 at 128 
40 See Richard J. Zeckhauser & Murray Horn, The Control of State-Owned Enterprises, in PAUL W. 
MACAVOY & ORS, (ED), PRNATIZATION AND STATE OWNED ENTERPRISES, 7, 9-11, Kluwer, 
Boston, (1989) (quoting Aharoni (1986 P.6) to the effect that SOEs have three distinguishing 
characteristics: "First... they must be owned by the government. Second ... (they) must be engaged in the 
Production of goods and services for sale... Third, sales revenues of SOEs should bear some relationship to 
cost.") Although this is not a definition of art, it does underline the requirement that an SOE to be such 
must of course belong to the public and must at the barest minimum aim to do business even if profit 
~ is not the sole objective. The Nigerian Bureau of Public Enterprises defines a SOE as 
&!ove~ent-owned or government controlled economic entities that generate the bulk of their revenues 
• 111 ~lling goods or services. It may also include enterprises established to provide commercial activities 
~~~h government controls management by virtue of its ownership stake. It encompasses enterprises 
-_uy or indirectly through other federal and state government entities." See bpeng.org 
41 
c,pSonny Nwankwo, Privatization and Organizational Taxonomy: The Case of the National Enterprise, in 
. RAo (ED), GLOBALIZATION, PRNATIZATION AND FREE MARKET ECONOMY, 28,31 
(Greenwood Publishing Group, Inc., Westport, CT, USA, 1998) (also noting that: "two crucial factors have ~ applied in explaining the private enterprise: (1) ownership and (2) management of benefits 
anadham, 1984). The crucial point of the private enterprise is that the organization and its 
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three defining characteristics. They are government owned and controlled, 
are engaged in commercial activities and also have sociopolitical goals 
alongside the primary economic goals.42 Ramanadham 43 has tried to analyze 
the public and commercial aspects of a public enterprise. He notes that three 
elements are encapsulated in the word "public". First, it means the non-
private accretion of the net benefits. In other words, the proceeds, profits or 
capital appreciation of the enterprise do not go to the enrichment of a private 
group of individuals standing in the position of owners. Second, it involves 
public decision-making so that entrepreneurial and other major decisions are 
made at some public level devoid of personal interest. Finally, it involves 
social accountability, thus the public enterprise has to be accountable to the 
public for its performance.44 On the notion of enterprise, Ramanadham 
identifies two components, (i) financial viability and (ii) cost price 
equation.45 He implies that a synthesis of the two concepts, "public" and 
"enterprise", is required for an entity to qualify as "public enterprise." He 
Ill8Dagement are solely answerable to the owners via the board of directors. As a consequence, management 
activities reflect the supremacy of shareholders' interests.") 
42 
Sonny Nwankwo, supra note 41 at 31 
., 
• EnSee V.V. RAMANADHAM, THE NATURE OF PUBLIC ENTERPRISE, 5-19 (Croom Helm, Kent, 
gland, 1984) 
44 
, RAMANADHAM, THE NATURE OF PUBLIC ENTERPRISE, supra note 43 at 15-19 
'''RAMANADHAM, THE NATURE OF PUBLIC ENTERPRISE, supra note 43 at 15-19 
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argues that an excessive shift towards "public" would make the entity what 
he calls a "public non-enterprise", while an excessive shift towards 
"enterprise" would result in what he terms a "non-public enterprise.,,46 The 
difficulty associated with the private -public dichotomy has also led to a 
suggestion that a third variant be included in the categorization.47 But the 
prevalent model has been the categorization of enterprises into private and 
public ones. A narrow definition of SOEs would require that they be owned 
by the government and be run as business ventures. While many SOEs 
engage in business activities, a prescription of profit motive would exclude 
many such entities because there are some which perform socioeconomic 
functions even though they are ostensibly business oriented. This is the 
contradiction that is at the root of the criticisms and reservation toward 
SOEs. Yet, much of the literature take a broad view of SOEs, and some 
writers include agencies, which perform regulatory aspects ofbusiness.48 
46 RAMANADHAM, THE NATURE OF PUBLIC ENTERPRISE, supra note 43 at 15-19 
47 
See Sonny Nwankwo, supra note 41 (arguing that the test of ownership might not fully capture the 
~nce of an enterprise as there might be enterprises privately owned but publicly controlled, just as there 
mIght be enterprises publicly owned but privately controlled; He therefore suggests the concept of a 
"national enterprise", which he defines as an "enterprise that is privately owned but still publicly controlled 
or PUblicly owned but controlled primarily by the market." See P. 33) 
48 
. See for example, Adebayo O. Olukoshi, The Historic Significance of the Policy of Privatisation in 
Nigeria, in R. OMATAYO OLANIYAN AND CHIBUZO N. NWOKE (EDs), STRUCTURAL 
~JUSTMENT IN NIGERIA, 103, 107-108 (Nigerian Institute of International Affairs, Lagos, 1989) 
(Identifying four broad groups of public enterprises in Nigeria, as follows: (1) those that could be described 
as public utilities; (2) those that can be described as financial institutions; (3) those that could be described 
b
as commercial and industrial companies; and (4) those that carry out regulatory duties or act as service 
oards) 
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The origin or development of SOEs in Nigeria dates back to the colonial 
period. It has been noted that pre-colonial Nigeria was essentially pre-
capitalist and the colonial authorities were faced with the task of 
commencing the process of capital accumulation.49 One way of dealing with 
this situation was the introduction, by the colonial authorities, of certain 
agencies for consolidating the colonial economy.50 The Public Works 
Department and the Native Authority were some of the agencies responsible 
for the provision of roads, installation of electricity generators and provision 
of pipe borne water/I while concerns such as coal mines at Enugu, saw mills 
at Ijora and stone quarry at Aro were some of the early public enterprises 
during the colonial period. 52 
49 
Olukoshi, supra note 48 at 105-106 
so 
Olukoshi supra note 48 at 106 
Sl 
OlukoShi, supra note 48 at 106 
S2 
L Tom Forrest, State Capital, Capital Development and Class Formation in Nigeria, in PAUL M. 
UBECK (ED), THE AFRICAN BOURGEOISIE: CAPITALIST DEVELOPMENT IN NIGERIA, KE~A AND THE IVORY COAST 307, 309 (Lynne Rennier Publishers, Boulder, CO, 1987); Other 
:tities were the West Africa Produce Control Board, which were later reorganized to create marketing 
ards, the Nigerian Government Collieries, and the West African Currency Board. See Olukoshi supra 
llote 48 at 106 
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Following World War II and the increased tempo of the agitation for 
independence, the colonial government increased its welfare and 
I . h 53 developmenta programs 10 t e country. 
Thus the 1950s saw the establishment of many federal statutory 
corporations. 54 After independence more corporations were created. And the 
end of the civil war, in 1970, with the consequent need for reconstruction 
coupled with the oil boom of the 1970s led to an explosion in public 
enterprises and the public sector. 55 It has been asserted that during the 1960s 
and 1970s, SOEs became the rule rather than the exception in sub-Saharan 
Africa.56 This would appear to be the direct consequence of the nationalistic 
and independent fervors that were prevalent in that part of the world at that 
33 Olukoshi supra note 48 at 106 
54 These included the Electricity Corporation of Nigeria (1951); the Nigerian Coal Corporation (1951); The 
Railway Corporation (1955); the Nigerian Ports authority (1955); the Nigerian Broadcasting Corporation 
(1958); and the Nigerian Airways (1959). See Forrest supra note 52 at 313 
5S Forrest notes that: "in the 1970s, the range of public corporations and companies was extended with the 
addition of the Nigerian National Oil Corporation (1971), the Nigerian Steel Development AuthOrity 
(1971), the Nigerian Mining Corporation (1972), the Nigerian National Supply Company (1972), the 
N~tional Freight Company (1976), the National Cargo Handling Company (1977), and the Nigerian 
Airports Authority (1978)." 
56 ERNST & YOUNG, PRIVATIZATION: INVESTING IN STATE OWNED- ENTERPRISES 
AROUND THE WORLD, 35 (John Wiley & Sons, Inc., NY, 1994); See also Peter M. Lewis, State, 
EcPQonomy, and Privatization in Nigeria, in EZRA SULEIMAN & JOHN WATERBURY (ED), THE 
LInCAL ECONOMY OF PUBLIC SECTOR REFORM AND PRIVATIZATION, 211 (1990) W~ew Press, Boulder (noting that throughout the 1950s and 60s Nigerian government's economic role 
Wbyas tnt~entionist and tutelary, but limited to the state acting as a "catalyst" for private sector development 
creatmg the physical, institutional and fmancial environment for economic progress, but that this 
changed with the military intervention in 1966 and as result the 1970s witnessed a strategy of defacto state 
capitalism. 
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time.57 Indeed, Nigeria's Second National Development Plan, for 1970 -
1975, called for the state to assume the "commanding heights" of the 
economy. 58 This plan was followed in 1972 by the government's 
implementation of a nationalization program under which some foreign 
owned companies were indigenized.59 Although the shares in the 
nationalized enterprises were available to and acquired by the private sector, 
the result of the exercise was the co-existence of state and private enterprises 
in the economy. If sub-Saharan African states embraced direct state 
interference and participation in the economy, the embrace appeared 
warmest in Nigeria, and it is claimed that by 1990, the country possessed the 
largest public enterprise sector in sub-Saharan Africa and one of the most 
troubled.60 The growth of the public sector and of SOEs may be a result of 
57 ERNST & YOUNG supra note 56; See also Thomas M. Gallaghy & Ernest James Wilson III, Africa: 
Policy, Reality, or Ritual, in RAYMOND VERNON (ed), THE PROMISE OF PRIVATIZATION; A 
CHALLENGE FOR US POLICY, 179-230 at 183 (1988) (Council on Foreign Relations) (attributing the 
pronounced state involvement in enterprises to a fall out of the anti colonialist efforts which were in 
essence anti capitalist and pro SOCialist) 
SSl . 
eWlS, supra note 56 at 213 
59 
See the Nigerian Indigenization Decree 1972. 
!iOLeWis, supra note 56 at 210-233; Lewis puts the number of such enterprises at 900 as of 1990. Callaghy fd Wilson indicate that Nigeria had 107 SOEs in 1981, 36 of which were wholly owned and represented 
3.6.per cent of the 107 SOEs. See Callaghy & Wilson, supra note 57 ... at 184; The number of the SOEs 
~~ued to rise in the 1980s and 1990s. By 1993, there were 1500 SOEs. See Nigeria Federal Public 
-r:"~iture, World Bank Report No. 14447 UNI March 1996 P. 65 (quoting Technical Committee on ~vatizat~o~ and Commercialization: Final Report of Technical Committee on Privatization and 
n!..mtnerclahzation, May 1993); See also W.A. Isola, Privatization, in M. ADEJUGBE (ED), 
c~SPECTlVES ON NIGERIA'S FLEDGLING FOURTH REPUBLIC, 80 (Malthouse Press, Ltd., Lagos, 
(noting that: ''the country has a large public enterprise sector, which expanded very rapidly as a 
197 of the implementation of the Indigenisation Decrees of early 1972 and 1977, and the oil boom of the 
. 0 thrQugh 1980. With this development, an increasingly dominant Public Enterprises (PEs) Sector 
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the nationalization of a number of companies in a particular industry or the 
transformation of a government department into a public enterprise; 
acquisition of equity in a profitable enterprise; or setting up of a fresh public 
• 61 
enterpnse. 
VI. OBJECTIVES OR RATIONALE FOR STATE OWNED 
ENTERPRISES 
As we have seen, the provenance of SOEs was founded in the need to fill a 
gap, which had existed in the economy. With the nigh absence of a vibrant 
private sector during the colonial era and the period immediately thereafter, 
the state had to take on the task of laying down the basic conditions, 
including the provision of the necessary infrastructure, to support the 
development of capital. 62 It has also been noted that public ownership has 
most commonly been viewed as a response to market failure and the failure 
accounting for about 50% of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and 60% of the modem sector/source 
employment had emerged in Nigeria by 1980s, (FRN, 1986). Concurrently, the number of PEs at the 
federal level was about 600 enterprises and some 900 smaller ones at the state and local government levels 
(TCPC 1993)."); According to the World Bank by 1990, Nigeria's public enterprise sector (at both the fed~ral and state levels) accounted for 30 to 35 percent of GDP (excluding petroleum-related parastatals, 
which aCcounted for 15 percent and one fifth of modem sector employment). See Nigeria- Structural 
Adjustment Program: Policies, Implementation, and Impact,30 (World Bank Report, May 1994) 
61 ~s. Mikaila, PrivatisationiCommercialisation and Nigeria Economy, in EMMANUEL E. UMEBALI 
B EPHRAIM N. MADU (EDs), NIGERIA ECONOMY: ISSUES AND TRENDS, 26, 28 (Acafor 
ooks, Enugu, Nigeria, 1992) 
62 
Olukoshi Supra note 48 at 104 
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of the private market to secure efficient outcomes.63 It is thus ironic that 
SOBs are being turned to the market for the same reason that they were 
formed. Broadly, the role of SOEs has been categorized into four groupS.64 
First is the provision of necessary environment and support for capital 
accumulation. Essentially, they provide aids to trade and commerce by the 
construction and management of infrastructure like roads, railways, harbors 
and other necessary infrastructure. Secondly, they promote local capital 
accumulation by giving loans to the private sector. An unintended aspect of 
the SOEs, especially in the developing world, has been the facilitation of 
primitive capital accumulation. By this is meant the corruption in the manner 
of kickbacks and other untoward practices through which some SOEs enrich 
certain individuals. It is noteworthy that some of the captains of industry in 
the private sector were formerly heads of SOEs. It is not far-fetched to 
speculate that they accumulated the capital with which they started or 
improved their private sector enterprises through the SOEs. 
Thirdly, it is noted that SOEs perform the function of regulating the 
accumulation process itself, so as to attempt to correct the manifestations of 
63 
RICHARD HEMMING AND ALI M. MANSOOR, PRIVATIZATION AND PUBLIC ENTERPRISES, 
3(IMF, Washington Dc, 1988) 
64 
Olukoshi supra note 48 at 109 
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uneven development at both sectoral and regional levels.65 This is an 
especially important function. Due to scarcity or paucity of private capital, 
the private sector might not be able or willing to invest in certain sectors of 
the economy or in certain parts of the country. Thus, SOEs fill the void. The 
fourth role that SOEs perform is the provision of social services.66 This is 
the most popular role and one with which SOEs are most often identified. 
The National Electric Power Authority provides electricity in Nigeria while 
NITEL was at one time the only enterprise providing telephone services in 
N· . 67 1gena. 
While the above roles properly belong to SOEs, it is also true that some of 
them were formed without adequate consideration of their place in the macro 
economy, but purely out of political considerations or as a source of 
6S Olukoshi supra note 48 at 109~1l1; see also JEROME UDOJI, WHICH WAY NIGERIA?, 157~159 
(Spectrum Books, Ibadan, 1999) (noting that upon independence, the wealth of the country was still in the 
~ds of foreigners and the politicians needed to do something. They had to take control and one way of 
do~ that was by public corporations especially since private firms could not go into some sectors which 
reqUITed large capital and infrastructure.) 
~ Olukoshi, supra note 48 at 109~1l1; See also GAMALIEL ONOSODE, THREE DECADES OF 
1 ONOMIC DEVELOPMENT CRISIS IN NIGERIA - ESSAYS, 146~ 157 (Malthouse Press, Ltd., Lagos, 
993); See also MEHDI HARIRIAN, STATE OWNED ENTERPRISES IN A MIXED ECONOMY; 
MICRO VERSUS MACRO ECONOMIC OBJECTIVES, 127 (Westview Press, Boulder CO, 1989) (~~g that"one of the reasons for creating SOEs in mixed economies is to achieve the ends of 
SOcIalIsm, yet retain the framework of capitalism") 
67 
Sometimes the social policy aims and distributional objectives are widened to include creation of 
. ~~?yment and prevention of rising unemployment. See RICHARD HEMMING AND ALI M. 
UU\1~SOOR, PRIV ATIZA nON AND PUBLIC ENTERPRISES, 34 (IMF, Washington, DC 1988) 
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68 patronage. 
VII. PERFORMANCE OF SOES IN NIGERIA 
Although the SOEs perform important functions, the verdict is that they are 
wasteful and hardly make any gains. While these shortcomings or failures 
were largely ignored during the oil boom period because the country had 
enough resources to continue to subsidize the SOEs, the economic 
depression of the 1980s and 1990s laid bare the reality that the country has 
not received much return from its huge investments in the public sector.69 
Many have noted that although the public sector in Nigeria has been 
considerably large it has also been largely unproductive in relation to the 
sizeable investments undertaken.70 Several factors account for such 
6& 
See A Etukudo, Issues in Privatization and Restructuring in Sub-Saharan Africa (Interdepartmental 
Action Programme on Privatization, Restructuring and Economic Democracy, Working Paper IPPRED-5) 
International Labor Organization, bttp;//www.ilo.orglpubliclEnglish/employmentientipapers/ippredS.htm 
Oast visited march 26, 2007); See also ISHRAT HUSAIN, PERSPECTIVES ON THE NIGERIAN 
E~ONOMY, 142 (NIIA, Lagos, 1987) (asserting that: "many public enterprises are established at the 
~l whim of a minister or of a donor without due consideration of economic and fmandal viability.") 
"D~::e Nigeria - Federal Public Expenditure, World Bank Report No 14447, UNI March 1996 (World 
--, West Central Africa Dept, Country Operations Division P. 66 
70 
Ex See ~ikaila supra note 61 at 28 ; see also Isola supra note 60 at 80; Nigeria - Federal Public 
;Pendlture, World Bank Report No 14447, UNI March 1996 (World bank, West Central Africa Dept, 
Country Operations Division P. 69 (noting that the returns from the considerable investments in the SOEs ~ve been negligible both in tenns of dividends and debt service on loans); Nigeria- Structural Aqjustment 
f o~am: PoliCies, Implementation, and Impact, 30 (World Bank Report, May 1994) (noting that "in tenns 
o ~ect investment and impact on the overall economy (most notably in its failure to deliver adequate ::c s~rvices and its displacement of the private sector from profitable activities) sector performance has 
Ullifonnly poor. Most of the Government's large-scale capital projects have not proved cost effective: 
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perceived dismal performance. First, if the measure of performance is only 
the amount of profit made, many SOBs are inherently primed to fail in so far 
as their raison d' etre is essentially social and not commercial. Secondly, 
even where a SOE would ordinarily do well, it is impeded by the pervasive 
corruption of its managers. Thirdly, it has been noted that sometimes the 
objectives for which a SOB is established are not clearly defined, while 
some projects are non-viable.71 Besides, sometimes there are bureaucratic 
and political interference and political patronage.72 Similar to these are the 
twin problems of lack of managerial and financial autonomy and lack of 
financial responsibility and accountability.73 
Yet, SOEs are not without defenders. Many suggest that in criticizing SOEs 
one should remember their origin. They were initially introduced by the 
colonial powers to prop up capital base for the private sector.74 As Lubeck 
has observed, "although the contradictions and costs attributable to 
they use inappropriate technologies, are built in the wrong locations, have long completion delays, and are 
overcharged by foreign suppliers.") 
7\ UDon supra note 65 at 160 
72 
unoJI supra note 65 at 160 
73 
DDOJI supra note 65 at 160 
74 O~~iba NnoIi, Introduction: The Intellectual Aspects of the Struggle for Nigerian Development, in 
1981) IBA NNOLI (ED), PATH TO NIGERIAN DEVELOPMENT, 1-5 (Codesrla, Dakar, Senegal, 
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inefficient state intervention are real enough, it is ironic that these same 
international agencies and former colonial powers introduced the very state 
agencies that are now the object of scom.,,75 Others ask for a balanced 
assessment of SOEs, taking into account their peculiar circumstances and 
not rush to compare them with the private sector using the profit standard.76 
Indeed, it has been argued that the failures of SOEs are those of the private 
sector because most SOEs' activities are performed by the private sector to 
which they are contracted.77 This is of course an aspect of the corruption 
malady. 
7S PAUL LUBECK, THE AFRICAN BOURGEOISIE: CAPITALIST DEVELOPMENT IN NIGERIA, 
KENYA AND THE IVORY COAST, 247 (Lynne Rennier Publishers, Boulder, CO, 1987); See also 
Olukoshi supra note 48 at III (noting that public enterprises played a major role in the emergence of the 
Nigerian domestic bourgeoisie and that it is significant that this class which relied heavily and directly on 
the state during its formative years should be at the forefront of the calls for privatization) 
76 
See ONOSODE supra note 66 at (arguing that, "criticism of our public enterprises is of mixed validity. 
Some of it is patently unfair having been born of ignorance of the nature of the political and social 
constraints within which they function. Some of these criticisms should, in fact, be directed at the 
machinery of government and the nature, extent and effectiveness of ministerial control over the operations 
8Ildatrairs of these enterprises.") See also HARIRIAN, supra note 66 at 128 (arguing that: "the comparison 
of fInancial accounts between private enterprises and SOEs cannot be used as a reliable measure for 
performance evaluation because such profitability comparisons are misleading and irrelevant. the use of 
SUCh a measure results in demonstrable biases against SOEs. Financial accounts consist of cardinal numbers 
that fiIil to consider the characterics and nature of SOE objectives. Comparisons and tradeoffs among 
. competing goals are often necessary. The evaluation of SOEs' performance should, therefore, be based 
Upon a goal attainment model, rather than solely on financial viability.") 
'/'IN Ii Pub ~o supra note 74 at 5 (asserting that: "most of its activities are now performed by private contractors. 
, hc enterprises now hardly execute any of their projects with their own personnel. How then can the ~ ,of their projects be blamed on them rather than the private contractors who execute them? Public 
-:'--Znses merely retain the form but not the substance of their previous existence. Their failures are today 
~lures of the private sector.") 
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CHAPTER 3 
MEANING AND RATIONALE FOR PRIVATIZATION 
I. MEANING OF PRIVATIZATION 
It is always ideal to define concepts involved in any study. This serves a 
two -fold function. First, it delimits the scope of the inquiry and secondly, it 
;,,; clarifies the perspective from which such concepts are viewed. But, as with 
; .... , 
, .,'," 
every attractive option, there are usually difficulties in circumscribing a 
study's understanding of concepts. Defmitions are not always easy for they 
require exceptional art and dexterity to delineate the contours of a concept 
while ensuring that such concept does not become too narrow and technical. 
This difficulty is especially pronounced in the case of an issue that dovetails 
into several disciplines. Privatization is a concept essentially suffering from 
a crisis of identity. Is it an economic, social, legal or political concept? The 
answer is that it straddles all the aforementioned theoretical and practical 
landscapes. It touches on the organization of the productive sources of 
SOCiety and as such is economic. It implicates the relationship between the 
government and the people as well as the relationship among the people, and 
as such is social. It addresses the jural correlatives of ownership, control and 
POWer and also impacts the corporate laws of a country. Consequently, it is 
also legal. It is political because it is also concerned with the role of the 
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government in the society. Accordingly, it is susceptible to defmition from 
all these perspectives. And there has not been a shortage of attempts at such 
definitions. Hence, the literature reveals that privatization can be defined 
broadly or narrowly.l 
In a broad sense, privatization has been seen "as a term which covers several 
distinct and possibly alternative means of changing the relationship between 
the government and the private sector.,,2 It is thus seen as a generic term 
covering a range of policies, which seek to alter the ownership structure and 
management of the economy away from the government to the private 
sector.
3 Wiezsacker, Young and Finger view privatization as referring to all 
initiatives designed to increase the role of private enterprises in using 
society's resources and producing goods and services by reducing or 
restricting the roles of governments or public authorities in such matters.4 To 
them, these initiatives include, but are not limited to, transfer of property or 
I Tamar Frankel, Symposium: A Recipe for Effecting Institutional Changes to Achieve Privatization: 
Forward, 13 B.U. Int'} L. 1. 295 (1995); Ronald A. Cass, Macro-Economic Changes from Centralized to 
Market Economies: Big Bang Gradual Change: The Optimal Pace of Privatization, 13 B.U. Int'} L. 1. 413 (1995) 
2 
W.A. Isola, Privatization, in M. ADE ADEJUGBE, PERSPECTIVES ON NIGERIA'S FLEDGLING F~URTH REPUBLIC, 80, 81 (MALTHOUSE Press Ltd, Lagos, 2002) (citing 1. Kay and O. Thompson, 
Pnvatization a Policy in Search of a Rationale, Economic Journal Vol. 96 PP.16"32, 1986) 
3 
Isola, supra note 2 at 82 
4 
(EEmt Ulrich von Weizsacker, Oran R. Young and Matthias Finger, in ERNST U von WEIZSACKER 
T D), LIMITs TO PRIVATIZATION: WHEN A SOLUTION BECOMES A PROBLEM, 4 (Earthscan, 
Otonto, Canada, 2005) 
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property rights, partial or total, from public to private ownership. They 
would also include purchase of goods or services by the government from 
the private sector and the granting of licenses, permits, franchises, leases or 
concession contracts by the government to the private sector even though 
ownership remains in the public.5 But they would exclude deregulation from 
the purview of privatization, even though the latter often comes with the 
former. 6 On the other hand, Professor Rose would attach the label of 
privatization generally to "governmentally sponsored efforts to move assets 
and economic decision-making away from the political arena and into the 
hands of individuals or private corporations 7 and would include such 
initiatives as recognition, deregulation, divestment and enablement.8 In one 
sense, it is said to be "an array of actions designed to broaden the scope of 
private sector activity, or the assimilation, by the public sector, of efficiency 
enhancing techniques generally employed by the private sector.,,9 This 
s 
WEIZ8ACKER, supra note 4 at 4 
6 WEIZSACKER supra note 4 at 4 
, 
Carol Rose, Privatization- The Road to Democracy?, 50 8t Louis L.J. 691(2006) 
8 
Rose Supra note 7 at 694 
9 
hMark.Baker, Privatization in the Developing World: Panaceafor the Economic Ills of the Third World or 
A escnption Overused?, 18 N.Y.L. 8ch. J. Int'l & Camp. L. 233,237,238 (1999) (quoting Christopher 
dam et at, ADJUSTING PRIVATIZATION: CASE STUDIES FROM DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, 6 (}~~); Ersnt & Young see privatization as a process and not an event, and note that it applies to all kinds 
~~ public -private ventures. See ERN8T & YOUNG, PRIVATIZATION: INVESTING IN STATE 
D- ENTERPRISES AROUND THE WORLD, 4 (John Wiley & Sons, Inc., NY, 1994) 
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definition is broad enough to include not only government's divestment of 
its interest in any or all enterprises, but also every conscious effort 
undertaken by the government to reform its public sector and make it more 
efficient. tO Understood in this way, privatization should be a constant in the 
political economy of every state. This is because no state would admit that it 
is not taking measures to make its public sector as efficient as possible. The 
dispute has never been on the need for optimization of public enterprises. It 
is always on the best way to achieve that result. There are myriad other 
definitions of privatization. 11 
In a narrow context, privatization has been defined as "a transfer of 
10 See also ERNST & YOUNG, supra note 9 (asserting that privatization is a process not an event); Thomas 
M. Callaghy and Ernest James Wilson Ill, African Policy, Reality or Ritual, in RA YMOND VERNON, 
(ED), TIlE PROMISE OF PRNATIZATION: A CHALLENGE FOR US FOREIGN POLICY, 180 
(Council on Foreign Relations, 1988) (asserting that: "in its broader sense, privatization is the introduction 
of greater market rationality or competitiveness into an arena of economic activity.") 
11 Se for example, Coskun Can Aktan, An Introduction to the Theory of Privatization, 
privatization.pdf&w=coskun+aktan+rationale+privatization&d=G7Y eMvmdOsCb&icp= 
l&.intl=us (stating that: "Privatization is frequently used referring to the sale of a 
publicly owned enterprise (POE)'s asset or shares to the individuals or a private firms. 
However, this definition gives only a narrow meaning of privatization. In broader 
ll1eaning, it refers to restrict government's role and to put forward some methods or 
~licies in order to strengthen free market economy. The former meaning of 
pnvatization, i.e. the sale of a POE's assets or shares to the private sector is mostly called 
;denationalizationll); Anthony Bennett, The Measurement of Privatization and Related 
~sues, in V.V. RAMANADHAM, HOW DOES PRNATIZATION WORK?: ESSAYS 
(RN PRIVATIZATION IN HONOUR OF PROFESSOR V.V. RAMANADHAM, 3, 4 
Outledge, Florence, KY, USA, 1997) 
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ownership and control from the public to the private sector, with particular 
reference to asset sales. It is therefore equated with total or partial 
denationalization." 12 In this context, it is viewed as "the transfer from the 
public to the private sector of ownership and/or control of productive 
assets.,,13 It is the sale of a government-operated enterprise to the private 
sector.14 It would seem that the narrower definition is more legal while the 
broader definition is more economic. Thus, the former focuses on the legal 
consequence of privatization whereas the latter captures its social and 
economic benefits. 
12 RICHARD HEMMING AND ALI M. MANSOOR, PRIV ATIZA nON AND PUBLIC ENTERPRISES, 
1 (lMF, Washington, DC 1988) 
13 Id; See also Stephanie R. Nicolas, Privatizing South Africa's Industries: The law and Economics of a 
New Socialist Utopia, 30 Law & Pol'y Int'l Bus. 721 (1999) (defining privatization as ''the sale ofa state-
owned business to entities other than the state."); Yuliya Mitrofanskaya, Privatization as an International 
Phenomenon: Kazakhastan, 14 Am. U. In1'I L. Rev. 1399, 1404 (1999) (quoting Andrei A. Baev, Civil Law 
and the Transformation of State Property in Post-Soviet Economies: Alternatives to Privatization, 12 
UCLA. Pac. Basin LJ. 131, 150 (1993) to the effect that privatization is "the single act of transferring (by 
. lIleans of buying and selling) the legal title of State property, which was in the possession of State 
enterprises for restricted purposes of producing certain goods under owner-State control, to individual or 
associated owners"; Callaghy and Wilson, in VERNON, (ED), supra note 10 at 180 (stating: "narrowly 
defined, privatization is any action that serves to dilute or eliminate government equity ownership or 
lllanagement control of an enterprise.") 
14 
to F~el Supra note 1 at 295; See also Cass supra note I (defming it as ''the sale of a state-owned business 
Sa~les other than the state"); Maxwell o. Chibundu, Law and Political Economy of Privatization in Sub-
. r:n 1fi'ica, 21 Md. J. Int'l L. & Trade 1.. .. (noting that "in the most commonly idealized image of 
:vatization, a state divests itself completely of all interests in a commercial venture, and relegates its 
volvement in the affairs of the entity solely to that of an impartial regulator, leaving it to the ingenuities 
profit-maximizing entrepreneurs to create national wealth.") see also Emeka Theme, The Legal 
of Privatization in Nigeria, in EZE ONYEKPERE (ED), READINGS ON PRlV ATIZA nON, 1 
EconOmic Rights, Lagos, 2003) 
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The narrow meaning of privatization is also not without complexity. If 
divestment is the essence of privatization, then how does one categorize the 
broader efforts, which diminish or eliminate the role of the state in an 
enterprise? Yet, some economies have an adjunct to privatization, which 
they regard as commercialization and by which effort is made to ensure that 
an enterprise is run purely on business basis and subject to market forces. 
Similarly, certain divestments are subject to the government retaining what 
are called "golden shares" 15 , which enable the government to intervene in 
the enterprise and to exercise what essentially is a veto over legitimate 
managerial decisions. 16 But from a legal perspective the narrow definition is 
preferable. Privatization presumes the existence of an enterprise owned 
wholly or partly by the government. The act of the government in divesting 
itself of such ownership is privatization. It is also possible that government 
does not transfer all its part or whole ownership. This raises the further 
problem of how to categorize the resulting enterprise. Does a sale which 
results in an enterprise in which the government and a private entity have 
interests still constitute privatization? Does it matter who controls the 
enterprise? Does it matter who has a majority of the shares? These are all 
nuances and complexities to which a strict defmition of privatization, as a 
--------------------ISCbj bundu supra note 14 
16 Cbib undu supra note 14 
86 
, 
.. ,.' 
"0-' 
"'\.' \, .. , 
f;JJl ";!. -fl.; 'j~l 
~~:»j.,~.r,. 
Iili'A",,~.?'~J~: 
t:i':.fr.' .~ ,'1 
~~~:~;~t;, 
if 
sale of government shares in an enterprise, is subject. But these nuances 
need not detain us. For the purpose of this work, we will regard privatization 
as simply the divestment of shares owned by the government or government 
entity. The beneficiary of such divestment would usually be the private 
sector. The seemingly successful outcome of the British experience, in 
privatizing otherwise State owned enterprises (SOE), in the 1980S17, and the 
collapse of communism, have thrust upon the world a certain urgency for a 
reduction in direct state involvement in economies.18 
17 See Ingo Vogelsang, Micro-Economic Changes from Government Owned and Managed Enterprises to 
Private Sector Enterprises: Micro-Economic Effects of Privatizing Telecommunications Enterprises, 13 
B.U. Int'l L.J. 313; See also Yair Aharoni, The United Kingdom: Transforming Attitudes, in RAYMOND 
VERNON, (ED), THE PROMISE OF PRIVATIZATION: A CHALLENGE FOR US FOREIGN POLICY, 
23 - 56, (Council on Foreign Relations, 1988); JOHN VICKERS AND GEORGE YARROW, 
PRIVATIZATION: AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, 428-429, (MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 1988) (giving a 
favorable review of the British program but expressing reservation about the privatization of monopolies); 
John Vickers and George Yarrow, Privatization in Britain, in PAUL MACAVOY & ORS, (ED), 
PRIVATIZATION AND STATE OWNED ENTERPRISES, 209-245 (Kluwer, Boston, 1989); Gladstone 
Hutchinson, EffiCiency Gains through Privatization of UK Industries, in ATTIAT F. OTT AND KEITH 
HARTLEY, (ED), PRIVATIZATION AND ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY: A COMPARATIVE 
ANALYSIS OF DEVELOPED AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, 87-107, (Edward Elgar, 1991) 
(concluding, from a study, that public ownership in the UK led to growth in labor productivity while 
Private ownership led to growth in profits); Ronald D. Utt, Privatization in the United States, in OTT AND 
HARTLEY, supra at 73 (asserting that the British experience is perhaps the best known and most 
SUccessful program of privatization where major divestitures occurred over an extended period) 
18 
See Otive Igbuzor, Privatisation in Nigeria (Critical Issues of Concern to Civil Society) A 
Paper presented at a Power Mapping Roundtable Discussion on the Privatisation Programme in Nigeria, ~ganiSed by Socio economic Rights Initiative (SERJ) Held at Niger Links Hotel Abuja on 3rd September 
~03 (asserting that "today, the received wisdom is that the state should recede and that private ownership 
o the means of production is the only viable approach to efficient production of goods and services, 
economic growth and development. Consequently, there is a move all over the world to privatize erstwhile 
public enterprises.") 
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Privatization is essentially the withdrawal of the government from active and 
direct participation in the affairs of an enterprise, which it hitherto owned.19 
privatization is at once an old and a new concept. On the one hand, the 
notion that business efficiency is best attained in private hands has been 
around from time immemorial, and could be found in the writings of Adam 
Smith as early as 1762.20 On the other hand, the conscious adoption of 
privatization as part of state economic policy is recent. It has been noted that 
the term first appeared in a dictionary only in 1983.21 Privatization is usually 
done in an effort to affect the economy in a positive manner by removing 
structural obstacles inherent in the ambiguous (if not self-contradictory) 
19 See L. GRAY COWAN, PRIVATIZATION IN THE DEVELOPING WORLD, 6 (Greenwood, Press, 
NY, 1990) (defming privatization as the transfer of a function, activity, or organization from the public to 
the private sector); ERNST AND YOUNG, PRIVATIZATION: INVESTING IN STATE OWNED· 
ENTERPRISES AROUND THE WORLD, 4 (John Wiley & Sons, Inc., NY, 1994) (also defining 
privatization broadly as "the transfer or sale of any asset, organization, function, or activity from the public 
to the private sector."); PAUL COOK AND COLIN KIRKPATRICK, PRIVATISATION IN LESS 
DEVELOPED COUNTRIES, 3-4 (St. martin's Press, NY, 1988) 
20 COWAN, supra note 19 at 6; See also VICKERS AND YARROW, supra note 17 at 1 (quoting ADAM 
SMITII'S WEALTH OF NATIONS (1776): "In every great monarchy in Europe the sale of crown lands 
would produce a very large sum of money, which, if applied to the payment of the public debts, would 
deliver from mortgage a much greater revenue than any which those lands have ever afforded to the crown 
.'. When the crown lands had become private property, they would, in the course of a few years, become 
well improved and well cultivated."); ERNST & YOUNG, supra note 9 at 4; See also STEVE H. 
1iANI<.E,(ED) PROSPECTS FOR PRIVATIZATION, Vol. 36 No.3 P.2, 1987, NY, Academy of Political 
Science (asserting that Adam Smith tilled the ground for privatization.) 
21 
. COWAN, supra note 19 at 6; ERNST & YOUNG, supra note 12 at 4 (noting that although privatization 
IS old, it came to worldwide attention with the British experiment in the 1980s); See also HANKE, supra 
note 20 at 2 (noting that although the word, privatization, was not in the dictionary before 1983, its 
counterpoint, nationalization, was already in the dictionary by then.); RICHARD HEMMING AND ALI 
M. MANSOOR, supra note 12 at 1 (noting that privatization entered popular usage only recently and that :e sal7 ~~ public assets is a recent phenomenon of the 1980s, even though both the word, privatization, and 
e actIvities can claim a longer history; further nothing that the word "privatize" appeared for the first time 
: the Webster Dictionary 1983 edition where its earliest recorded use is given as 1948; they also note that i: Hanke claims responsibility for popularizing the word while serving on the US President's Council of 
onomic Advisers in 1981 and 1982) 
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roles of the government in seeking to provide services at the cheapest terms, 
to the citizenry, whilst at the same time hoping that an enterprise remains a 
going concern. 
Privatization may also be done gradually or with a "big bang,,22. While a 
gradualist or intermediate approach to privatization effects a phased 
divestment of government's interest in enterprises, a "big bang" or 
immediate privatization exercise seeks to transfer government's interest, in 
an enterprise, to the private sector as quickly as possible. It is argued that a 
gradualist approach spreads the time within which the pains of the exercise 
may he felt and thereby reduces its impact. On the other hand, proponents of 
immediate privatization posit that the inherent disruption in services is felt 
once and for all. Even if its severity is pronounced, the populace would take 
.solace in the fact that it is for a short while.23 The line between the so-called 
bang" and intermediate approaches may not be so sharp. It is 
that a government would wake up one morning and simply 
its holdings in public enterprises. Usually, preparatory work is done. 
lnu.renver, because of the vagaries and uncertainties associated with the 
See Nicolas, supra note 13 at 721 - 722; Mitrofanskaya, supra note 13 at 1404 
It Kim Reisman, The World Bank and the IMF: At the Forefront of World Transformation, 60 Fordham 
. ev. 349, 391(1992) 
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exercise, most states start out gradually on the privatization course. 
ll. RATIONALE FOR PRIV A TIZA TION 
Privatization is the pet project of neo liberal advocates, and is validated on 
the same grounds as other free market principles. An attempt at justification 
of privatization of SOBs is at once a canvassing of the reasons for preferring 
free market capitalism to a system where the state sits at the commanding 
heights of the economy. Since privatization overlaps different branches of 
human existence, the rationale for it cuts across all branches of human 
endeavor. The reasons for privatization may therefore vary according to the 
perspective.24 
A. Efficiency 
First, and most importantly, it is argued that privatization leads to 
24 
See Bruno Dallago, The Teaching of Western Experience. in IVAN MAJOR (ED), PRIVATIZATION 
AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE, 1,4 (Edward Elgar, Che~tenham, UK, 1999) {noting that there four main groups of goals of privatization: (a) social, political :m l~logical goals(these include reduction of political interference, weakening the role of trade unions, 
. Cfeasmg number of shareholders and attracting foreign support and capital); (b) financing the state bud~~t; (c) short run micro(efficiency) and macro economic goals (equity and macro economic :"illZlltiOU); (d)long run economic goals, including the economic system and its functioning and targets 
. r development} 
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efficiency25 in the erstwhile SOEs. The notion here is that the performance 
of most SOEs is not measured on the basis of their profitability. Nor are the 
managers and other staff of the companies necessarily answerable for losses 
sustained by such entities. Instead, the continuity of their employment may 
be dependent on other factors.26 On the other hand, the private sector is 
profit driven. Performance is based on output and profit. Directors are 
constantly aware of the bottom line and of the need to achieve results. In 
consequence, it is thought that when the ownership of a SOE is transferred 
to the private sector, it will be infused with the efficiency that is believed to 
be standard in the private sector. 
Economists are not totally agreed on the relationship between ownership and 
performance. Instead, conventional wisdom is that efficiency is a function of 
2S Mary M. Shirley, The What, Why, and How of Privatization: A world Bank Perspective, 60 Fordham L. 
Rev. 23, 25-28 (1992) (asserting that privatization improves the use of public resources and also improves 
operating and dynamic efficiencies); Peter Rutland, Economic, Legal, and Political Dilemmas of 
Privatization in Russia: Privatization in East Europe: Another Case of Words That Succeed and Policies 
That/ail?,5 Transnat'l L.& Contemp. Probs. 1,5 (1995); John R. Dempsey, Thailand's Privatization of 
State Owned Enterprises During the Economic Downturn, 31 Law & Pol'y Int'l Bus. 373, 374 (2000) 
(asserting that "privatization is the best route to the development of competitive industries, the deepening 
of domestic and international capital supplies, and to the continued economic growth in a world ftxated on 
reducing commercial barriers and promoting a free market."); Roger Barrett James, Information - The Key 
to Fair Privatization: British Successes and Russian Pitfalls, 20 Loy. L.A. Int'l & Compo L.J. 837839, 840 
(1998) (stating that "among the most widely espoused reasons are to create an enterprise culture, increase 
competition, reduce government involvement in industry decision - making, eliminate waste, minimize 
state dependency, and increase and improve the quality of goods and services") 
l6 
Such as party affiliation and patronage; For example, Nigerian Supreme Court jurisprudence holds that 
~ of government owned enterprises cannot be terminated at will. They can only lose their jobs for 
DlISConduct, and this can only be after a rigorous procedure. Such employees are said to enjoy a status with ~~ltory flavor; See University of Lagos v Olaniyan; Garba v university of Maiduguri; Laoye v Federal 
lVi Service Commission, S.C. 202/87 (l989) NILR 2l 
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market and incentive structures.27 However, advancing what has been 
termed the residual claimant theory, it is claimed that for effectiveness and 
to produce results, a firm needs a monitor to ensure that each member of the 
firm does not shirk their work. However, such a monitor might have no 
incentive to do the monitoring, and as a result someone needs to monitor the 
monitor. This function devolves on the person who is the residual claimant 
to the profit of the firm and who would thus have an incentive to maximize 
profits and hence the efforts of the members of the firm. 28 An 
owner- managed firm does not face this problem, but a SOE certainly faces 
it because public authorities are not residual claimants.29 Even so it is 
conceded that a mere change of a corporation from SOE to a private owned 
company, does not, in and of itself, solve this problem. This is because in a 
large corporation, shareholders may not have an incentive to monitor 
managers. On the other hand, it is argued that the stock market would 
indirectly perform the monitoring function, since it would act as a barometer 
for measuring the health of the company. If the share prices fall, 
shareholders would notice and may in fact sell their shares, This may 
Ultimately lead to a takeover. Proponents of privatization note that there is 
~-----------------pA~ee AZIZUL ISLAM AND CAROLINA MONSALVE, PRIVATIZATION: A PANACEA OR A 
ru..LlATlVE?, 13 (UN, New York, 2001) 
28I8LAMAND MONSALVE, supra note 27 at 14 
29 18 LAM AND MONSALVE supra note 27 at 14 
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no mechanism to sanction bad performance and that SOEs are not under the 
threat of takeover and are free from the danger of bankruptcy. 30 
Similarly, Hemming and Mansoor,31 in discussing the claim to efficiency by 
a private enterprise as opposed to a public enterprise, distinguish between 
two forms of public enterprises, namely, SOEs that are not monopolies and 
which have been exposed to competition, on the one hand, and SOEs that are 
monopolies on the other hand. In the case of the former, they note that such 
firms, perhaps, survived competition only with budgetary support. Thus, 
they should not have been SOEs in the first place, and their privatization 
should be straightforward. For the latter, they note that large efficiency gains 
can come from privatization of monopolies, but if they have to remain 
monopolies, they have to be regulated.32 This is the worst dilemma presented 
by SOEs. If an SOB is a natural monopoly, and is privatized, it is assumed 
that the same government which could not manage it effectively to obtain 
30 
See ISLAM AND MONSALVE supra note 27 at 14-16 (also identifying other strands for the superior 
perfonnance by private sector over the public sector as, the fact that the government is less knowledgeable 
than private managers or owners with regard to the everyday functioning of the ftrm and that a change in 
OWnership changes the structure of information incentives and controls affecting operating decisions and ~ economic performance; and also the fact that SOEs lack clearly defined goals and objectives); See also 
~ Dote 1 (noting that: "if employees' pay and perquisites were the same whether they produced high 
quahty goods or low quality goods, they tended to produce low quality goods. If their lives were not 
affected by Whether the goods ever got to the market after leaving the factory, they tended not to invest a 
great deal in making sure that the goods were actually delivered.") 
31 
HEMMING AND MANSOOR, supra note 12 at 12 
32 
HEMMING AND MANSOOR, supra note 12 at 12 
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optitnal and balanced social and economic results, would now have both the 
wherewithal and technical capabilities to regulate the enterprise and prevent 
it from abusing its market power. It would seem that the factors, which 
militate against the government's effective management of the enterprise 
would still constrain its ability to effectively regulate. This is especially the 
case in the developing countries that do not have effective regulatory 
systems. 
Nevertheless, it argued that a number of reasons suggest that a regulated 
private monopoly, in place of a public monopoly, will increase productive 
efficiency. First, it is contended that privatization, even of a monopoly, will 
reduce or eliminate political interference. And this will be so even where the 
privatization is partial. In such a situation, Hemming and Mansoor argue that 
governmental interference would face two constraints; from the regulatory 
agency and from the other shareholders. Again there may be a divergence 
between the theory of these constraints and their reality. How would a 
governmental agency prevent government's interference in the affairs of a 
privatized firm? The regulatory agency itself may be subject and open to 
interference by the same government. In all likelihood, the regulators were 
appointed by the government and answerable to them. In the developing 
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regulatory agencIes are yet to acquIre the independence and 
autonomy necessary to constitute such obstacle to governmental 
interference. Hemming and Mansoor, themselves, seem to recognize the 
disparity between the theory and reality of the second constraint. They note 
that if the shares of the firm are broadly held, then it would be difficult to 
check the government. Their solution is that if the other shares are held by a 
financial institution, which of necessity must monitor its investment, then 
the financial institution would be alive to this responsibility, and, perhaps, at 
least call attention to it.33 
The second reason a regulated private monopoly is preferred to a public 
monopoly is that the changing of property rights would act as a check on the 
.. performance of the enterprise.34 This is the basic leitmotif of privatization. 
What belongs to the public or government belongs to no one, whereas an 
individual owner would pay sufficient attention to what belongs to them 
individually. Thirdly, it is thought that privatization even of a monopoly 
Would result in withdrawal of government financing and therefore subject 
33 
. They rightly note that such a scenario would run counter to another rationale for privatization which is to 
SPread and broaden share ownership. See HEMMING AND MANSOOR, supra note 12 at 13 
34 
See HEMMING AND MANSOOR, supra note 12 at 13 
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the enterprise to the discipline of the capital market.35 But, the whole notion 
of monopoly might actually militate against efficiency. The monopoly status 
insulates the firm from competition, which is the economic incentive for 
productivity. And we have seen that the regulation might not be effective 
because the very constraints, which inhibit the government from being an 
efficient owner of the enterprise, would still prevent it from effectively 
I · h' I 36 regu atmg t e pnvate monopo y. On this account, it is doubtful if a 
so- called regulated monopoly is preferable to a public monopoly. 
B. Privatization Yields Revenue to the State 
The sale of SOEs yields revenue to the government. But, again this must be 
viewed in the context of the performance of the SOEs. Obviously, if the 
SOEs are performing optimally, then, society is better off keeping them. 
This is because while the government may realize money from the sale, it 
will also lose money in the nature of future profits. But if the SOE is ailing, 
3$ 
See HEMMING AND MANSOOR, supra note 12 at 13 
36 
See John N. Drobak, A Comment on Privatization and Democratization, 50 St. Louis L.1. 783, 789 
(2006) (noting that natural monopoly goods, public goods and goods with social benefits exceeding 
:::gate private benefits would not be adequately provided by the market and consequently, it does no 
STUDto the market to have the government provide these goods); See also V.V. RAMANADHAM, 
IES IN PUBLIC ENTERPRISE FROM EV ALVA nON TO PRIV AnSA nON, 200-202 (Frank 
:s, NJ, 1987) ( noting that poof performance is the most powerful factor favoring privatization and that 
be b has two strands - social and financial returns; he argues that the social goals and achievements should 
case ~ced with any poor performance and if the poor performance outweighs the social benefits then a 
IS made for privatization.) 
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then, its sale will bring revenue to the government that it can use for other 
purposes or to reduce any deficits that it is facing. Thus, privatization or 
divestiture can be used as a means to overcome a short~term financing gap.3? 
It is also noted that if the driving force of a privatization program is the 
maximization of proceeds from the sale of SOEs this particular objective 
might conflict with the more persuasive aim of efficiency. This is because in 
seeking to maximize the proceeds, the government may not promote 
measures aimed at increasing competition. 38 
C. Distributional Equity 
Another reason for privatization is said to be the promotion of distributional 
equity. Ironically, one of the reasons for the existence of SOEs, in 
developing states, in the first place, was to ensure that the comprador class 
.. did not appropriate all the resources of the nation. In other words, most 
SOEs were created to perform social functions. And it was thought that they 
Would work for the public good since they belong to the public. Following 
their perceived poor performance or, indeed, their appropriation by the 
ruling class, the SOEs, in most cases, became instruments of the ruling class 
37 
\ ISLAM AND MONSAL VE supra note 27 at 18 
ISLAM AND MONSAL VB supra note 27 at 18 
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and served their interests. Privatization, which is a reversal of the public 
ownership, is thus considered to be a remedy for the ills associated with 
SOBs. But there is a trap in using privatization as a cure for the inequities of 
society. The government usually handles the privatization programs and 
oftentimes it is feared that the SOEs might be sold to government officials or 
• • 39 theIr cronIes. 
As a way out of this, many programs aim for a broad-based ownership 
structure for the privatized entities. Two further problems arise. First, not 
many people would have the funds to purchase shares. So, in reality, some 
of the masses would buy the shares and resell to other individuals, thereby 
defeating the purpose of the broad-based ownership. Secondly, the attempt 
to have a dispersed shareholding runs counter to the basic objective of 
ensuring efficiency by holding the managers' feet to the fire. Where many 
individuals hold small fractions of the shares in the entity, the situation is not 
so different from a government owned enterprise. The result may be that no 
shareholder has enough interest in the company to be motivated to monitor 
its activities and ensure that it is being run profitably. In this sense, "the 
~ -----------------~ee Frederic Boehm, Juanita Olaya and Jaime Polanco, Privatization and Corruption, in ERNST U. von 
267 IZSACKER, LIMITS TO PRIV A TIZA TION: WHEN A SOLUTION BECOMES A PROBLEM, 263-
(Earthscan, Toronto, Canada, 2005) (discussing the opportunities for corruption in privatization) 
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goals of privatization programmes may come into direct 
conflict with the efficiency objectives.,,4o 
D. Privatization Facilitates Foreign Investments 
In the era of globalization, privatization is also seen as being beneficial to a 
state's economy because it attracts foreign capital in terms of foreign 
investment. Practically, since the SOEs are for sale, they constitute another 
avenue for foreign investment. This is mostly the case in developing 
countries where the enterprises may be very gigantic and the purchase price 
may not be readily available locally. However, while privatization may 
make SOEs available to foreign investors and therefore increase the avenues 
for capital inflow into the country, privatization alone may not promote 
foreign investments.41 Outside investors are usually aware of the political, 
social and other dimensions to these enterprises. Such circumstances may 
40 
ISLAM AND MONSAL VE supra note 27 at 22; See also Bennett supra note 11 at 12 (noting: "how to 
feconcile efficiency with equity remains a leading issue in the transitional economies, Equity calls for the 
distribution of public assets to the people at large, not to those who are able to pay the most for them as a 
resu~t of their (often illegal) amassing of wealth in an earlier regime .... Efficiency, on the other hand, 
requires that effective control of assets is in the hands of those possessing entrepreneurial vision of how 
can be most productively used.") 
41 Th' , 
Prj I~ IS, one of the stated objectives of the Nigerian exercise; See Article 1(2) of the Guidelines on 
vatisation of Government Enterprises (contained in Privatisation Handbook, 3nl edition, published by the 
re' Council on Privatisation) (stating that the government intends to use the privatization program to 
.~tegrate Nigeria into the global economy, as a platform to attract foreign direct investment in an open, 
and transparent manner,) 
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make foreign investors wary of committing their resources into these 
ventures. Sometimes, in order to do so, they would seek so many assurances 
and other guarantees from the government. But on the whole, privatization 
has always been coupled with democracy.42 Another aspect of this rationale 
is that privatization promotes technological development in the developing 
world. By opening the SOEs to investment by foreigners, the opportunity is 
created for the foreigners to bring both their technology and their technical 
skills. Besides, the competition resulting from privatization would stimulate 
innovation and development in order to optimize productivity. The firm is 
therefore likely to invest in methods that would enhance this. 
Privatization also helps in the development of the capital market. Depending 
on the method of privatization adopted, the capital market may prove central 
to its implementation. If the shares of a SOE are to be sold by public offer, 
they would be sold through the capital market. In most developing countries, 
the capital and securities market may still be in infancy. With the surge of 
activities associated with privatization, handling the sales might 
impact the capital market. At the same time, such development 
See Rose supra note 7 at 693-694 (arguing that: "the relationship of privatization and democratic 
cannot be seen simply as ancestor - to - successor, where one (privatization) precedes the 
(democratization). At most (to continue the family analogy) privatization and democratization are 
co-existing in a mixed environment of mutual support, dependence, and occasional rivalry.) 
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th .. d . 43 would steer e cItIzens towar s mvestments. 
Privatization is also said to free the government to do what it is best suited 
for, which are regulation and the provision of security and other fundamental 
services encapsulated in its police powers.44 Perhaps, this rationale can best 
be understood on two levels. Since, government is inherently not best suited 
to run profitable businesses, its direct involvement distracts attention from 
its other functions. By pulling out of direct involvement in the running of 
corporations, it can concentrate on its core functions. An analogy to the 
basic economic concept of specialization is apposite. Privatization results in 
the government deploying all its resources to the fundamentals of running 
the country and this will lead to optimum performance in that area, while the 
private sector engages in directly providing goods and services. This may be 
a variation on the theme of efficiency. Even where the government retains 
some enterprises, it is thought that privatization of the others gives it more 
time and resources to concentrate on the few that it retains.45 On another 
43 Coskun Can Aktan, The Rationale for Privatization, supra note 11 
44 !hi s is one of the reasons which the Nigerian government gave for embarking on the privatization 
exercise; See Statement by the Nigerian President, Olusegun Obasanjo, on the occasion of the inauguration 
~f th~ national Council on Privatization, at the Presidential Villa, Abuja, July 20, 1999 (hereinafter 
PreSidential Statement") 
4S IIEMMING AND MANSOOR supra note 12 at 6 
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level, the government is the regulator of the economy. In performing its 
refereeing role, the government is supposed to be impartial and fair. If at the 
same time, that it is regulating the conduct of market players, the 
government is also a market participant, there is an inherent conflict of 
interest.46 This may lead to distortions in the economy and again militate 
against efficiency. So privatization removes this structural imbalance in the 
economy. 
Some consider the reduction of government involvement in the economy as 
an end in itself and therefore point to privatization as a positive on this 
account. Privatization is thus seen as reducing the size of the government.47 
A corollary is that it limits the opportunity for interference in the enterprise 
and therefore reduces the avenues available for government corruption.48 
However, a better analysis, or, rather, a logical conclusion to the argument, 
. 
18 that privatization facilitates efficiency by reducing governmental 
46 '1"1.: 
HUS is not just a theoretical possibility. There are claims that in some states SOEs may violate 
regulations and go free; See Shirley, supra note 25 at 26 (giving the example of one African country in 
Which the SOEs were several years behind in paying their taxes and their utility bills but were not 
sanctioned) 
. 47 
ISOla, supra note 2 at 83 
48 
. Boehm, Olaya and Palanco supra note 39 at 263 
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interference and corruption in the enterprise. 
Privatization also reduces the influence of trade unions.49 Obviously this 
would be a controversial advantage, as not every one would agree that a 
reduction of the influence of trade unions is a good thing. But to advocates 
of free market, trade unions interfere with the efficient operation of market 
forces in the labor market, and to the extent that privatization reduces their 
influence it actually does have a salutary effect on the economy. Another 
labor related claim made by proponents of privatization is that it eliminates 
hidden unemployment. 50 In other words, a SOE retains employees whether it 
needs them or not, and whether they are productive or not. It leads to a 
situation of hidden unemployment. But where the SOE is privatized, the new 
entity is likely to rationalize the workforce to ensure that employees who are 
redundant are so declared. 
There are other reasons51 for which a state may choose to privatize its public 
49 
HEMMING AND MANSOOR supra note 12 at 6 
so Aktan supra note 11 
·:~or instance privatization is said to curb inflation. See Aktan supra note 11.; Often times too, privatization 
B JUSt a policy prescription imposed on a country by the international fmancial institutions like the World 
ank and the International monetary Fund. See Frankel supra note 1; Some cynics believe that in some 
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" ' ~ enterprises. These may vary with the particular state, but the over arching 
consideration is usually the attempt to attain economic efficiency. 52 
m. ARGUMENTS AGAINST PRIVATIZATION 
The concept of privatization is not a wholly sweet pill to swallow. It has its 
critics, who charge that privatization results in increase in prices and hurts 
the common man. This is the direct antithesis of the advantage of efficiency 
and market forces. Since the SOEs are not profit driven, they may charge 
significantly lower prices for their goods or services. Indeed, the subsidies 
from the government are indirectly passed to the citizens, in the nature of 
low prices. With privatization, and the need to compete on equal terms with 
cases a state may privatize its s just because the level of failure on the part of the enterprises is such that 
they imperil the position of the state officials. See Mitrofanskaya, supra note 13 at 1403. In that sense the 
privatization is prompted by the self-interest of such officials. See also Callaghy & Wilson, supra note 10 at 
183 (attributing the momentum of the privatization exercise in Africa partly to the fact that African 
governments ran out of cash) 
~13ut sometimes the touted objectives may conflict. And scholars may disagree on the hierarchy of these 
rationales. Compare VICKERS AND YARROW, supra note 17 at 425 (arguing that the primary criterion 
for judging privatization is the improvement of industrial efficiency and that other goals such as extending 
share ownership, raising revenue and so on, are secondary; they assert that the latter goals can be achieved 
by other means) with Leroy P. Jones, Pankaj Tandon and Ingo Vogelsang, Net BetWjils from PrtvatiUJIton 
of Public Enterprises, in OTT AND HARTLEY, (ED), supra 17 at 2, 53-70 53 (alluding to ''the most 
~dard measure of performance" of privatization, as being social welfare; they assume that governments 
pnvatize in order to maximize social welfare, and that to assess the success of privatization is to examine 
thharpe effect of the divestiture on social welfare); Of course the dichotomy between the two reasons is not that 
S . The one inevitably leads to the other. Economic efficiency invariably results in the greatest benefit to 
:e greatest number of individuals, that optimal and utopian state which is not antithetic of social welfare. 
d owever, as with every controversial subject, perceptions may differ. The rationales may also vary 
~pending on the stakeholder concerned. This may range from national and local governments, managers 
o the SOE to employees; See ERNST & YOUNG, supra note 9, 13-14 
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other participants in the market, the enterprises tend to increase pnces. 
However, advocates of privatization would counter that while the cost of the 
products may increase, there is a corresponding increase in the quality and 
standard of services obtained. 
Closely related to this are the redundancies and loss of jobs that seem to 
follow privatization. In a bid to achieve efficiency, the privatized enterprises 
are wont to streamline operations. This results in loss of jobs.53 The 
projected positive impact on the over all economy is not immediate and such 
aspiration may not seem a sufficient counterpoint to the devastating effect 
the loss of jobs may have on individuals. No wonder that in most developing 
economies, the stiffest resistance to privatization comes from the labor 
unions and other workers' groups. 54 But proponents argue that while the 
enterprise remained state owned, the unemployment was hidden55 and that 
53 
But see Leroy Jones, Winners and Losers in Privatization, in AHMED GALAL AND MARY SHIRLEY 
(EDs), DOES PRIVATIZATION DELIVER? (Highlights from a World Bank Conference) 91-94 (The 
W~rld Bank, Washington, DC, 1994) (commenting on case studies of privatization in four countries, and 
notmg that employees were not worse off; he attributes this to the fact workers generally have some power 
to negotiate a favorable deal during privatization and that most public enterprises are reasonably high tech 
and thus require employees with technical skills and that this gives employees some leverage) 
34 
For example the Privatization agency in Nigeria has been having a running battle with the workers of the 
state owned electricity enterprise, National Electric Power Authority (NEPA). The workers strongly 
OPPOsed privatization ofNEPA. 
55 
See Aktan supra note 11 
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privatization is not the cause of the unemployment but rather the solution.56 
This is because the loss of jobs accompanying the short term restructuring 
may be compensated by future employment opportunities that will attend an 
efficient enterprise. 57 In some cases, the government has to take account of 
the impact privatization would have on jobs and may obtain a guarantee 
from the prospective transferees, of its interest, that workers would not be 
.... ' . . laid off. The issue may also be addressed by dialogue with the employees 
and by encouraging the employees to participate in ownership. 58 
Similarly, it is contended that privatization exposes the economy to 
dominance by a few. Only a few rich are in a position to acquire the SOEs. 
This problem is compounded by the fact that in most developing countries 
SOEs are monopolies. While the government owned them, political 
pressures generally would insulate the consumers from the predatory 
tendencies of the monopolies. But when they are transferred to private hands 
the few rich folks who can afford them would exploit and indeed abuse their 
56 
CHARLES VUYLSTEKE, TECHNIQUES OF PRIVATIZATION OF STATE - OWNED 
ENTERPRISES, Vol. 1 Methods & Implementation, 129- 133 (The World Bank, Washington, DC, 1989) 
51 
VllYLSTEKE supra note 56 at 129-133 
58 
VUVLSTEKE supra note 56 at 129-133 
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market dominance. 59 This will undercut the social and macroeconomic 
objectives for privatization, because "privately efficient profit seeking can 
no longer be expected to lead to socially efficient results.,,6o In a region, such 
as Africa, reeling from the effects of colonialism, this concern is elevated 
and may be at the heart of opposition to privatization. Some might see the 
clamor for liberalization as another mechanism to re-colonize the region of 
Africa using privatization as the Trojan horse.61 The panaceas for this 
shortcoming are few. First, states may take measures to reduce the market 
power of the privatized enterprise by expanding the scope of competition. 
This may be achieved by eliminating any barriers to entry into the relevant 
market so as to increase the scope of actual or potential competition.62 
Secondly, the enterprise may be restructured so as to eliminate or reduce its 
market dominance.63 Where monopoly power remains, then, as of necessity, 
the state has to enact effective competition laws and other regulations.64 A 
caveat is that a cautious balance must be maintained between appropriate 
$9 
.Thus Vickers and Yarrow argue that "theoretical analysis and empirical evidence support the view that 
pnvate ownership is most efficient - and hence privatization is most suitable - in markets where effective 
(actual or potential) competition prevails." See VICKERS AND YARROW, supra note 17 at 426. 
60 
VICKERS AND YARROW, supra note 17at 426 
61 
Callaghy & Wilson, supra note 10 at 183 
62 
VICKERS AND YARROW, supra note 17 at 427 
i'lId 
64 Id 
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regulation and over regulation since the latter may defeat the purpose for the 
privatization.65 Ideally, both reduction of market power and regulation, 
should precede the privatization. However, expenence shows that most 
developing states at best enact regulatory laws, if they do so at all, only as 
part of the privatization exercise. 
This imbalance is more pronounced in developing states, and a scholar66 has 
argued that writers on the subject tend to ignore this tension. Simply put, 
privatization and "marketization" of the economy would benefit the 
economically dominant few. It would further entrench their dominance and 
cause a tension between democracy, as represented by the majority, and 
market, which is dominated by the rich minority. Chua asserts: 
"In developing countries with a market - dominant minority, markets 
65 Jones, Tandon and Vogelsang, in OTT AND HARTLEY, (ED), supra note 17 at 67 (noting that 
government should safeguard against price increase by regulating the enterprise after the privatization, but 
that such regulation should be done carefully in order to maintain a balance between the need to protect 
against price increase and the need for the enterprise to achieve the objective for its privatization in terms 
of cost constraint and productivity improvements.) 
66 
Amy L. Chua, Markets, Democracy and Ethnicity: Toward a New Paradigm for Law and Development, 
108 Yale L.J.I, 79 (1998) (stating: "most developing countries have one or more ethnic minorities who, for 
varying reasons, have economically dominated the 'indigenous' majorities around them. Under certain 
conditions, the presence of an economically dominant minority will introduce a fundamental tension 
between markets and democracy. This will be the case whenever the economically dominant minority is 
also market - dominant, meaning that it tends to be economically dominant under market conditions.") Of 
COurse it is arguable whether such tension is wholly undesirable. To the extent that the market dominant 
~~ is in the political minority, that scenario will offer an inherent protection to the consumers, which 
Will mVariably be in the political majority. Furthermore, in the peculiar context of developing or 
undeveloped democracies, the dilemma may be theoretical because political power may tend to track 
economic power. In other words, those who control economic power, even if they are in the minority, still 
:ssess POlitical power. Although this is antithetic of democracy, developing countries especially in Africa 
Ve not witnessed true democracy. 
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and democracy will tend to favor different ethnic groups. Markets (by 
definition) benefit the market - dominant minority, while democracy 
will increase the power of the relatively impoverished majority. In 
these circumstances, markets and democracy will not be mutually 
reinforcing. Rather, the combined pursuit of markets and democracy 
will produce a very charged and unstable situation.,,67 
Chua's thesis assumes a powerful ethnic minority but the thrust of the 
proposition is equally true even where the minority is not a recognized 
ethnic group. As long as the economic power resides in the hands of a few, 
they will tend to coalesce into an association that may be likened to an 
ethnic group. This triggers a tension where they are in a position to virtually 
, buy all SOEs. 
Privatization also results in the loss of a sense of symbolic ownership of the 
SOEs. Notionally, since the enterprises are owned by the State, they belong 
to every one. They are the common heritage of the entire citizenry. 
Therefore, upon sale, it is not only the government that is divested but also 
the common man. And critics may not be persuaded by the fact that the sale 
of the enterprises will be for valuable consideration, which will go to the 
common purse. They see the physical structure of the SOE as a sign of their 
common ownership. The money realized from the sale may not be so visible 
6i 
Chua supra note 66 at 79 
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to them, and indeed, it may be doubtful if it would be used for their common 
good. Besides, in a system that is not particularly transparent, the valuation 
and pricing of the enterprises may be tainted or, indeed, be dubious. 
Similarly, privatization might be seen as a loss of sovereignty especially if 
the SOEs involved relate to the natural resources of a developing country 
and is acquired by a multinational corporation or other foreign investor. And 
fears are expressed that privatization implies a return by the developing 
world to imperialistic conditions, and that it affects a retreat from national 
identity and self-determination.68 
IV. METHODS OF PRIVATIZATION 
Various mechanisms are available to a country desirous of privatizing its 
SOEs. As with the meaning of privatization, these methods are as varied as 
the perceptions of privatization. But, we shall concentrate on those methods, 
which result in an ouster of the property rights of the state in the shares in 
the SOEs. 
;-------------------
EcJohn ~. Rhea, Privatization in the International Petroleum Industry: The Interplay Between Politics, 
onOmlcs, and Reliance, 33 Denv. 1. Int'l L. & Pol'y 609, 629-632 (2005) 
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In a direct sale, the shares of the SOE are sold to a pre-identified single 
, ~ .r purchaser or group of purchasers.69 This may be through a pre-qualification 
of bidders who then bid for the shares or through direct negotiation. For 
investors, direct sale represents the most straightforward method of 
acquiring control over a SOE. For the government, this method has the 
advantage of enabling it to select strong purchasers with relevant industrial, 
commercial, financial or other experience.70 This method also has the 
advantage of ensuring a quick completion to the transaction. However, it has 
been noted that the most effective way of finding the best suited investor and 
to maximize government revenues from the sale is through competitive 
. tender, and that direct negotiations with a single buyer rarely generate the 
possible deal for the government. 71 It has also been noted that 
..... .lL,Q.u ... 'u by sale to the highest bidder is the preferred method in 
...... V'IJ~'" economies because it leads to efficient matching of buyers and 
.. \TUnsTEKE supra note 56 at 16-20 
VUVtSTEKE supra note 56 at 16-20; KALLY MEGYERY AND FRANK SADER, FACILITATING 
P ARTICIPA nON IN PRIV ATIZA TION, 14 (World Bank, Washington DC, 1996) 
. MEOYERY AND SADER supra note 70 at 14 
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assets.72 On the downside, where the direct sale is done privately, it opens 
the process to accusations of lack of transparency. 73 
B. public Offering 
Under a public offering, the state sells to the general public all or large 
blocks of stock that it holds in a SOE.74 This is usually through the stock 
exchange. This is usually the preferred mode where the aim is to broaden the 
share ownership. Usually the SOE is prepared for the privatization to make it 
attractive to the public and to ensure there is an adequate distribution 
network for the sale.75 Sale through public offering has the advantage of 
transparency. Anyone can buy the shares on the stock exchange. However, 
it might result in the transfer of the SOE to so large and dispersed a group as 
; to negate the economic or efficiency motive for the privatization. This is 
"because no one investor or group of investors would have a significant 
.'12 
.' See John Bennett, Saul Estrin and Giovanni Urga, Methods of Privatization and Economic Growth in 
Transition Economies 
'13 
1. 
, 
P. 8 (last visited May 17,2007) 
VUYLSTEKE supra note 56 at 16·20 
VUYLSTEKE supra note 56 at 11·16; See also Philip M. Nichols, Creating a Market Along the Silk 
A Comparison of Privatization Techniques in Central Asia, 29 N.Y.U. J. Int') L. & Pol'y 299, 308 
MEGYERY AND SADER supra note 70 at 14 
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:lnterest to warrant the extra effort that might be required to monitor the 
enterprise. Some countries address this shortcoming by combining the public 
stock offering with a direct sale. A particular portion of the SOE' s shares 
might be sold to pre-identified investors who have both requisite resources 
and acumen to tum the entity around, while the remainder of the shares 
would be sold to the public at large through the public offering. 
c. Sale of Government Assets 
In this method of privatization, the assets of the SOE are sold usually 
through private sale.76 The distinctive feature of this method is that the 
purchasers do not receive any shares. Instead they buy the assets of the SOE. 
But if all the assets are sold, then the SOE is wound up. Sometimes the 
assets may be transferred to a new company to be formed by the government 
and private shareholders, and the assets would thus be considered the 
government's, or part of the government's, contribution to the new 
Company. The advantage this has, for the investor, is that they can acquire 
;-----------------
VllYLSTEKE supra note 56 at 20- 23 
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the company without the attached liabilities, since they buy only the assets.77 
D. Reorganization into Component Parts 
This involves the breaking up of a SOE into several entities or into a holding 
company and several subsidiaries.78 This might be a prelude to outright sale 
of some or all of the entities. This is usually preferred where the SOE 
incorporates many activities that, in the aggregate, are not attractive to 
potential investors, whereas individual units would be. It may also be used 
where the SOE is a monopoly and the fragmentation would facilitate 
competition. This method can be considered as a method of privatization in 
the broadest sense. To the extent that the breakup of the SOE into several 
units, entails the elimination of the SOE as it was initially known, it could be 
said that the act of reorganization extinguished the SOE. But until the 
several entities are transferred to the private sector, the privatization remains 
;------------------
MEGYERy AND SADER supra note 70 at 15; In truth the investors do not technically acquire the 
COinpany. They only buy its assets. Perhaps a better analysis is that the investors acquire the use of what 
once the company but not its liabilities. 
TEKE supra note 56 at 23-26 
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private Investment in a SOE 
Private investment in a SOE entails the injection of new capital into a 
80E.79 The result is that of a dilution of the government's interest and the 
creation of a partially privatized enterprise (that is if there was no private 
equity involvement in the enterprise in the first place). This method is used 
where the SOE has capital problems and there is the desire to infuse private 
capital into it. This is considered a method of privatization not so much 
because the government parts with its shares in the enterprise but because 
the private sector now participates in what was previously a wholly 
government enterprise. 
F. ManagementlEmployee Buy-Out 
Under this method of privatization, its management and employees acquire 
the SOE.80 Usually, the employees and managers would have to source for 
the funds to acquire the SOE, and would sometimes use the SOE as 
collateral for the funds. This method is usually adopted where the SOE is 
plagued with labor issues and where the alternative is liquidation. The 
;------------------
VDYLsTEKE supra note 56 at 26-29 
80 
MEGYERY AND SADER supra note 70 at 16; VUYLSTEKE supra note 56 at 29-34 
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interest becomes an incentive for the management and employees 
they now have a direct personal and pecuniary interest in the success 
of the enterprise.81 Politically, too, this method is attractive as it avoids the 
criticism of selling out to foreign or other interests. But the downside is that 
the enterprise might become undercapitalized because the management and 
employees might not have enough funds and in some cases the enterprise 
could even be sold to them on a discount.82 
G. Voucher Privatization 
oucher privatization is used where the purpose is to spread the ownership 
of the SOE. Typically vouchers are given to citizens for free. They can then 
these vouchers to "purchase" the shares of SOEs. This is not effective in 
~G1~mJl: capital for the enterprise, even if it is popUlar. Besides, it may defeat 
purpose of the privatization because of the spread of the shareholding.83 
are other devices which some regard as methods of privatization. 
range from lease and management contracts to introduction of 
supra note 56 at 29~34 
AND SADER supra note 70 at 16 
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competitive features to the enterprise.84 
~----------------------84 
See generally VUYLSTEKE supra note 56 at 8-9 and 34-40; others included are economic policy lef~nns such as demonopolization, increased private sector fmancing of new activities such as contractor ~~ financing, revenue participation certificates or revenue bonds issued by the state or state bodies and 
pnvatization by "attrition" (SOE failing to invest in its monopoly and thereby allowing the private sector to 
Illvest in plants and related facilities and take over all or part of the SOE's operations) 
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pRIV A TIZA nON: THE NIGERIAN EXPERIENCE 
As earlier stated, Nigeria has, for some time now, experimented with the 
privatization of its SOEs. Two broad episodes are identifiable: the first 
major attempt was in 1988 under the supervision of the then existing 
military government while the second, and subsisting effort, was initiated in 
1999 and is being managed by the civilian administration. This chapter will 
be devoted to the first episode. The current exercise will be discussed in 
Chapter 5. 
I. BACKGROUND TO THE PRIV A nZA nON PROGRAM 
While there might currently be ambivalence about SOEs in Nigeria, the 
provenance and reason for the state's intervention, in the nature of 
Participation in ownership of SOEs, are undoubtedly clear and free from 
controversy. At independence, the establishment of SOEs seemed a natural 
policy for the government to take. The development of the newly 
independent country of Nigeria was one of the topmost items on the agenda 
118 
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the government. Understandably, development of private capital was very 
low. The First National Development Plan, 1962-1968, thus aimed at the 
development of an economy in which private capital would be dominant. l 
But certain SOBs were inherited from the colonial administrators and were 
retained, principally to stimulate the private sector. These enterprises were 
not profit driven, but instead charged prices, which were statutorily 
determined? It was thought that since the outputs of the SOBs constituted 
inputs in the production of other goods and were also required by 
households, setting their prices low would attract inflow of foreign capital 
and reduce disparity in the living standard of the people. But these 
expectations did not materialize. The inflow of foreign capital was limited 
and went into commercial rather than the industrial sector. The private sector 
was not developing fast enough and there was a general lack of expertise, on 
the part of Nigerians, to occupy the positions left by foreigners after the 
indigenization program in the 1970s.3 To address this lapse, the Second and 
Third National Development Plans, 1970-1974 and 1975-1980, respectively, 
I MIKE OBADAN AND 'SESAN AYODELE, COMMERCIALIZATION AND PRIVATIZATION 
POLICY IN NIGERIA, 6-7 (NCEMA, Ibadan, 1998) (hereinafter "OBADAN AND A YODELE, 
COMMERCIALIZATION AND PRIV A TIZA TION POLICY") 
2 
OBADAN AND AYODELE, COMMERCIALIZATION AND PRIVATIZATION POLICY, supra note 
lat 6-7 
3 
h Omawale A. Kuye, Problems and Prospects of Nigeria's Privatisation and Commercialisation 
ogramme, The Quarterly Journal of Administration, Vol. XXV No. I October 1990, P. 49 at 54-57 
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iIi,anessc~u the enlargement of the existing SOBs and the establishment of 
ones.4 Similarly, the establishment of the SOBs extended, beyond the 
~ial services and utilities sector, into unorthodox areas such as 
manufacturing, agriculture, commerce and banking. Thus from the private 
sector focus (as the engine of development) of the First National 
Development Plan, there was a shift in the Third National Development 
Plan, which relied on the public sector to be the prime mover of the 
socio-economic development of Nigeria and the SOBs thus became the main 
engine of growth.5 
The conventional wisdom was that the SOBs did not perform well although 
it is an open question what standard was used for measuring their 
performance. Bven as early as 1968, the question of how best to use the 
SOEs had become topical. Different commissions were set up by different 
aaIinmlstra1ti()nJ.~ to look into the best way to optimally use SOBs.6 The Ani 
, Some of the enlarged ones included Nigerian Railway Corporation, Nigerian AirWays Limited, the Post 
" Telecommunications Department and Nigerian Telecommunications, NlTEL. The new ones included 
Electric Power authority (created from the merger of Electricity Corporation of Nigeria and the 
dams Authority), the River basin Development Authorities, the Nigerian national Petroleum 
i .... urDO"'.tj~n NNPC, (which metamorphosed from the Nigerian National Oil Company). See OBADAN 
AYODELE, COMMERCIALIZATION AND PRlV A nZA nON POLICY supra note 1 at 7-8 
AND AYODELE, COMMERCIALlZA nON AND PRlV ATIZATION POLICY, supra note 1 
7; See also National Centre for Economic Management and Administration (NCEMA), Pubic 
Reform,29 (Training Programme Report 2000/200 I) 
Adebayo Olukoshi, The Historic Significance of the Policy of Privatisation in Nigeria, in R. OMOTA YO 
AN AND CHIBUZO N. NWOKE (BDs), STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT IN NIGERIA, 103, 
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'(~OJnmI:S:SJLVU was instituted to look into government parastatals in 1968. In 
, 1973, the Udoji Commission was also concerned with an examination of the 
public sector. This was followed by the Onosode Commission, in 1981, and 
the AI·Hakim Commission, in 1984. Results from the reports of the 
commissions showed problems with the SOEs. These problems included 
misuse of the enterprises' monopoly powers; defective capital structures 
resulting in heavy dependence on the Treasury for funding; escalating 
budgetary burden; bureaucratic bottlenecks in relations with supervising 
Ministries; mismanagement, corruption and nepotism; ill advised investment 
resulting in costly and inefficient utilization of public resources; and 
constant political interference in decision making. 7 The latter two 
Commissions8 were specifically charged with the responsibility of 
determining the basis for a new funding arrangement that would make the 
SOBs less dependent, on the treasury, for funding, detennine appropriate 
. capital structures and appropriate incentives to enhance productivity and 
.115 (Nigerian Institute of International Affairs, Lagos, 1989); Technical Committee on Privatisation and 
~lIunelrciailisa1tion Final Report Vol. 1 (Main Report) 1993 (Hereinafter "TCPC Report") P. 8; A.F. 
A Framework for Evaluating the Performance of Nigerian Public Enterprises: Implications for 
frll1tlliZ'atiGIn. The Quarterly Journal of Administration Vol. XXI Nos. 3 & 4 April/July 1987P. 190 at 191; 
Centre for Economic Management and Administration (NCEMA), Pubic Enterprises Reform,29 
Programme Report 2000/2001); Ekong Emah, The Change of Baton: From State Control to 
[rJV,atis(;rtion and Commercialisation, in Setting the Economy Free (a publication ofKee Communications 
LagOS, 1993) p.9 
VIlO~lOde Commission set up by the Shagari administration and AI-Hakim Commissions set up by the 
adtninistration 
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efficiency of the staff.9 Both recommended a selective privatization of the 
public sector. lO Significantly, both the Onosode Commission and the AI-
Hakim Commissions were set up at a time of perceptible economic crisis 
and international pressure for the country to rationalize its public sector. And 
it is arguable that their recommendations reflected the global trend towards a 
shrinking of the public sector in favor of private enterprises as championed 
by the "Washington Consensus". Yet there are those who contend that 
privatization was not new to Nigeria even in the 1980s.11 
Certainly, here and there before the 1980s, the government might have 
handed over a project or another to the private sector, but it was only in the 
1980s that privatization came to be considered as a thrust of government's 
economic policy. The first documented attempt at privatization was in 1983 
9 
Ekong Emah, The Change of Baton: From State Control to Privatisation and Commercialisation, in 
Setting the Economy Free (a publication ofKee Communications Ltd, Lagos, 1993) P.9 
10 Od "d eJl e supra note 6 at 190-191; The AI Hakim Commission recommended as follows: (a) the 
government should embark on a program of selective privatization as a way of prompting the parastatals to 
~ more efficient; (b) in embarking on the program, the government should ensure that the 'national 
mterest' and 'national security' were paramount; (c) four out of eight public utility companies should be 
fully or partially privatized by making them go public and seek quotation on the stock exchange; (d) the 
government's privatization exercise should ensure that private interests were allowed to hold between 50 
~d 70 per cent of the shares of public enterprises put up for sale, the aim being to reduce government 
l1l~nce in their management to the barest minimum; and (e) in undertaking the change from public to 
Pl'iv~te ownership, workers of the affected parastatals should be allowed 10 per cent participation in the 
eqUlty so as to induce in them a sense of commitment to the organization. See Olukoshi, supra note 6 at I 17 
II 
JEROME uoon, WInCH WAY NIGERIA? 166 (Spectrum Books Ltd, Ibadan, Nigeria, 1999) (stating tba~ priVatization was ftrst practiced in Eastern Nigeria in the early sixties when the government of that 
regIon sold its shares in the Nkalagu Cement Company to the public.) 
122 
when the Shagari administration, as part of its effort to contain the growing 
/ fiscal and payments problems of the country, announced that it had decided 
in principle to relinquish its ownership, of certain corporations and 
parastatals, to private interests. 12 Since that administration was terminated 
that year, it did not have time to fully implement that decision. 
That responsibility fell to the succeeding military administration of 
Muhammadu Buhari, which also had to continue the negotiations with the 
International Monetary Fund (lMF), an institution that had been demanding 
governmental economic reforms including privatization of SOEs. That 
administration instead opted for commercialization, maintaining that it 
would be unfair to sell the parastatals, with the huge public investments that 
had gone into them, to a few people.13 Nonetheless, the government decided 
to sell a set of public companies engaged in agro-allied activities to the 
private sector. 14 However, neither the commercialization to which the 
government was amenable, nor the privatization of the few enterprises could 
be completed before the Buhari government was itself sacked by the Ibrahim 
Babangida military administration. 
-12 
See Olukoshi, supra note 6 at 116 
13 
Olukoshi, supra note 6 at 117 
14 
Olukoshi, supra note 6 at 118 
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As shown in Chapter 1, the Babangida administration, 1985-1993, was the 
first to seriously adopt a privatization program in Nigeria. Although such 
policY prescription was one of the fundamentals of the conditions usually 
imposed by the IMF and World Bank, two institutions that the government 
was desirous of working with, the Nigerian version of privatization was also 
said to have been prompted by so many other factors most of which dovetail 
with the general rationale usually proffered for privatization any where. 
Olukoshi 15 has summarized the prevalent arguments for privatization ill 
Nigeria as follows: The primary concern is the notion of efficiency and 
performance. The SOEs were considered to be underperforming and to be 
unprofitable. For instance, it was argued that the electricity enterprise NEPA 
continued to operate at a loss from 1978-1987.16 Moreover, the unprofitable 
SOEs constitute an intolerable drain on the scarce resource of the 
government because apart from failing to generate revenue for the 
15 
Olukoshi supra note 6 at 120-121 
16 
OBADAN AND AYODELE, COMMERCIALIZATION AND PRIVATIZATION POLICY, supra note 1 at 61'~6; See also A.O. Sanda, Justification and Strategies for the Selective Privatization of State Owned 
J;jerpnses, The Quarterly Journal of Administration Vol. XXI Nos 3 & 4 ApriIJJuly 1987 P. 173; 
(MaHNSON A. AKINBADE, PUBLIC ENTERPRISES AND PRIVATISATION IN NIGERIA, 74·75 
cal< Books Ud, Lagos, 2004) 
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< government, they also depended on the state for sUbventions. I7 The SOEs 
were also accused of failing to fulfill the objectives for which they were 
established, namely large scale physical output of goods and services, and 
they were also alleged to be characterized by poor billing systems, poor 
costing and credit control. It was thought that the only way to correct these 
anomalies was to privatize them. Furthermore, it was argued that privatizing 
Nigeria's SOEs would generate greater wealth and provide more 
employment. It was also thought that the corruption endemic in public 
enterprises would be solved by their privatization, while at the same time the 
opportunity for political interference and administrative red-tape would be 
eliminated. Privatization would also yield enormous amounts of money for 
the government through the proceeds from the sale of the enterprises. This 
would be in addition to the taxes that would be chargeable on the profits of 
privatized enterprises and such monies would go a long way in helping to 
solve the fiscal crisis of Nigeria. Moreover, "even if the SOEs were viable, 
profitable and efficient, they would perform better if they were privatized 
because private managers are better than government managers.,,18 And 
finally, privatization would unfetter the market forces to liberate the 
;-----------------
Olukoshi supra note 6 at 121 
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from the burden of unnecessary and obstructive state 
Obadan and Ayodele20 would seem to broadly classify these arguments into 
three groups. First is the efficiency-based justification. Secondly, there is the 
public finance justification, which relies on the need to relieve the enormous 
burden, which the SOBs impose on the government. Third is the socio-
economic rationale, which itself has three dimensions: to rein in government 
deficits, to improve efficiency by introducing private sector reward/penalty 
incentive structure, and to reduce the size of government involvement in 
economic activities, if only in response to international agencies. 
19 Other writers have also alluded to similar arguments. See A.O. Sanda, Justification and Strategies for the 
Selective Privatization of State Owned Enterprises, The Quarterly Journal of Administration Vol. XXI Nos 
3 & 4 ApriVJuly 1987 P. 177~ 17 (noting that the justifications for privatization were@i)the manifestations 
of underdevelopment; (U) the limited capacity of the SOEs to perform efficiently; (iii) some SOEs were 
involved in providing uneconomic services; (iv) phenomenal growth in the number and size of the SOEs; 
and (v) extreme levels of misallocation of resources in the SOEs); AKINBADE supra note 16 at 74-75 
(noting the objectives of the privatization program to be: (i) improvement of economic performance; (ii) 
resolVing management problems; (iii) revenue generation; (iv) discipline of the Trade Unions; 
(v)promotion of popular capitalism; and (vi) promotion of consumer sovereignty); The government, on its 
part, jUstified undertaking the privatization program on grounds that it would: (i) restructure and rationalize 
the public sector so as to lessen dominance of unproductive investments; (ii) reorient the enterprises for 
privatization and commercialization towards new horizon of perfonnance improvement, viability and over 
all efficiency; (iii) ensure positive returns on public sector investments in commercialized enterprises; (iv ) 
check the absolute dependence of commercially oriented parastatals on the Treasury for funding and 
encourage them to approach the Nigerian capital market fOT funding; (v) initiate the process of gradual 
• Cession to the private sector of such public enterprises that by the nature of their operations are best 
~anaged by the private sector; (vi) create a favorable investment climate fOT both local and foreign 
Investors; (vii) reduce the level of internal and external debts; (viii) provide institutional arrangement and 
Operational guidelines that would ensure that the gains of privatization and commercialization were 
~tained in the future. See TCPC Report PP. 2·3 (quoting the statement of then Nigerian Chief of General 
taff, Augustus Aikhomu, at the inauguration of the TCPC) 
.. 20 
I 
OBADAN AND AYODELE, COMMERCIALIZATION AND PRNATIZATION POLICY, supra note 
at61-n 
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above reasons boil down to the proposition that Nigerian SOEs are 
being privatized because private sector is more efficient and productive than 
the public sector and also because the government would have a positive 
fiscal impact by such privatizations. We shall return to this proposition but it 
is important to note that certain criticisms were leveled at the introduction of 
the privatization exercise in Nigeria. 
Akinbade summarizes these criticisms.21 While privatization reduces the role 
of the government, it does not reduce its responsibilities. Privatization 
widens the gap between the rich and the poor. Perhaps, this is because while 
the rich might afford to buy the SOEs, the poor might not. The lack of : .. ~ 
f. '-I 
transparency that sometimes attends the privatization programs raise doubts 
about the real motives. Privatization might breed unemployment. This is 
remarkable because advocates of privatization also argue that privatization 
improves employment. While privatization yields revenue, the funds, which 
are realized, are not ploughed back into the economy. In other words, there 
.: are no guarantees that the privatization funds would be used for the greater 
gOOd. This is a very important objection considering Nigeria's experience 
21 
AKlNBADE supra note 16 at 74 -75 
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with corruption. The sale of the SOBs entails the loss, on the part of the 
government, of future revenue, at least in respect of those SOBs that are 
profitable, and also compromises the developmental objectives of the SOBs. 
Furthermore, privatization opens the economy to domination by foreign 
investors and their local proxies. Most of the SOBs are national symbols and 
heritage and their sale is essentially the sale of national patrimony. 
Privatization might well be the fad of the moment and might also appeal to 
the international community. It is also possible that in terms of profits, the 
private enterprises make more money than do the SOBs. Yet, to return to the 
proposition that SOBs should be privatized because they are less efficient 
and less productive than the private sector, such a conclusion is simplistic. 
Private enterprises exist for different reasons and answer to different 
constituencies. SOBs perform a social function. To assess SOBs on the same 
standard as private companies, which is on the basis of profitability, is to 
reject the fundamental distinction between the bases for their existence. 
Indeed, it has been noted that private enterprises have operated mainly in a 
sellers' market and always enjoy numerous direct and indirect incentives and 
Subsidies from the state?2 They enjoy these without the concomitant social 
;-----------------
Olukoshi supra note 1 at 122 
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responsibilities that apply to SOEs. Consumer protection laws are dead 
letters, if they exist at all, in Nigeria. Besides, it has been noted that, "a 
comparative analysis of the specific role of the private sector in production 
vis-A-vis that of the public sector, reveals the relatively poor performance of 
the private sector in Nigeria's economic development.,,23 And this is so even 
though most of the private sector enterprises have been doing well reporting 
growing turnovers and annual profits.24 
The failure of the SOEs is merely symptomatic of the failure of governance 
in Nigeria. Most countries of the west, which are admittedly market oriented 
and profess economic liberalism, do retain social safety nets, be it in health 
care, unemployment benefits or other similar cushions, against market 
failures and the other vagaries of capitalism. In Nigeria, and most 
developing countries, especially in Africa, such safety nets are lacking. 
Perhaps, if the argument is framed in terms of an option between doling out 
benefits and having servIce oriented public enterprises, 
while providing needed social services, also provide employment 
,OBADAN AND AYODELE, COMMERCIALIZATION AND PRIVATIZATION POLICY, supra note 
at4S 
OBADAN AND AYODELE, COMMERCIALIZATION AND PRIVATIZATION POLICY, supra note 
at 49 
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opportunities to the people, the choice would not easily be privatization. The 
perceived failures of the SOEs are those of the government. And such 
failures are not limited to the SOEs. They pervade the broad gamut of 
government functions. The seeming readiness, willingness and ability of the 
government to embark on the privatization program is in essence a shirking 
of the responsibility to instill in the SOEs whatever good or business 
management that are considered fit. But because the so-called leaders and 
those in government, in most cases, are usurpers who seize the reins of 
government through illegal means, they become captives to the unsavory 
machinery by which they come to office. The SOEs thus become sources for 
appeasing and patronizing that same machinery. This is the crux of the 
problem of SOEs. Government is always able, if it is willing, to demand 
accountability from the SOEs. But it is unwilling because it is compromised. 
The standard argument of efficiency is a smokescreen to mask what is in 
essence the failure of government. Privatization might result in increased 
profits for the enterprise, but as Olukoshi asserts: ''what does it matter if the 
'. owners of a privatized NEP A or water corporation record fantastic annual 
profits but a majority of Nigerians continue to suffer darkness as a result of 
.. an inability to pay for electricity and do not have access to portable water for 
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the same reason."Z5 Whatever the merits or demerits of privatization in 
Nigeria, the military government introduced the policy in 1988, and it has 
continued since then. 
ll. THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR THE PRIVATIZATION 
PROGRAM IN 1988 
A feature of the military administrations that dominated the political 
landscapes in Africa in general, and in Nigeria in particular, from the 1960s 
to the late 1990s, was the ease with which they enacted laws. Being 
dictatorships, laws in most cases required only the assent of the head of state 
or military president, whatever the chosen appellation. Some adopted a 
semblance of legislative bodies, populated by military subordinates and 
other cronies, some of whom were civilians. In reality, these bodies were, at 
best, advisory to the military ruler. The result was that most laws did not 
enjoy detailed examination and scrutiny as would be the case in a normal 
democracy. Most laws, too, were terse, in most cases containing few, but 
SOmetimes broad, provisions. Usually the government could amend any of 
<the laws as easily as it could make them. The Babangida administration 
" legislated through the instrumentality of decrees. The decree introducing the 
Privatization program was thus issued with the ease with which the 
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government regularly passed its laws. It is noteworthy though that to the 
extent that the privatization program is a part of the structural adjustment 
program, the government could claim that the country sanctioned it when, in 
a national debate, it rejected the IMP loan and instead "chose the local 
variant." We had adverted, in Chapter 1, to the quaint interpretation, which 
the government applied to the popular rejection of the IMF package. 
That decree was the Privatisation and Commercialisation Decree.26 The 
scheme enunciated by the 1988 decree was the categorization of enterprises 
into four groups. These were those to be partially privatized, fully privatized, 
partially commercialized and fully commercialized.27 Partial privatization, 
under the decree, implied the divestment of part only of governmental 
holding in the affected enterprise. Government still exercised some influence 
over the partially privatized SOEs but only to the extent of its representation 
the board of directors.28 Full privatization entailed the divestiture of all 
proprietary interest held by the government in the affected firm.29 Such 
CnVilltIsaltion and Commercialisation Act, Vol. XXI Cap 369, Laws of the Federation 
(formerly Privatisation and Commercialisation Decree No 25, 1988) 
. See Sections 1 and 12 of Decree No 25, 1988. (The former deah with partial and full privatization while 
, latter dealt with partial and full commercialization.) 
Ituye Problems and Prospects supra note 3 
the provision of Section 14 of the Decree the word "enterprises" was given an expansive connotation 
-
Illean: "any corporation, board, company or parastatal established by or under any enactment in which 
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enterprises would cease to be operated by he government but instead would 
nOW be owned and run by the private sector. Similarly, full 
conunercialization meant the reorganization of the enterprises with the result 
that they operate as profit making ventures and without subvention, of any 
kind, from the government.30 For partially commercialized entities, the 
government was to still fund capital projects but not recurrent ones. As with 
most decrees promulgated by the military administrations, the 1988 decree 
was brief and contained scant substantive provisions.31 It established a 
Technical Committee on Privatisation and Commercialisation (TCPC), with 
responsibilities for advising on the capital restructuring needs of enterprises 
coming under the purview of the decree and generally implementing the 
provisions of the decree.32 
Federal Military Government, or any of its Departments, Ministries, or agencies has ownerShip or 
interest and shall include a partnership, joint venture or any other form of business arrangement or 
IIP1lllsati{1n ." 
See Section 14 of Decree No 25, 1988. 
Contained 14 sections divided into three parts. 
See Sections 3 and 4 of Decree No 25, 1988. 
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The TCPC was given the function of conducting the privatization program. 33 
Although the TCPC was charged with implementing the privatization 
exercise, it did so under the general supervision and guidance of the Federal 
Military government.34 
The 1988 decree introduced the novel concept of commercialization as an 
adjunct to the policy of divesting government's interests in the SOEs. It 
defines privatization as "the relinquishment of part or all of the equity and 
other interests held by the Federal Military Government or its agency in 
enterprises whether wholly or partly owned by the Federal Military 
Government", and similarly construes the word "privatise". 35 On the other 
hand, it defines commercialization as "the reorganization of enterprises 
33 The specific functions were to: (a) advise on the capital restructuring needs of enterprises to be privatized 
or commercialized in order to ensure a good reception in the Stock Exchange market; (b) carry out all 
activities required for the successful issues of shares of the enterprises to be privatized including 
appointment of issuing houses, stockbrokers, solicitors, trustees, accountants and other experts to the 
issues; (c) approach through the appointed issuing houses the Securities and Exchange Commission for a 
tlir price for each issue; (d) advise the Federal Military Government after consultations with the Securities 
and Exchange Commission and the Nigerian Stock Exchange, on the allotment pattern for the sale of the 
~~s of the enterprises concerned; (e) oversee the actual sale of shares of the enterprises concerned by the 
ISSUing houses in accordance with the guidelines approved by the Federal Military G()vernment; (f) submit 
to the Federal Military Government from time to time, for the purpose of approval, proposals on sale of 
Government shares in such designated enterprises with a view to ensuring a fair price and even spread in 
the ownership of the shares; (g) ensure the success of the privatization exercise taking into account the need 
for balance and meaningful participation by Nigerians and foreign interests in accordance with the relevant 
Jaws of Nigeria; (h) ensure the updating of the accounts of all commercialized enterprises with a view to 
assuring financial discipline. See Section 4 (1) of Decree No. 2S 1988. 
34 
Decree No. 25 contains several provisions in which the TCPC could act only with the approval of the 
• Federal Military Government to which it submitted periodical reports. For example Sections 4 (4), 9, and 
10. 
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or partly owned by the Federal Military Government in which such 
shall operate as profit making commercial ventures and without 
subventions from the Federal Military Government." It also requires that the 
word "commercialise" be accordingly construed.36 The TCPC regarded 
privatization as the transfer of government owned shareholdings in 
designated enterprises to private shareholders and broadly as an umbrella 
term to describe the variety of policies, which encourage competition and 
emphasize the role of market forces in place of statutory restrictions and 
monopoly power.37It noted that such broad definition applies in countries 
such as Nigeria, where privatization is an integral part of the structural 
adjustment program, while the narrow definition applies to developed 
countries where the privatization program is not necessarily coupled with 
structural adjustment. The agency saw commercialization as the 
reorganization of an enterprise wholly or partially owned by the government, 
such that they would operate as profit making ventures, without subvention 
from the government. Its main thrust were: (a) to provide enhanced 
operational autonomy at enterprise level; (b) to provide competitive 
remuneration; (c) to evolve a more result-oriented and accountable 
36 
Section 14 of Privati sat ion and Commercialisation Decree No. 25 1988 
37 
19 See Technical Committee on Privatisation and Commercialisation, Final Report Vol. I (Main Report) 
93 (TCPc Final Report) P.I3 . 
135 
"',: 
management based on performance contracts; (d) to strengthen financial and 
accounting controls at the enterprise level; (e) to upgrade information 
management system of affected enterprises; (t) to ensure financial solvency 
of the public enterprises through effective cost recovery, cost control and 
prudent financial management; (g) to remove bureaucratic bottlenecks and 
political interference through clear role definitions between the supervising 
ministry, the board of directors and the management of the enterprises.38 
In most countries, the common reform policy is that of privatization.39 The 
tacking of the policy of commercialization to the privatization exerCIse 
indicated the ambivalence towards total surrender to the market forces. It 
would seem that the government was concerned that even though the SOEs 
deserved a total revamping in terms of their ownership outlook, there were 
those, which could not just be abandoned to the private sector. In another 
sense, it was perhaps a reflection of the gradualist approach to Nigeria's 
privatization program. Such approach did not want to sell the SOEs in one 
.. fell swoop, but rather preferred to privatize some first and others later. In a 
SUbsequent chapter, we would notice that some of the SOEs, which are 
38 
TCPC Final Report p, 13 
39 
,See TCPC Final Report p, 13 (noting that Nigeria was the only country carrying out a hybrid program of 
pnvatization and commercialization simultaneously) 
136 
,\'( 
:'J 
,. ',1'1 
.;, 
subject to privatization under the current exercise, are those that were 
commercialized under the regime of the 1988 decree. 
Similarly, in curtailment of any notion of unbounded free market, the 1988 
decree sought to ensure that a few individuals did not hijack the SOBs. It 
provided that in the event of over subscription for the shares of the 
enterprises, no individual should be allowed to hold more than 1 per cent 
equity in anyone enterprise.40 
And, in an attempt to placate the most fervent critics of privatization, namely 
workers of the affected SOBs, Section 7 of the Decree provided that not 
more than 10 per cent of the shares in any SOB to be privatized should be 
reserved for the staff of the SOB. It is obvious that the section intended to 
give the implementing agency the discretion to determine the percentage of 
shares to be given employees of the enterprise even though the decree put a 
cap on such percentage. The provisions of Section 7(5), as couched, enabled 
the implementing body to set aside a percentage for the staff, provided such 
.,erc:entage did not exceed ten. But did the discretion enable such agency to 
allot any percentage at all to the employees? In other words, could the 
. Section 7(6) of Decree No 25 of 1988 
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agency set aside zero percentage for the said staff? This would seem an 
academic question, but it could certainly have arisen under the section. 
Obviously, zero is not more than ten per cent and since the section 
prescribed no minimum percentage, it could be argued that a failure to set 
aside any number, at all for the workers, would be in compliance with the 
decree. This was more so when the subsection is juxtaposed with Section 
7(2), which prescribed that a maximum of twenty percent and a minimum of 
ten per cent was to be set aside for associations and interest groupS.41 On the 
other hand, it is also arguable that not setting aside any percentage at all 
would have negated the intention of the decree, which was clearly to 
guarantee some stake for the employees in the enterprise. Happily the 
implementing body, the Technical Committee on Privatisation and 
Commercialisation (TCPC), exercised the discretion by following the spirit 
of the section, which was apparently to give priority to the workers in the 
sale of the SOES.42 
41 Se . 
ctlon 7(2) provided: ''Not less than 10 per cent and not more than 20 per cent of the total shares shall 
be allotted to associations and interest groups such as, but not limited, to State investment agencies, 
Workers, trade unions, market women organizations, universities, friendly societies, local and community 
associations: provided that in the case of an over-subscription not more than 1 per cent of the shares on 
offer shall be allotted to each State through its investment agency. 
42 
. M See I.N. Chigbue, Legal Framework for Privatisation and Commercialisation, in GODSON O. 
. ONEKE (ED), PRIVATISATION AND COMMERCIALISATION OF PUBLIC ENTERPRISES: THE :LE OF PROFESSIONALS, 187 (Nigerian Institute of Quantity Surveyors, Lagos, 2000) (also noting 
the the Bureau of Public Enterprises Decree 1993, which replaced the Privatisation and 
Conunercialisation Decree 1988, clarified the position by stating that ten per cent of the shares were to be 
reserved for the staff. 
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In similar vein, and in a comparable bid to ensure widespread sale of shares, 
Section 7 went further to require a mandatory allocation of shares to 
associations and interest groups.43 All these provisions were aimed at 
ensuring that the privatization exercise benefited a wide spectrum of the 
society and the resulting acquisitions were not limited to the top echelons of 
society but instead cut across all strata of the public from the affluent, the 
middle class to the poor. 
Section 2 seemed to be directed at the main source of the problems of the I, ' 
SOEs. It prescribed that "notwithstanding the provisions of any enactment 
~ . .' , 
,;:' ,,~ 
and without prejudice to the generality of 1 Section 1 (dealing with the 
categorization into partial and full privatization and the power of the 
president to modify those classifications)44 the control, management and 
composition of the Boards of Directors of privatised enterprises shall as 
.' from the date of privatization reflect the ownership structure of the 
enterprises." Many commentators considered this provision to be 
J .. :/) 
SUch as State investment agencies, workers, trade unions, market women organizations, universities 
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monumental and even controversial.45 However, the section was not that 
monumental. It was a declaration or affirmation of what ordinarily should be 
the case. The prevailing company laws even at the time of the passing of the 
decree had several rules governing the appointment and control of corporate 
bodies. And usually, ownership and management generally belonged to 
equity shareholders. Technically, control might differ from ownership as 
where majority ownership is dispersed resulting in the effective control by 
minority shares concentrated in one individual or a group of individuals who 
are able to coordinate. However, the question of control is usually a question 
of fact, which is perceptible from the circumstances of a company. It is 
hardly amenable to legislative prescription. It is a de facto situation, which 
may not necessarily tally with a de jure stipulation. Certainly, a law, or a 
. company's constitutive documents, could specify the composition of the 
Board of Directors or of management. And notionally, the Board controls 
the day-to-day running of the company whilst the overall control and default 
• POwers lie in the general meeting, which retains the power to appoint and 
., 
See, for example, Eyimofe Atake, The Legal Aspects of the Implementation of the Privatisation and 
~~tmel·cja.rjsalrjon Programmes, in H.R. ZAVYAD (ED), ECONOMIC DEMOCRATISATION, 57 
lagos, 1992); Ki~r D. Barnes' Comments on Atake's Paper; Udoji supra note 11 at 169 (observing 
one hank had interpreted the provision to mean that owners of the enterprise would have their own 
at the general management level of the privatized companies in proportion to their equity 
but noting that Section 2 should have applied only to the Board of Directors and not to 
,UllIIIllgenlent. See also Boiaji Owasanoye and T.A.T. Yagba, Legal Frameworkfor Privatisation of Banks 
in I.A. AYUA AND BOLAJI OWASANOYE, PRIVATISATION OF GOVERNMENT 
BANKS AND THE ISSUE OF OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL, 5 (Nigerian Institute of 
,f'IlYanCp.rI Legal Studies, Lagos, 1996) 
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rel110ve directors. It did not seem that Section 2 was meant to be strictly 
interpreted. Were it so intended, the further question would have arisen as to 
the basis for the allocation of the control of management or the Board 
especially where the shares were vested in a dispersed group as was 
contemplated by the widespread share ownership envisaged under the 
decree. Instead, Section 2 was an admonition, to the government officials in 
the affected Ministries, to desist from intermeddling and trying to control the 
enterprises. They were to respect the corporate structure enunciated by the 
privatization of the SOEs. The proper and normal functioning of corporate 
management was to be allowed vis-a- vis the privatized entities. The point 
being made is that pre- privatization, the same officials were not supposed to 
meddle in the affairs of the SOBs, some of which were set up as companies, 
and therefore were subject to the normal rules of corporate management. But 
they did so anyway, because they, in fact, could get away with it. Thus, the 
legal prescription that the control of the enterprises would be vested in the 
ownership of the enterprises, did little to prevent the same officials from 
intermeddling because the source of their ability to interfere was not 
necessarily the prevailing law but a de facto situation in which, in reality, 
they could do so. 
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The 1988 decree also stipulated the methods of privatization to be adopted. 
It required the shares of the SOBs to be offered for sale in the Nigerian 
capital market and that the offers should be by public issues.46 However, the 
Federal Military Government could decide that the shares should be sold by 
private placements. This would be on the advice of the implementing 
47 
agency . 
III. INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK 
Most government policies are benign. They become good or bad, depending 
on the implementation. Thus, the fate of the privatization program depended 
so much on the character, ability and effectiveness of the implementing 
The literature reveals three universal alternatives available to a 
intent on privatizing its SOBs.48 First, there is the ministerial or 
..... u:,.'"'u approach. Under this approach, the Ministries, which had been 
the SOBs, are charged with implementing the privatization 
-"""'_.04. Bach Ministry conducts the sale or transfer of the government 
in the SOBs under its supervision. This approach has the advantage 
6 of the Decree 
supra note 42 at 187-188 
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that since the Ministry has been supervising the SOE, it is familiar with all 
its ramifications, and, all things being equal, is in a good position to assess it 
both in terms of the appropriate purchaser of the shares and in terms of the 
price to be charged for them. This was certainly not an appealing option for 
Nigeria. First, the civil servants in the Ministries always viewed the SOEs as 
areas over which they could exert influence. They probably would have 
scuttled or slowed down the privatization program. Secondly, given the 
reality of Nigeria's political life, especially under the military 
administrations, with the leadership vesting in one institution, indeed one 
. individual (the head of state), and the colossal nature of most of the SOEs, 
the president, and indeed any Nigerian president, would like to keep a tight 
reign over the exercise. Besides, it is arguable that, even the privatization 
program would be an avenue for patronage and the ruling class would be 
very reluctant to let civil servants oversee such exercise. 
second approach is what is called the treasury approach. Here the 
or Ministry of Finance privatizes all the SOEs. The advantage is 
the treasury department is intimately involved in fiscal and sometimes 
--"' ....... ·l~ policies and since privatization is somehow connected to the over 
policy of the country, the treasury department would be in a good 
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, position to implement it. The downside is the same as under the ministerial 
or decentralized approach, which is that civil servants might not be keen to 
effect the privatization. 
The third and most popular approach is the independent focal point 
approach. Under this method an entirely new agency is constituted, with the 
purpose of implementing the privatization program. The agency would 
normally be independent and have direct channel to the highest quarters of 
government. The upside to this approach is that since the main purpose of 
/ the agency is to undertake the privatization of the SOEs, it would embark 
upon that purpose with zeal. It would also serve as one stop shop for all 
SOEs, so that anyone desirous of acquiring interests in the SOEs would 
have to deal, for the most part, with only the agency. The downside is that if 
properly managed, the agency could become additional government 
with its members being tempted to transform it into a 
---& ............... u. bureaucracy. 
adopted the independent focal point approach in both the first 
and in the ongoing program. The 1988 decree established a 
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committee known as the Technical Committee on Privatisation and 
Commercialisation (TCPC).49 
The TCPC's membership was drawn from both the private and public 
sectors of the economy and was made up of persons with detailed 
knowledge and experience.5o The members were appointed on such terms 
and conditions as the president might deem fit in the circumstances. 51 
Besides the specific functions contained in Section 4(1 )52 of the decree, the 
TCPC was also charged with performing such other functions as the 
president might, from time to time, assign to it. 53 It was also subject to such 
directions as the president might deem necessary. 54 Similarly, the TCPC was 
to report to the federal government through the office of the president.55 The 
rcpc was funded by grants from the federal and state governments and was 
required to maintain a fund, which consisted of such moneys as was, from 
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.. time to time, provided by the federal and state governments. 56 Its expenses 
were defrayed from such fund. 57 It was also required to keep proper accounts 
and records of its receipts, payments, assets and liabilities and to prepare, in 
respect of each financial year, a statement of accounts in such form as the 
federal government might direct. 58 Its accounts were to be audited within 3 
months after the end of the financial year to which the accounts related. 59 It 
is reported that "from 1988 to 1993, activities of TCPC were funded from 
three main sources, viz Federal government grants (74.2%), United Nations 
Development Programme (1 %) and "other receipts" typified by interest 
incomes (24%)",60 for a total ofN43.8 million. 
was to submit a report of its overall activities every 6 months,61 and a 
", ... " ... ,. report within 3 months after the expiration of the year.62 Consistent 
efficiency and, perhaps, because of the complexity involved, the TCPC 
N.M. OGUBUNKA, ELEMENTS OF PRIVATISATION IN NIGERIA, 103 (Rhema Enterprises, 
2000) (noting further that the federal government provided grants to TCPC for only two years 
and 1989/90) and that the grants from UNDP came in for two years too, 1989/90 Iud 1990/91) 
9 
10 
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authorized to have standing and ad hoc sub-committees and to co-opt 
non-members into the sub-committees provided such sub-committees were 
presided over by members.63 
IV. CLASSIFICATION OF ENTERPRISES FOR THE PURPOSE OF THE 
pRIV ATIZA TION PROGRAM 
The scheme of the first privatization program was the classification of 
enterprises into those to be partially privatized, fully privatized, partially 
commercialized I:llld fully commercialized.64 Experts suggest that for such 
classification to be meaningful there need be bases for placing a SOE into 
one or the other of the groupS.65 Some suggest that indeed the decision to 
privatize a particular SOE should be based on whether the perceived market 
failure, in the sector in which the SOE operates, has been solved. If it has, 
then, the SOE should be privatized, whereas if it has not, the government 
should retain ownership.66 Others, such as Sanda,67 opine that privatization 
See Section I of the 1988 Decree. 
See for example the comments of Professor V.V. Rhamanadan on H.R. Zayyad, Implementation of the 
Privatisation and Commercialisation Programme, in H.R. ZA YY AD (ED), ECONOMIC 
U"II..((r-.r.~ TISATION, 44 (TCPC, Lagos, 1992) (stating that: "the question which is necessary to be 
and answered by the Government is: in which sectors have market failure been completely solved? 
ttt.at case, let us divest or privatise. Secondly, we will ask the question; in which sector is market failure 
In existence? In conditions of market failure, the enterprise may have to remain in the public sector for 
but at the same time we have to make the enterprise operate under market discipline.") 
See Prof Rhamanadan's comments supra note 65 
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should be selective based on the following criteria: (i) extent of strategic 
significance of each SOE; (ii) level of government equity participation; (iii) 
the empirical records of performance of the SOE for an interval of time 
(example five years or more); (iv) level or extent of government 
administrative capacity; (v) the availability of investors, entrepreneurs and 
local associations to take over the divested shares.68 It is not clear what 
criteria informed the placement of the SOEs into the different 
classifications.69 It is not exactly the case that the SOEs were established as a 
result of perceived market failure in certain sectors of the economy, and 
therefore Professor Rhamanadan's formulation/o on the choice of 
enterprises to be privatized, might not have been appropriate to Nigeria. As 
has been shown above, the SOEs were formed following independence and 
mainly because the private sector was not yet developed, and not because of 
any market failure in the private sector. Perhaps, a variant on Rhamanadan's 
" See A.O. Sanda, Justification and Strategies for the Selective Privatization of State Owned Enterprises, 
The Quarterly Journal of Administration Vol. XI Nos 3 and 4, April/July 1987 (published by the Faculty of 
. Administration. Obafemi Awolowo University, IIe-Ife, Nigeria) P. 173 
68 
Sanda supra note 16 at 179-180 
69 
.'. !'t.~. Odejide, supra note 6 at 191 (noting that the decision of the government on the enterprises to be 
.. pnvatized or commercialized was not arrived at as a result of any critical or dispassionate evaluation."; See 
..• ·.h1so Udoji supra note 11 at 171-172 (noting that it is difficult to discover the criteria government used for 
. the classification of enterprises into those to be privatized fully, those to be partially privatized and those to 
.... commercialized fully or partially, but guessing that the government wanted to retain ownership and 
COntrol of viable enterprises and strategic industries like steel. He further observes that whilst retention of ~tegic industries might be justified, retention based on the fuct that particular SOEs are viable might not 
.. JUStified.) 
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theme would be to ask the question, in what fields the private sector had 
become developed. This overlaps with the criteria articulated by Sanda 
above. Certainly, the privatization program could have benefitted from an 
apriori examination of all enterprises before their placement into one or 
other category of the four-pronged reform, and the TCPC could have been 
empanelled even before the allocation of the enterprises into those 
categories. 
Nonetheless, while the government did not specify the exact bases for the 
classification into the full privatization, partial privatization, partial 
commercialization and full commercialization categories, a plausible 
rationale could be detected from the types of enterprises placed in each 
group, and it did not seem that the government was trying to retain viable 
enterprises whilst selling unprofitable ones. The first category contained 
those SOEs, which were partially privatized. These included development, 
commercial and merchant banks; oil marketing companies; steel rolling 
mills; air and sea traveling firms; fertilizer companies; motor vehicle 
assembly plants; paper mills; sugar companies; and cement companies.71 It 
could be speculated that these were areas of the economy in which although 
-------------------'1 Tc~e Section 1(1) Part I of Schedule 1 to Privatisation and Commercialisation Decree No 25 of 1988; 
rC Report P. 11 
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private sector was fairly developed, because of their impact on the 
the government did not want to fully divest. It still desired to be 
.... involved in some ways,72 especially as the private sector could not be said to 
bave attained the level of development suitable for an economy such as 
. ., Nlgena s. F or instance, whereas there were private oil marketing 
companies, the downstream sector could not just be left for the private sector 
in 1988, as there were not enough of such concerns to effectively serve the 
country. Similarly, steel rolling mills, motor assembly plants and fertilizer 
companies involved substantial amounts of capital outlays that could still be 
considered fairly substantial for private concerns. In these, and similar 
industries, it could be surmised that the government chose to "partner" the 
private sector, under the auspices of partial privatization, in the continued 
effort to develop those segments of the economy. Of course, it also reflected 
the ambivalence or, if you are more charitable, the cautious approach, of the 
government towards privatization. 
A similar analysis attends those SOBs placed under the category of fully 
PriVatized enterprises. For the most part, these were enterprises involved in: 
hotels and tourism; textiles; transportation; food and beverages; agriculture 
-------------------
72 
.• l(uye assert that "Enterprises to be partially privatized are those which the government considers 
strategic' because of the greater 'public' nature of their goods." See Kuye supra note 3 at 65 
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end livestock production; salt; wood and furniture; insurance; film 
. production and distribution; flour milling; cattle ranching; construction and 
engineering; dairy; and others.73 It could be conjectured that the government 
felt that its total withdrawal from these sectors would not have a negative 
impact on the overall economy. Compared to the kinds of enterprises in the 
partially privatized group, it is arguable that the kinds of companies in the 
fully privatized group were more widespread and commonplace, and also 
more easily operated by the private sector. They also involved less capital 
outlays. 
The clearest manifestation of the government's hesitation, or carefulness, is 
in the coupling of commercialization to the privatization program. The 
choice of the enterprises for commercialization seemed to be informed by 
. the need to guard against imperiling the public utilities and those other 
enterprises that are not only strategic but, indeed, central to the economy. 
included: the Nigerian Railway Corporation; Nigerian Airports 
, Nigerian Power PLC; Nigeria Security Printing and Minting 
\"OIlnDalnv,~ National Provident Fund; Ajaokuta Steel Company Limited; 
l'1U!'PM~ln Machine Tools Limited; Federal Housing Authority; Federal Radio 
. See Section 1(2) and Part II of8chedule 1 to Privatisation and CommerciaIisatioJl Decree No 25 of 1988; 
ReportP.ll 
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~_ ..... I'\1'!l1·10n of Nigeria; Nigerian Television Authority; News Agency of 
Kainji Lake National Park; and the River Basin Development 
These were partially commercialized, which meant that 
government stopped giving them money for recurrent expenses even though 
it could fund their capital projects.74 On its face, the list boasted enterprises, 
which were significantly important to the economy nay the nation. And 
while the government was not entirely satisfied with their performance it 
was not ready to turn them entirely and immediately to the private sector. 
tnstleaCl. it tried to gradually set them on the path to market forces. 
last category, under the 1988 Decree, consisted of those SOEs, which 
fully commercialized. Again, the government considered these to be 
to the economy, but perhaps what distinguished them from the SOEs 
were only partially commercialized was that unlike the latter, they were 
commercial from the beginning, even though they also contained 
social or public utility aspect. In other words they seemed to have less 
utility content than the partially privatized group. The partially 
group included: the Nigerian National Petroleum 
.............. Vlll. the Nigerian Telecommunications PLC; the Associated Ore 
See Section 12(1) and Part I of Schedule 2 to the Privatisation and Commercialisation Decree No. 25 of 
TCPC Report PP. 59-61 
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IY.LP'--~ Company Limited; the Nigerian Mining Corporation; the Nigerian 
coal Corporation; the National Insurance Corporation; the Nigerian 
h Reinsurance Corporation; National Properties Limited; and Nigerian Ports 
PLC.75 The commercialized enterprises were empowered to fix the rates, 
prices and charges for goods and services, which they provided and to 
capitalize their assets.76 They were also empowered to borrow money and 
issue debenture stocks, as well as to sue and be sued.77 
v. PRIVATIZATION METHODS USED BY TCPC 
The TCPC utilized several methods in privatizing the SOES.78 Thirty-five of 
the SOEs were privatized through public offer of shares in the Nigerian 
· Stock Exchange. Those enterprises were required to satisfy the requirements 
by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). Such 
conditions included the requirement that the SOE must show strong 
· evidence of historic and futuristic profit and must, at the time of sale, show 
7$ 
See Section 12(2) and Part II of Schedule 2 to the Privatisation and Commercialisation Decree No 25 of 
· 1988; TCPC Report PP. 62-63 
'18 
TCPC Final Report PP. 22·23; MIKE I. OBADAN AND A'SESAN AYODELE, 
· COMMERCIALISATION AND PRlV ATIZA TION POLICY IN NIGERIA, 89 (NCEMA, Ibadan, 1998) 
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evidence of five years maintainable profit and a strong net asset base.79 
. TCPC refrained from selling weak shares to the pUblic. Thus, it required that 
such SOBs should be in a position to pay attractive dividend to shareholders, 
and that it should also be possible to recover the cost of floatation of any 
SOE privatized by public offer.80 Seven SOBs were privatized through 
private placement. This method was adopted where TCPC felt that a SOB 
had a lot of profit potentials but would entail a high cost of floatation if it 
was sold by public offer.81 Obviously, sale by private placement presents the 
worst possible opportunity for corruption, in that the privatizing agency if it 
was not careful could transfer the SOBs to a few individuals. But the TCPC 
adopted a policy of first offering such SOBs, to be sold by private 
placement, to state investment institutions, because it considered them to 
reflect the generality of the Nigerian society. Secondly, such practice 
iiC(:Orc:led with the declared policy of spreading share ownership.82 However, 
SEC was still involved in determining the price of the shares. Eight 
were disposed of by the method of selling their assets, the so called 
Omowale A. Kuye, Problems and Prospects of Nigeria's Privatisation, Quarterly Journal of 
Vol. XXV No 1 October 1990 P. 49 at 58 
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stripping. This approach was adopted for the SOEs that were 
characterized by serious losses that it was thought that they could not be 
turned around. Essentially, the assets of the SOEs were sold off. The River 
Basin Development Authorities were disposed of in this way. 83 One SOE 
I Ii' was sold in a management buyout. Four were handled through a system 
called deferred public offer. This meant that the government sold the shares, 
in the applicable SOE, to a group of private investors on condition that a 
certain percentage (40o/G) would, in turn, be sold to the public within five 
years.84 The reasoning was that the concerned SOE was not very viable at 
the moment but could be turned around. The group of investors essentially 
was to turn it around within the prescribed period, and then sell a portion of 
the stake in the enterprise to the Nigerian public. 
commercialization, the TCPC's approach was to detail a committee of 
to undertake a diagnostic exercise, covering many aspects of the 
. Nigeria - Structural Adjustment Program: Policies. Implementation, and Impact, (World Bank Report, 
1994) P. 32; Shamsuddeeen Usman, Monitoring and Regulatory Aspects oj Privatization in Nigeria, 
V.V. RAMANADHAM (ED), PRIVATIZATION AND AFTER: MONOTORING AND 
TION, 92, 95 (Routledge, London, 1994) (noting the deferred public offer method was adopted 
enterprises which, though viable, were such that their privatization by public offer would not raise 
commensurate with the real value of their underlying assets) 
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enterprise.85 These included its organizational and management structure of 
the enterprise, development of scientific measurement criteria for assessing 
the performance of the enterprise, the design of appropriate capital structure 
and expenditure policies. Other areas covered by the detailed analysis were 
the revenue generation and collection system, evolving staff remuneration 
programs commensurate with the revenue generated by the enterprise; and a 
review of the management information system of the enterprise in terms of 
its relevance.86 Then the enterprise would be commercialized either partially 
or fully. An important feature, indeed, the most revolutionary aspect of the 
commercialization program, was the performance contract, which SOEs 
signed with the government and which also included the TCPC. We shall 
.IJ 
. ; ~ to this reform device later in this chapter. 
ASSESSMENT OF THE FIRST PRIVATIZATION PROGRAM 
assessment of the first privatization program would reveal some positive 
I-" ................ u or that it had salutary impact on the economy. It is noted that 
lCuye supra note 3 at 69 
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exercise reduced the number of the 80Es87, and, presumably, by that 
reduced the problems associated with SOEs with which the 
govenunent had to contend. While such a reduction might be a primary 
. outcome of the privatization effort, it is not, in and of itself, significant. This 
is because it is merely a corollary of the exercise and does not per se show 
benefit to the economy. The sale of the shares in the SOEs also yielded 
enormous revenue to the government. It is claimed that the government 
realized 3.3 billion Nigerian naira from the sale of the enterprises which 
enterprises had an original investment of 652 million Nigerian naira. This 
translated to a 2.6 billion Nigerian naira capital gain accruing to the 
government. 88 Moreover, the government realized additional funds from 
. corporate taxes, accruing as a result of the increased efficiency on the part of 
the enterprises.89 Again, prima facie, these proceeds would seem to have 
JUSllne:(1 the privatization, but this might not present a full picture. First, 
account must be taken of the hyper-inflationary trend that 
the Nigerian economy during the period. Perhaps, reckoning 
MIKE OBADAN AND A' SESAN AYODELE, COMMERCIALIZATION AND PRIVATIZATION 
IN NIGERIA, 169-173 (NCEMA, lbadan, 1998) (noting that the public enterprise sector was 
by the number of the 88 SOEs which were privatized under the first program); See also MIKE 
PRIV A TIZA TION OF PUBLIC ENTERPRISES IN NIGERIA (ISSUES AND CONDITIONS 
SUCCESS IN THE SECOND ROUND), 55 (NCEMA , Ibadan, 2000) 
TCpc Final Report PP 14-15; OBADAN, PRIVATIZATION OF PUBLIC ENTERPRISES IN 
(ISSUES AND CONDITIONS FOR SUCCESS IN THE SECOND ROUND) supra note 87 
157 
... 
. , 
inflation might reveal that the so-called capital gain, was actually a loss 
or, at least, not as much as it seemed. Besides, if adequate account is taken 
of the potentials of the SOBs, and the government's loss of potential future 
profits, the short term cash realized from the sale of the SOEs would not 
appear as significant as the 2.6 billion naira capital gains might first suggest. 
Yet, having said that, it must be noted that since the conscious decision had 
been taken to privatize the SOEs, essentially because they were not 
performing well, it was encouraging that so much was realized from the sale. 
A noteworthy beneficial effect of the privatization program is the investment 
consciousness, which it seemed to engender in the populace. It is claimed 
that prior to the commencement of the privatization program the awareness 
of the capital market was at a low level, and that no serious efforts were 
made to arouse the financial consciousness of Nigerians and to redirect their 
consumptive habits to investment habits.90 But as soon as the exercise began, 
the implementing agency, TCPC, began to undertake national tours to 
enlighten the people on the need to invest their money in business activities 
that are more rewarding to them in the long run, instead of committing them 
;-----------
A.tI~?Wale A. Kuye, Problems and Prospects of Nigeria '$ Privatisation, Quarterly Journal of 
. -.umtstration, October 1990 P. 66 
158 
activities, which are consumptive in nature. 91 The result was an increase 
personal share ownership in Nigeria. Over 800,000 shareholders were 
m"'<l' ...... - as a result of the privatization program, almost twice as many as 
. .there were in 1988 when the program was commenced.92 The increase was 
such that the TCPC could proclaim that: "the cold hands of Treasury control 
'. have been replaced by the warm hands of the Capital Market which are as 
, stimulating as they are invisible.,,93 
upshot of the increase in acquisition of shares is the perceived 
,. .... \,IJ, ...... v ....... v .... of national wealth implicit in the newfound interest of the low-
mc()me group in becoming shareholders. Using data from the subscriptions 
three enterprises, Kuye noted that 74.3% of the shares on offer in 
Mills Nigeria Limited were allotted to people of the low income 
In the case of African Petroleum 68.02% was allotted to the low 
group, while 92% of the shares on offer in National Oil and 
.. • ....... JIU""'i:lll:::; Marketing Company Limited were allotted to that group.94 
Final Report 14-15 
Final Report P 15 
luye supra note 3 at 67 (asserting that ''within a short time TCPC has contributed more to the 
of national wealth than economic policy measures had achieved in the past.") 
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It is also claimed that the privatization program led to improvement in the 
efficiency of the enterprises.95 A number of enterprises gained solvency and 
began to make profits following the privatization and commercialization 
policy.96 In a World Bank study on the privatization of banks and 
performance, spanning the period 1990 to 2001, the researchers found that, 
"while privatized banks performed significantly worse than privately owned 
commercial banks before privatization, this gap was effectively closed by 
privatization. ,,97 It also found evidence of the poor performance of banks that 
continued with minority government ownership during the sample period.98 
In another study, that measured the impact of privatization on the private 
9S TCPC Final Report P. 14-15 
96 Shamsuddeen Usman supra note 84 at 101 (noting that the most notable of these enterprises was the 
Nigerian telcommunications PLC (NITEL) ); See also Commercialisation of Public Enterprises: A Case 
8tuc/yo[NEPA, in SETTING THE ECONOMY FREE, supra note 6, P. 72 at 81 (noting that between 1990 
and 1992, following the commercialization of NEPA, there was an improvement in the financial 
Performance of NEP A and in the supply of electricity nationwide as well as in revenue/debt collection and 
~ quality of staffs performance); and Commercialisation of Public Enterprises: A Case Study of NITEL, 
III SETTING THE ECONOMY FREE, supra note 6, 83 at 88 (stating that following commercialization; !cPc Final report PP. 14-15 (noting improvement in the internal efficiency of the enterprises as well as 
unprovement in the allocative efficiency of the economy and that a number of public utilities regained 
SOlvency) 
97 
E !h0rsten Beck, Robert Cull and Afeikhena Jerome, Bank Privatization and Performance Empirical 
:V/(Jencefrom Nigeria, World Bank Policy Working Paper 3511, February 2005, P. 4 
98 ~orsten Beck et al supra note 97 at 4; But the study also noted that the Nigeria case was difficult to 
Classify as a success or failure, and that the performance improvement related only to profitability and 
POnfolio qUality. It further asserted that: "since other tests indicate that privatization did not bring about 
~st reductions, at least not in the first years thereafter, profitability improvement is only attributable to 
:~eased revenue generation." (See P. 25) Thus the study seemed to suggest that while the banks increased 
8 ~Ir re~enue generation, it could not be conclusively stated that their improved fortunes translated into 
~ stan.bal welfare improvement. This was because "the mix of profit generating activities for Nigerian 
was tilted away from private lending."(See P. 25) 
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sector, it was found that privatization led to some improvement in the 
economic and financial position of the enterprises.99 It also found that the 
operational efficiency measures and earnings per share showed significant 
itnprovement. The study was of seven fully privatized firms and covered a 
period of five years prior to privatization and five years after privatization. 100 
It also found that the wage income of workers increased, and that contrary to 
expectation, privatization did not lead to unemployment in some enterprises. 
On the public revenue rationale, it was also found that the government 
subsidies did not continue after the privatization, while, on the other hand, 
the firms recorded a significant increase in the payment of taxes to the 
government. 101 
The privatization program also had a positive impact on the Nigerian capital 
market. By all accounts the program led to a growth of the Nigerian capital 
market from a capitalization of N8 billion in 1988 to over N30 billion in 
99 See A. Soyibo, Kolawole Olayiwola and Babatunde Alayande, A Review of Nigeria's Privatisation 
Programme, in E. REM! AlYEDE, BABATUNDE ALAYANDE AND AZZEZ MABAWONK (EDs), 
READINGS IN DEVELOPMENT POLICY AND CAPACITY BUILDING IN NIGERIA, 211, 224-232 
100 
The firms were: (i) Okomu Oil Palm PIc; (ii) United Nigerian Insurance Co. Plc. (UNIC); (iii) Royal 
~Ch~ge assurance; (iv) Aba Textiles Mills Plc.; (v) Flour Mills of Nigeria; (vi) National salt Company of 
1gena Plc. (NASCON); (vii) Nigerian Yeast and Alcohol manufacturing Plc. (NIY AMCO). See A Soyibo 
SUpra note '" at 224 
101 
A Soyibo, supra note 97 at 23 1-232 
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1992.102 Given that the economy was still young relative to the developed 
countries, the privatization program helped to stimulate development and 
exposed the capital market to complexities. It has been stated that: ''the 
money and capital markets, until privatisation programme was put in place, 
were characterized by dullness." 103 The privatization program created 
awareness in the capital market. The Securities and Exchange Commission 
and the Nigerian Stock Exchange earned increased incomes from the fees 
arising from the floatation of shares by the implementing agency, the TCPC, 
and by those in the private sector who followed the example of the TCPC. I04 
Similarly, the withdrawal of subventions in commercialized enterprises 
meant considerable savings to the government. 105 
VII. PERFORMANCE CONTRACTING 
If the concept of commercialization is a compromise between advocates of 
privatization and those who are dubious about government's divestment of 
. 102 TCPC Final Report, PP.14 - 15; OBADAN AND AYODELE, COMMERCIALIZATION AND 
PRIVATIZATION POLICY IN NIGERIA, supra note 1 at 169 - 173 (. that the floatation of shares 
through, and borrowing from the capital market raised the market capitalization of the Nigerian Stock 
Exchange from N 12 billion in 1989 to N285 billion in 1996); Usman supra note 84 at 95 
103 
I(uye supra note 3 at 68 
104 
I(uye supra note 3 at 69 
10$ 
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shares in SOEs, such compromise poignantly finds expression in the 
i~nIjl"""I'" of performance contract. This is a mechanism, which is intended to 
efficient management into public enterprises, by using the 
instrumentality of a contract. A linchpin of the commercialization program is 
the use of this mechanism to instill performance-based standard into the 
SOEs. Performance contracts are "negotiated, written agreements between 
governments and the managers of state enterprises that specify targets that 
management pledges to achieve in a given time frame and define how 
performance will be measured at the end of a specified period."t06 They are 
sometimes called other names such as, contract plans, memorandums of 
signaling system, program contracts, performance 
agreements, statements of intent, or public utility licenses. to7 
The origin of performance contracting is traced to Europe, especially France 
in the 1960s and 1970s in the context of high inflation and unemployment, 
Which prevailed in those times. t08 Corporatist governments, such as France 
106 Mary Shirley, Why Performance Contracts for State-Owned Enterprises Haven't Worked, Public Policy 
for the Private Sector, Note No 150, August 1998 
107 
Mary Shirley, supra note 106; PERFORMANCE CONTRACTING FOR PUBLIC ENTERPRISES, 
(PI apers presented at an Expert Group Meeting Held in New York, 24-27 April 1994, United Nations, NY, 
995) P. 11 
loa 
. PERFORMANCE CONTRACTING FOR PUBLIC ENTERPRISES, supra note 107 at 8 
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and the United Kingdom, used public enterprises to counter those 
problems. I09 The first performance contract signed in a developing country 
was in Senegal with the National Railway in 1980.110 Since then, other 
African countries have followed. 1 II 
They are aimed at the common purposes of clarifying the objectives of 
service organizations and their relationship with government, and to 
facilitate performance evaluation based on results instead of conformity with 
bureaucratic rules and regulations. 112 Most SOBs are criticized because of 
the entanglement with supervising Ministries, which exert a lot of 
interference in what should be business decisions. Besides, it is contended 
that the governments' control of SOBs places emphasis on the input into the 
SOEs and their procedures. Performance contracts try to shift this paradigm 
to results-oriented controls. 1 I3 It serves to clarify the relationship between 
the government and the enterprise, by delimiting their respective roles, 
101) 
PERFORMANCE CONTRACTING FOR PUBLIC ENTERPRISES, supra note 107 at 8 
llO 
PERFORMANCE CONTRACTING FOR PUBLIC ENTERPRISES, supra note 107 at 9 
III . 
for lOStance, Cote d'Ivoire used it in 1985; Benin from 1987; Ghana from 1989; Guinea from 1990; the 
G8Illbia from 1987; Malawi from 1990 and Nigeria in 1992; see PERFORMANCE CONTRACTING FOR 
ENTERPRISES, supra note 107 at 9. We shall discuss the Nigeria experience with performance 
\iIlntractinQ shortly. 
112 
PUblic Sector Management Reforms in Africa: Lessons Learned, 20, Development Policy Management 
Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, (Published by the Economic Commission of Africa, Dec 2003) 
Public Sector Management Reform supra note 112 at 20 
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L __ .f.nY\~ and problems.114 In order to achieve its objective a performance 
addresses three of the key problems commonly facing public 
115 These are "ill-defined and unreconciled goals, political and 
bureaucratic interventions in operational decision-making, and management 
rewards which are fixed irrespective of efforts or results.,,1l6 
A basic and conceptual problem with performance contracts is the 
nomenclature, or rather its exact legal nature. Although known as 
performance contract, the agreement does not lend itself to enforceability in 
the normal way contracts are enforced. It is said to be only a metaphor for 
the relationship between cooperators rather than a legally enforceable 
document. 11? Of course, it will not be realistic to expect that a government 
an enterprise, and therefore can exercise all the incidents of 
including the ability to hire and frre the management of the 
,~nt:erolris.e. would instead be suing the enterprise or its management for a 
Violation of a performance contract. A more pragmatic remedy, where the 
-··"" .... ""LI. .. is not satisfied with the enterprise or its management, would be 
PERFORMANCE CONTRACTING FOR BUSINESS ENTERPRISES supra note 1 07 at P.12 
PERFORMANCE CONTRACTING FOR PUBLIC ENTERPRISES, supra note 107 at P.14 
PERFORMANCE CONTRACTING FOR PUBLIC ENTERPRISES, supra note 107 atP.14 
PERFORMANCE CONTRACTING FOR PUBLIC ENTERPRISES, supra note to7 at P. 13 
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to exercise those powers to hire and fire or to discipline. Similarly, it will 
require an unnatural audacity on the part of management to sue the owners, 
in this case the government, for a violation of a performance contract. A fear 
of retribution, in terms of exercise by the government of the rights attaching 
to ownership, might discourage management from seeking judicial 
enforcement of the performance contract. Some performance contracts 
provide for arbitration as an enforcement mechanism. But, even arbitration, 
to the extent that it contemplates a mandatory submission thereto, may not 
offer a meaningful solution. This is because a government might still not be 
• .! easily amenable to such process. Thus, the efficacy of performance 
contracts depends, in large measure, on the commitment of the parties, 
especially the government, to the enterprise objectives and other terms 
,. ' , contained in them. And it would, perhaps, be more appropriate to refer to 
,.;: these so-called contracts for what they are: mere understandings between 
governments and enterprises. In a sense, it would seem to corrupt the term 
"contract", which has a standard and widely known legal connotation and 
denotation, and to reduce the respect often attached to it, to apply it to 
understandings that, from the get-go, are known to lack judicial 
enforceability, which is an essential characteristic of the term, especially in 
166 
.. i 
the conceptual difficulty associated with performance 
many countries utilize them as yet another reform tool in dealing 
with public enterprises. 
Under the first privatization and commercialization program, the TCPC 
adopted the use of performance contracts in commercializing those 
enterprises, which were still to be owned by the government. According to 
TepC, the performance contracts were introduced in order to ensure that the 
increased autonomy granted public enterprises was not misused or abused 
. and that the public enterprises act consistently with the goals of the owner 
(government) and also to instill a culture of accountability within the public 
enterprise sector. I IS The performance contract was intended to formalize the 
business relationship between the government and the enterprise specifying 
the obligations and responsibilities of the government and of the enterprise; 
It was also meant to identify and specify the overall mission of the 
enterprise, and specify the business strategies and actions the enterprise 
Would take to attain its mission; Similarly, it was expected to provide 
appropriate incentives for performance, while providing a basis for fair 
iiI 
TcPC Final Report P. 54 
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UQ"JL"~~ of the enterprise; Finally it was meant to provide an independent 
IlIU .. ":.::,_ .. ,n,.. process through the TCPC, which was authorized under the 
;.;. .... .."f'r$l'r.T to monitor the compliance of the parties to the contract. 119 In simple 
termS, the board and management of the enterprise guaranteed the attainment 
pfcertain stated levels of performance in return for operational autonomy.120 
Each such contract was intended to have an initial tenure of three years 
during which no material modification was to be made to it. The TCPC was 
to monitor its effectiveness during such period. 121 An essential part of the 
performance contract was the corporate plan, which identified the 
'Aftt"'1"1"l1"1' 's mission, provided an assessment of its current performance, as 
as determined what its long-term objectives were. Furthermore, the 
plan identified the strategies that the enterprise would use to 
its objectives and the resources that that would require. Having 
,,",VIJ'I.,",U the language of contract it was important for the performance 
to prescribe duties or obligations of the parties. The performance 
were in essence tripartite contracts involving the government, the 
and the privatization and commercialization program 
"'p1emell1tlflg agency, the TCPC. The Federal Government's obligations 
Final Report P. 54 
Final report P. 55 
Final Report P.55 
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.' were, in the main, to allow the enterprise to operate with autonomy and not 
to hinder the enterprise in its implementation of its corporate plan. 122 For 
their part, the Board and Management of the enterprise undertook to manage 
the enterprise efficiently.123 The TCPC's obligations were to monitor due 
performance by the parties of their obligations under the contract and to 
compile and publish operational data on the activities of the enterprise. It 
was also to generally facilitate the process of negotiations between the 
Federal Government and the enterprise. 124 It could demand that any party in 
default of its obligations under the contract remedy the default and, failing 
" ! that, could refer the matter to the Public Enterprises Arbitration Panel. 
122 Other obligations of the government were: not to subject the commercialized enterprises to civil service 
circulars relating to conditions of service; to allow the enterprises the freedom to, (i) pursue their corporate 
mission and take normal business decisions without let or hindrance, (ii) hire and fIre their personnel at all 
levels and to reward on a competitive basis, with the exception of the Chief Executive and executive 
Directors, (iii) determine their tariff structure so as to recover their production cost plus adequate margin to 
earn. reasonable return on investments subject to consultation with the supervising ministries, (iv)operate 
their own budget and to allocate their resources and raise funds within the capacity of their balance sheets 
to finance their operations, without government guarantees, (v) acquire and dispose of their capital assets as 
the needs arise, and (vi) take such business decisions as will promote the enterprise's survival and growth . 
See TCPC Report P. 56 
123 
The specifIc obligations were as follows to: (a) manage the enterprise efficiently to achieve the 
objectives in the corporate plan and faithfully implement the approved TCPC reform measures; (b) ensure 
financial prudence by the adoption of efficient management techniques for cost reduction and maximization 
of revenue; (c) at all times during the continuance of the performance agreement maintain and keep in 
proper working order and condition of the plant, machinery and equipment, buildings belonging to the 
enterprise; (d) insure and keep insured all its insurable property and equipment against aU risks in 
IlCcordance with sound commercial practices; ( e) keep proper books of accounts in line with sound 
Commercial principles which shall give a true and fair view of the enterprise's fInances and operations; (f) 
PUblish its annual report and accounts within three months of the end of the fInancial year to which they 
refer; (g) make contributions to the staff pension fund; (h) do all that is reasonable and consistent with the 
other provisions of the agreement to achieve the level of performance specifIed in the corporate plan, 
annual budget and detailed performance targets. See TCPC Report P. 56 - 57 
124 
See TCPC Final report P. 57 
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It could be asserted that the performance contract system adopted by the 
not work to achieve the touted objective of insulating the 
enterprises from governmental interference and also enabling them to 
perform efficiently. And such failure is not unique to the Nigerian 
commercialization program. As Shirley notes, "the logic of performance 
contracts is persuasive, but the reality has been disappointing.,,}25 Citing two 
empirical studies probing the link between performance contracts, on the one 
hand, and profitability and productivity, on the other hand, she noted that 
both found no evidence that performance contracts had improved 
efficiency. 126 She attributed the failure to three problems, which she suggests 
a performance contract must address for it to improve performance. First, it 
must reduce the information advantage that managers enjoy over owners. 
Secondly, it must motivate managers through rewards or penalties to achieve 
the contract's targets; and thirdly, it must convince managers that 
government's promises are credible. 127 One of the critical problems of the 
divorce of ownership from management is the fact that the owner might not 
as much technical and other information as the manager. As a result, 
owner might not be in the best position to superintend the manager. In 
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context of the performance contract, Shirley notes that managers are able 
use their information advantage to negotiate targets that are either hard for 
outsiders to evaluate or easy for the firm to achieve. 128 In such 
circumstances, the performance contract will hardly conduce to efficiency. 
Similarly, if the performance contract does not properly provide incentives 
for the managers or other workers, then it might not achieve its objective of 
promoting efficiency. The mistrust toward government and the absence of 
enforcement mechanism also militate against the utility of performance 
contracts. 
Apart from these inherent problems associated with performance contracts, 
. the Nigerian performance contracts, which TCPC and its successor, the 
... Bureau of Public Enterprises (BPE), orchestrated with commercialized 
enterprises also encountered the problem of lack of adequate monitoring. 
Under those contracts, the performance of the enterprises was to be 
evaluated every year. But, more than a decade after the "contracts" were 
made, most of the enterprises were yet to be evaluated. 129 And the 
-------------------
. 128 Shirley supra note 107 
·129 
Po MIKE OBADAN AND SESAN AYODELE, COMMERCIALIZATION AND PRIVATIZATION LIcy IN NIGERIA, supra note 1 at 156 
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have been no less subject to interference from governmental 
prlnistries and department, than they were prior to privatization. 130 
Performance contracting is one more illustration of a penchant for pseudo 
legalism - a declaration of readiness to abide by law while in actuality 
remaining above it. The Boards or Managements of the enterprises could not 
, i sue the government on these contracts. Indeed, TCPC had the power to 
. r 
'J 
unilaterally review or vary the performance contracts. For all of its 
formalities, performance contracts create no legally or judicially enforceable 
relationship. They are so broad and ambitious resembling more such policy 
documents as budgets and statement of objectives. It is in some respects a 
misnomer to regard them as contracts, and in a fledgling democracy with 
fragile institutions, it might be better to use other terms so as to avoid 
confusion and also in order not to detract from the aspiration towards respect 
for contract and agreements. Prior to commercialization, the intermeddling 
of the Ministries in the affairs of the enterprises was not legal. Such 
was not normally in the nature of formal official actions. Most 
See Usman, supra note 84 at 101 (arguing that the failure can be attributed to a number of factors: (i) the 
human problem of resistance to change; (ii) inadequate staff and training at the TCPC (or BPE) to 
"'U""T""'~ fully the monitoring exercise; (iii) inadequate or tardy records of the activities of the enterprises 
hinder the monitoring activities; (iv) the enterprises have been very slow in implementing certain 
of the reform program; (v) the government's failure in ensuring the stability in the boards and 
of the enterprises as required under the performance agreement; (f) government's failure to 
the enterprises the freedom to review their tariffs as provided for in the performance agreements.) 
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titnes, it was informal and subtle. Essentially, it took the nature of political 
pressure, intimidation and other pressures, which could not be classified as 
wholesome or even legal. So the solution did not lie in a formal contract 
such as the so-called performance contract. It lay in punishing or otherwise 
legally redressing the actions of the erring officials of the Ministries and of 
the enterprises. One dares say that it lay in criminal sanctions in some cases. 
No wonder the officials continued to interfere in the affairs of the enterprises 
notwithstanding the existence of the performance contracts.131 
Besides, there is a measure of contradiction in the TCPC or BPE monitoring 
the performance of the enterprises. Granted, TCPC and BPE were and are, 
respectively, manned by professionals, but they are essentially government 
agencies not dissimilar to the Ministries. And they constitute another layer 
of bureaucracy . 
TCPC Final Report P. 58 
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CHAPTER 5 
THE NIGERIAN PRIVATIZATION AND COMMERCIALIZATION 
PROGRAM 1999-DATE 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Although the privatization program introduced by the 1988 decree was 
mainly successful in the sense discussed in Chapter 4, it was also beset by 
numerous problems. The erudite Professor Mike Obadan has summarized 
the problems encountered in the execution of the first privatization 
program. 1 According to him those who were ideologically opposed to 
privatization mounted significant opposition to it.2 Similarly, some public 
officials and enterprise managers and staff resisted the policy. Public 
officials saw the program as diminishing their areas of influence because it 
( sought to sell the SOEs over which they exercised a lot of influence, and, in 
the case of commercialization, it sought to grant the SOEs autonomy from 
those officials. The opposition from the public officials, even though subtle, 
-------------------
( ~~ OBADAN, PRIVATIZATION OF PUBLIC ENTERPRISES IN NIGERIA, 58-62 (NCEMA, 
. &vauan,2oo0) 
2 ~ee also A Soyibo, Kolawole Olayiwola and Babatunde Alayande, A Review of Nigeria's Privatisation 
~mme, in E. REMI AIYEDE, BABA TUNDE ALAYANDE AND AZEEZ MABA WONK (Eds), 
. (J) INGS IN DEVELOPMENT POLICY AND CAPACITY BUILDING IN NIGERIA, 211, 221 
evelopment Policy Centre, Ibadan, 2003) 
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more effective because the privatization agency required their 
Organized labor, especially in the SOEs that were to be 
a~u .• --. vehemently opposed the program, which they feared would lead 
to retrenchment and other forms of unemployment. 
The program was also hamstrung by the absence of market competition and 
effective regulatory framework. "And so, commercialized PEs that were 
., planned to operate in a competitive environment in order to allow for the 
emergence of economic efficiency in all its ramifications, continuously 
retained their monopoly statuses in an evolving market-oriented economy. 
Consequently, the tariffs of social services and utilities skyrocketed while 
the associated services remained poor and undesirable.,,3 Of course this 
problem was always at the core of misgivings about privatization. The fear 
was that public monopolies could be turned to private monopolies. The 
Utilities Charges Commission, which was supposed to regulate the tariffs of 
commercialized enterprises proved weak in doing so, with the result that 
commercialized enterprises hiked their tariffs. Another consequence of an 
3 
OBADAN, PRIV A TIZA TION OF PUBLIC ENTERPRISES IN NIGERIA, supra note I at 59; See also 
Sesan Ayodele, Public Enterprises Reforms in Nigeria, in I.B. BELLO· IMAM, AA ADUBI AND AA 
FAJINGBESI, PERSPECTIVES ON NATIONAL ECONOMIC MANAGEMENT AND 
ADMINISTRATION IN NIGERIA, ]28, 134 (NCEMA, Ibadan, 2004) (noting that: "it may be recalled 
that up till ] 994, except for air transportation and the postal services, a truly competitive market 
environment as envisaged in the Decree which legalized the reform, remained elusive.") 
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Incftelil\.CU monopoly, or a poorly regulated one, was that the efficiency, 
was the aim of privatization and commercialization, was 
Furthermore, there was the problem of inaccessibility to credit. Many 
prospective shareholders did not have enough money to acquire the shares, 
and the banks did not heed the government's directive to extend credit 
facitlities to those desirous of acquiring shares. Besides, some of the shares 
were oversubscribed, because of the activities of institutional investors. 
Small individual investors were thus obstructed from acquiring shares. Other 
problems were that there were "imbalances in equity shareholder distribution 
among income groups and geo-politically,,4, and there were unanticipated 
delays in the commencement of the privatization program and in the 
processing of the equity share application forms. 5 
OBADAN, PRIV A TIZA TION OF PUBLIC ENTERPRISES IN NIGERIA, supra note 1 at 61 
Other problems associated with the program were: political interference in the operations of the PEs and 
also traces of bureaucracy causing delays; arbitrary fixture of products and services tariffs; supply cum 
imbalances in utilities market. See Sesan Ayodele, Public Enterprises Reforms in Nigeria, in I.B. 
---.. ... V-l1YlA.M A.A ADUBI AND AA F AJINGBESI, PERSPECTIVES ON NATIONAL ECONOMIC 
AND ADMINISTRATION IN NIGERIA, 128, 134 (NCEMA, Ibadan, 2004) and A 
Kolawole Olayiwola and Babatunde Alayande, A Review of Nigeria's Privatisation Programme, in 
AIYEDE, BABATUNDE ALAYANDE AND AZEEZ MABAWONK (Eds), READINGS IN 
POLICY AND CAPACITY BUILDING IN NIGERIA, 211, 221 (Development Policy 
Ibadan,2003) 
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As a result of these problems, the first privatization program was heavily 
criticized. And some suggest that these criticisms led to its suspension in 
1994.6 Before the abandonment, the government had already made 
modifications. It passed the Bureau of Public Enterprises Decree No 78 of 
1993 (to replace the Privatisation and Commercialisation Decree No 25 of 
1988) and replaced the Technical Committee on Privatisation and 
Commercialisation with the Bureau of Public Enterprises as the agency 
responsible for the privatization and commercialization of SOEs.7 While the 
issue of the problems might have been one consideration in suspending the 
program, it was not necessarily the only reason. Nigeria's political 
experience has been marked by frequent and oftentimes unplanned changes 
in government. And any incoming administration would always try to 
discredit the policies of its successor. It would be recalled that the Babangida 
administration, which started the privatization program, ended in August 
The Abacha administration, which succeeded it, was not as enthusiastic 
GSo . YIbo & others, supra note 2 at 221; Ayodele supra note 3 at 134 
, 
See J.J. Bala, The Impact of Commercialization in Nigeria, in V.V. RAMANADHAM" HOW DOES 
nZAnON WORK? ESSAYS ON PRIVATIZATION IN HONOUR OF PROFESSOR V.V. 
63,75 (Routledge, Florence, KY, 1997) 
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about privatization as its predecessor. Instead, it introduced the concept of 
contract leasing in 1995.8 This involved leasing SOEs to both local and 
foreign entrepreneurs on as-it-were basis.9 The lessees were to be fmns with 
proven track records and must possess the managerial and technical skills 
peculiar to the enterprise as well as financial resources needed to manage the 
enterprise. The leases were to be for a period of ten years with an option for 
renewal on a mutually agreed upon basis. 
The trial with contract leasing did not really gam ground before the 
government reverted to what it called "guided privatization." The aim of 
guided privatization was to privatize one enterprise at a time, so that the 
lessons learned in that one privatization would be applied to subsequent 
pmrattzations. It also sought to limit the share acquisitions to core strategic 
with relevant expertise to participate in the ownership of the 
.. ft"d __ ~· 1 0 
underscore the point that the fate of the privatization program was tied to 
OBADAN supra note I at 63; Bala supra note 7 at 75; Ayodele supra note 3 at 134; Soyibo & others 
note 2 at221 
& others supra note 2 at 22] 
See generally OBADAN supra note 1 at 63-68; Ayodele supra note 3 at 134~135; Soyibo & others supra 
2 at 222-223 
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disposition of the administration for the time being, the interest in the 
vau.£.al-,lV.L .. program was fully revived in 1999 during the tenure of a new 
of state. The military administration of Abdulsalami Abubakar passed 
'the law that has formed the legal basis for the current wave of privatization 
and commercialization of SOEs. II It must be noted that although that 
administration passed the law and, in essence, jump started the program 
again, the country was returned to democratic rule in May 1999, and since 
then there have been two civilian administrations, both of which have 
continued with the efforts to reform the economy and particularly to 
privatize or commercialize the SOEs. 
A further illustration of the penchant on the part of the government to 
pretend to make a clear break with the past, especially in the areas of 
refonns, is that although the law enacted to effect what may be called the 
second wave of privatization and commercialization is for the most part 
similar to the 1988 decree, the government also sought to articulate its own 
reasons for the privatization program. 12 Those reasons are not dissimilar to 
II Upon coming to office Abubakar reaffirmed his government's commitment to privatization and 
announced that the government would privatize its investment in telecommunications, electricity, 
petroleum refineries, petrochemical and bitumen production and tourism in addition to spillovers from the 
first round of privatization, ie the one that began in 1988. See OBADAN supra note 1 at 69. 
12 
The objectives are stated to be the following: (i) to redefine the role of government in order to allow it 
concentrate on the essential task of governance which includes the creation of sound legal and 
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the original motivations that informed the earlier efforts. The over arching 
fiscal constraints that plagued the economy in 1988 were still present. 
Indeed, they were aggravated by the instability that characterized the politics 
of the 1990s in Nigeria. 
II. CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE CURRENT PRIVATIZATION 
PROGRAM 
An issue, which assumed a measure of prominence in the discourse of the 
pros and cons of privatization, under the second program, was the 
constitutionality of the policy of privatization and commercialization. Again 
this was peculiar to the second phase because it was to be implemented by a 
macroeconomic frameworks among others; (ii) to restructure and rationalize the public sector in order to 
lessen the dominance of unproductive investments in the economy; (iii) to re-orientate the enterprises slated 
for privatization and commercialization towards a new horizon of performance improvement, viability and 
overall efficiency; (iv) to promote efficiency by fostering well structured markets and competition; (v) to 
create more jobs, acquire new knowledge and technology and expose the country to international 
competition; (vi) to raise funds for financing socio-economic development in such areas as health, 
education and infrastructure; (vii) to ensure positive returns on public sector investments in commercialized 
enterprises through more efficient management; (viii) to check the absolute dependence on the treasury 
funding by otherwise commercially oriented parastatals and so, encourage their approach to the Nigerian 
capital market to meet their funding requirements; (ix) to initiate process of gradual cession to the private 
sector, such public enterprises that are better operated by the private sector; (x) to reduce the fiscal burden 
ofloss- making in public enterprises which undermine fiscal control and macro-economic stability; (xi) to 
mobilize domestic resources for developing and deepening financial development; (xii) to spread and 
democratize share ownership with the benefits of positive change in labor attitudes and enhanced 
productivity; and (xiii) to lead to fairer pricing. See PRIV A TISA TION HANDBOOK (Published by the 
~ureau of Public enterprises, National Council on Privatisation, 3rd Edition 2001) (Hereinafter simply 
PRIVATISATION HANDBOOK" PP. 40 - 41; See also Eze Onyekpere, Challenges/or the Privatisation P~ogramme, in EZE ONYEKPERE (ED), READINGS ON PRIV ATIZA TION, 24, 26 (Socio Economic 
. ~ghts Initiative (SERI), Lagos, 2003) (hereinafter simply "READINGS ON PRIVA TIZA TION"); But see 
OIINSON A. AKINBADE, PUBLIC ENTERPRISES AND PRIV A TISA TION IN NIGERIA, 95 (Macak: B~ks Ltd, Lagos, 2004) (suggesting that the major concern of the government under the Obasanjo 
• P?vatization program was fiscal, ie to raise revenue and that a secondary objective was to remove price 
dIStortions in the economy) 
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elected government operating under a constitution that was 
as the supreme law of the land. 13 It is an elementary proposition 
that any law or policy inconsistent with the constitution is void to the extent 
of the consistency.14 Theoretically, the constitutional jurisprudence that 
prevailed during the first privatization program, discussed in Chapter 4, 
recognized the primacy of the constitution, or what was left of it. However, 
the manner of amending the Constitution was simple. Whereas the current 
constitution is fairly rigid, the one operated by the military in 1988, and 
thereabouts, was flexible. The government could easily modify it. Indeed, no 
affirmative act of amendment was required. It was deemed amended by any 
subsequent law, usually called decree, passed by the military administration. 
As a result, the 1988 decree, on privatization and commercialization, did not 
. necessarily have to pass constitutional muster because its prOVIsIons 
prevailed over what was left of the then prevailing constitution.15 
To return to the current exercise, which is subject to the constitution, many 
people faulted its constitutional validity. This protestation of constitutional 
13 
See Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999, Section 1(3). 
14 
Section 1(3) of the Constitution of the Federal republic of Nigeria 
IS 
At C~nstitution ofthe Federal Republic of Nigeria 1979 as modified by the Constitution Suspension and 
odification Decree No 1 1983. 
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was especially loud in the activist civil society and was rooted 
liberal conception of the role of government than in strict 
~on,::;UI,U"'J.'VU'''''' analysis. For instance, much of the argumentl6 is centered on 
of Section 16 of the 1999 Constitution, which provides, 
among other things, that the state shall "manage and operate the major 
,sectors of the economy.,,17 Major sectors of the economy are defined as 
"such economic activities as may, from time to time, be declared by a 
resolution of each House of the National Assembly to be managed and 
operated exclusively by the government of the Federation.,,18 But "until a 
resolution to the contrary is made by the National Assembly, economIC 
activities being operated exclusively by the Government of the Federation 
on the date immediately preceding the day when,,19 Section 16 came into 
force, "whether directly or through the agency of a statutory or other 
:corporation or company, shall be deemed to be major sectors of the 
16 
; See for example Kalu Onuoha, The Legal Regulation of Privatisation - A Critique, in READINGS ON 
'PRIVATIZATION,9, 10-13 (arguing that: "the practice of having core/strategic investors particularly in 
those SOEs providing essential services/utilities is unconstitutional"); Chom Bagu, Efficient Allocation of 
Resources or Looting the Patrimony: A Critical Review of Privatization in Nigeria, in READNGS ON 
'. 'PRIvATIZATION, 43, 47-48 (arguing that Sections 16 and 17 make the current privatization program 
unconstitutional); Otive Igbuzor, Privatisation in Nigeria: Critical Issues of Concern to Civil Society, in 
READINGS ON PRIVATIZATION, 36,40 (suggesting that the privatization program appears to "abuse" 
Section 16 of the Constitution) 
, 17 
The full provisions of Section 16 are: 
18 
, Section 16(4) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 
, 19 Ibid section 16(4) 
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economy.,,20 The argument then is that to the extent that the public utilities 
and other enterprises hitherto owned and operated by the Federal 
Government are sold to the private sector that would be an abnegation of 
Section 16 of the Constitution and therefore be void. 
However, neither the text nor the spirit of Section 16 compels such a 
conclusion. The section enables the State to manage the major sectors of the 
economy, but it does not state that such management should be to the 
: , , exclusion of any participation by the private sector. On the contrary, it 
recognizes in Section 16( 1)( d) "the right of any person to participate in areas 
of the economy within the major sectors of the economy." It is also arguable 
that management of the major sectors could be achieved by the State simply 
by maintaining robust regulations over those sectors whilst allowing private 
individuals to participate in them as envisaged by Section 16.21 Besides, 
Section 16 is a statement of aspirations, and, just like other parts of Chapter 
II of the constitution of which it is a subset, it is not meant to be a precise 
constitutional command admitting of no variation. In legal or judicial 
lOlb' Id section 16(4) 
11 
See also Emeka Iheme, The Legal Regulation of Privatisation, in READINGS ON PRIV A TISA TION, 1 
~ 3 (arguing that "privatization, no doubt, is one way in which the government may enable individuals to 
~~cipate' in a sector of the economy", and further that "on the whole, however, the Constitution does not 
hge the government either to maintain public enterprises or to privatize them. The question is one of 
POlicy to be addressed by each government in its own wisdom." 
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it is said to be non-justiciable.22 This means that the normal 
judicial remedies available in the event a constitutional breach are not 
,,) available in any alleged violation of Chapter II. The Courts do not have 
.j jurisdiction over disputes founded on violations of that part of the 
Constitution and, as a result, will not entertain actions to redress any such 
violations. 
However, one must agree with Theme that there are aspects of the Public 
.! • Enterprises (Privatisation and Commercialisation) Act 1999 that might not 
comport with the 1999 Constitution.23 The Act confers enormous powers on 
the National Council on Privatisation (NCP) to add to, delete from, alter or 
amend the list of enterprises to be privatized.24 Iheme25 rightly argues that to 
the extent that NCP's powers enable it to add a statutory corporation (not 
otherwise included in the list for privatization) to such list, such powers may 
be unconstitutional if the addition implies an amendment or repeal of the 
statute that established the enterprise. Since the designation of such statutory 
corporation involves an amendment or repeal of the statute, only the 
22 
See Section 6(6)(c) of the Constitution 
23 
. lheme supra note 21 at 4 
14 • 
. Section 1(3) of the Act 
2s lh eme supra note 21 at 4 
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Assembly, in the exercise of its constitutional legislative functions, 
is competent to designate it for privatization. 
Ill. LEGAL FRAMEWORK OF THE CURRENT PRIVATIZATION 
PROGRAM 
, , , The currently operative legislation, which provides the legal framework for 
privatization, is the Public Enterprises (Privatisation and Commercialisation) 
Act 199926 (hereinafter "Privatisation and Commercialisation Act" or "the 
, i Act"). The Act enacts a gradualist approach27 to privatization. In doing so, it 
follows the 1988 model of placing SOEs into four categories: (i) partially 
privatized28, (ii) fully privatized29, (iii) partially commercialized30 and (iv) 
fully commercialized.31 
26 
There was also the Bureau of Public Enterprises Decree 1993 but this was repealed by the Privatisation 
and Commercialisation Act 
2'1 It is gradualist or intermediate if you take the entire exercise as a whole, otherwise it is arguable that for 
the enterprises to be fully privatized the approach is immediate or the so-called big bang. 
, 28 Section 1 (1) of the Act and Part I of the First Schedule thereto. 
29 
Section 1(2) of the Act and Part II of the First Schedule to the Act. 
30 
Section 6( 1) of the Act and Part I of the Second Schedule to the Act. 
31 
Section 6(2) of the Act and Part II of the Second Schedule thereto. 
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pARTIAL PRIVATIZATION 
OLU' ...... ~~ •• ,.., to the Act, partial privatization means that the government does 
not fully divest its interest in the concerned SOE. Instead, in the exercise of 
the powers vested in it, the NCP introduces a scheme whereby fifty one per 
cent of the shares in such enterprise are sold to what they call "core" or 
"strategic" investor. The government retains twenty nine percene2 of the 
!\ equity, while twenty percent is available for subscription by Nigerian 
individuals. Out of the twenty percent available to individuals, ten percene3 
(i.e. half) will be allotted to the staff of the affected enterprise. 34 
Significantly, the notion of "core investor" has been central to the ongoing 
privatization program. The Act does not specifically provide for it, although 
it would seem to tacitly recognize it in the provisions of Section 4 thereof 
which states that "a privatized enterprise which requires participation by 
strategic investors may be managed by the strategic investors as from the 
effective date of the privatization on such terms and conditions as may be 
-
32 The distribution was formerly forty percent to core investor and forty percent to the government. The 
National Council on Privatisation (NCP) Amended Schedule. 
33 
Section 5(3) of the Act; Originally this was one percent, but pursuant to powers which the Act has 
vested in it the NCP increased it to ten percent. 
341'L, 
tlUS appears to be an attempt to woo employees and to reduce their opposition to the exercise. 
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upon." As a policy matter, it has been driven by the NCP and the 
in the exercise of the enormous powers and wide latitude given to NCP 
'in respect of administering the privatization program . 
The concept of "core investor" appears to be an indirect appeal to foreign 
investors. This is because such an investor "must not only possess the 
technical know - how in relation to the activities of the enterprises they wish 
to invest in but also possess the financial capacity to pay competitive price 
for the enterprise and increase their capital base.,,35 Given the paucity of 
both resources locally, it appears the dual requirements would work in favor 
35 Presidential Statement supra not 14; See also Section 34 of the Act (which defines "strategic investor" as 
"a reputable core investor or group of investors having the requisite technical expertise, the managerial 
experience and the financial capacity to effectively contribute to the management of the enterprises to be 
privatized"). The Guidelines on Privatisation issued by the NCP has the following proviSions on core 
investors: "Core Investors or Strategic Investors can be described as formidable and experienced groups 
with the capabilities for adding value to an enterprise and making it operate profitably in the face of 
international competition. They should possess the capabilities of turning around the fortune of such an 
enterprise, if by the time of their investment, the enterprise is unhealthy. The major characteristics that 
distinguish strategic/core group investors are:~ 
(a) They must posses the technical know~how in relation to the activities of the enterprises they wish 
to invest in. For example, a Core Investor into a Cement Company must have access to cement production 
expertise with regards to optimal use of the machinery, maintenance of such machinery and other technical 
aspects of Cement Production such as procurement of raw materials, etc. 
(b) The Core Investors must also posses the fmancial muscle, not only to pay competitive price for the 
enterprise they wish to buy into but also to turn around its fortune, using their own resources without 
relying on the Government for funds. Each CorelStrategic Investor is expected to prepare a 
ShortlMediumILong term plan for the development of the enterprise and indicate how it will be fmanced. 
(c) The Core Investor must have the management know~how to run a business profitably in a 
Competitive environment where market forces dictate the business environment. 
13.2 Given the magnitude of investment level in the utilities earmarked for Privatisation, the limited 
absorptive capacity of the Nigerian Capital Market, our low technological level among other reasons, it is 
qUite obvious that there is need to utilise the services of core investors in the new dispensation. 
13.3 In consonance with 8(4) of the Privatisation Act, privatised enterprise which requires participation 
by Strategic Investors may be managed by the Strategic Investors as from the effective date of Privatisation 
?D such terms and conditions as may be agreed upon. On the other hand, strategic investors will work hand 
III hand with the existing Management for a certain transition period." 
187 
· foreign investors. This is consistent with the general intendment of the 
"'41'{~lSt::: to attract foreign investments. It is also pertinent to mention that the 
of the shares available to Nigerians shall be done on the basis of 
equality of Federal Constituencies.36 And where there is an over-
subscription, no individual subscriber shall be entitled to hold more than 0.1 
" per cent of the equity shares in the enterprise.37 Significantly, the critical 
enterprises are in the list of entities to be partially privatized.38 This reflects 
the ambivalence with which many still view privatization. The government 
' .. i.' is yet to wholeheartedly embrace it.39 Whether this approach is beneficial is 
an open question. On the one hand, considering the strategic nature of these 
36 Section 5(2) of the Act; again this result is consequent on the amendment effected by the NCP. 
Originally, the emphasis was on equality of States. 
37 Section 5(4) of the Act; It is arguable whether this is an adequate safeguard against monopoly. 
38 Examples are: the telecommunications sector (Nigerian Telecommunication PLC (NlTEL»; the 
electricity sector (National Electric Power Authority (NEPA»; the petroleum sector (the Refmeries); gas 
sector (Nigerian Gas Company Ltd); others are machine tools (Nigerian Machine tools Company Ltd); steel 
and aluminum sector (Jos Steel Rolling Mill Ltd; Katsina Steel Rolling Mill Co. Ltd; Oshogbo Steel 
Rolling Mill Co. Ltd ; Ajaokuta Steel Co. Ltd; delta Steel Co. Ltd; Aluminum Smelter Co. Ltd); insurance 
COmpanies (NICON Insurance PLC, Nigerian Reinsurance PLC); transport and aviation companies 
(Federal Airports Authority of Nigeria, Nigerdock PLC, Nigeria Airways Ltd); paper companies (Nigerian 
National Paper Manufacturing co. Iwopin, Nigerian Newsprint Manufacturing Co. Ltd Oku Iboku, Nigerian 
paper Mills Ltd Jebba); sugar companies (Sunti Sugar Co. Ltd, Lafiagi sugar Co., Nigeria Sugar Co. 
Bacita) and other miscellaneous companies. See generally Part I of the First Schedule to the Public 
Enterprises (Privatisation and Commercialisation) Act No 28, 1999. 
19 
Herbst attributes the ambivalence to the political roles SOEs play in Africa. As a result, he argues, 
governments would not wholeheartedly commit to privatization. He thus suggests a more realistic and 
lasting solution that would involve incremental reforms to improve public sector operations along with 
selected divestment. See Jeffrey Herbst, The Politics of Privatization in Africa, in EZRA SULElMAN & 
JOHN WATERBURY (ED), THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF PUBLIC SECTOR REFORM AND 
~RIVATIZATION, 234-254, 251 (Westview Press, Boulder, 1990); Indeed the control of these huge SOEs 
IS seen as one of the attractions of governance and many politicians factor them in their political 
calCulations. 
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enterprises, there may be a need for the government to retain some form of 
interest in them. However, experience has shown that once the government 
is involved, it may in fact call the shots irrespective of the amount of its 
shareholding.40 As a result, such an arrangement may not augur well for 
attracting the much needed foreign capital. Foreign investors are usually 
particular about stability and some form of certainty. And they are aware of 
the legal, political and other constraints in redressing governmental 
intermeddling in enterprises. One suspects that it is this incongruence that 
caused the National Council on Privatisation41 (NCP) to amend the ratio of 
percentage ownership in partially privatized SOBs, from 40: 40 to 51: 29, in 
favor of core investors. It is doubtful if such enhanced and clear majority 
provides a sufficient assurance that the government will allow the core 
investors the required free hand to turn the ailing partially privatized 
enterprises around. 
40 ~or instance in the past government has been known to appoint and remove directors of companies in 
whIch it had an interest without reference to constitutive documents of such companies; See also ERNST & 
YOUNG, PRIVATIZATION: INVESTING IN STATE OWNED- ENTERPRISES AROUND THE 
WORLD, 35 (John Wiley & Sons, Inc., NY, 1994) (alluding to the unwillingness or inability of 
government to relinquish control completely, but noting that private investors and governments usually 
Illake uncomfortable bed partners.) 
4\ A body created under the Privatisation and Commercialisation Act 
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FULL PRIVATIZATION 
Full privatization entails the divestment of the entirety of government's 
shat'e holding in the enterprise. In most of the companies involved, the 
government is only part holder of the stocks. Thus, privatization, in this 
sense, is the transfer to the private sector, of the government's already 
litnited interest in the companies. The firms in this category are not as 
strategic as those for partial privatization.42 As in the partially privatized 
companies, the shares available for sale are to be allocated on an equitable 
geographical spread using the equality of Federal Constituencies as a basis; 
and ten percent of such shares are to be made available to employees of the 
enterprises. 43 
.2 The prominent fIrms here may be some of the operators in the downstream sector of the oil industry 
(such as Unipetrol PLC, National Oil and Chemical Company PLC and African Petroleum PLC); others are 
cement companies (such as Ashaka Cement Company PLC, Benue Cement Comapany PLC, Northern 
Nigeria cement Company PLC; Nigerian Cement Company Limited Nkalagu" Calabar Cement Company 
Ltd, West African Portland Cement); Commercial and Merchant Banks (Afribank Nigeria PLC, Assurance 
B~ PLC, FSB International bank PLC; NAL Merchant Bank PLC); Agro-Allied Companies(Ayip-Eku 
Oil Palm Company PLC, Opobo Boat Yard, Nigeria Romania wood Industries Ltd, Ihechiowa Oil Palm 
Co. PLC); Motor Vehicles and Truck Assembly Companies (such as ANAMCO Ltd, Leyland Nigeria Ltd 
Peugeot Automobile of Nigeria Ltd, Volkswagen of Nigeria); Hotels (Nigeria Hotels Ltd, Festac 77 PLC, 
AbUja International Hotel Ltd) etc. See generally Part II of the First Schedule to the Public Enterprises 
(Privatisation and Commercialisation) Act No 28, 1999. 
43 
Section 5(2) and (3) of the Act, respectively 
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COMMERCIALIZATION 
:} we saw earlier, privatization, in the broad sense, encapsulates 
.... ; : commercialization. This is because, in its wide connotation, privatization 
encompasses every attempt by the state to make the SOEs operate with the 
same level of efficiency found in the private sector. This is at the heart of the 
Nigerian approach to commercialization, which at the same time 
distinguishes commercialization from privatization. For firms to be partially 
,,~. , 
commercialized, the implication is that "such enterprises so designated will 
be expected to generate enough revenue to cover their operating 
expenditures. The government may consider giving them grants to finance 
" ./ their capital projects.,,44 On the other hand, full commercialization ~'means 
that enterprises so designated will be expected to operate profitably on a 
. commercial basis and be able to raise funds from the capital market without 
government guarantee. Such enterprises are expected to use private sector 
procedures to run their businesses.,,45 
44 
See Article 6( d) Guidelines on Privatisation 
•. 4$ See Article 6(c) 
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strict or narrow interpretation of privatization may exclude both forms 
of commercialization because the legal ownership of the enterprises or 
therein, remams vested in the government. However, 
conunercialization effects the removal of the subsidies they hitherto enjoyed 
from the government. These enterprises are, therefore, not available for 
foreign direct investment. But the bulk of the enterprises in both categories 
provide social and other important services46 to the economy. And to the 
extent that they operate at their optimum, they definitely would contribute to 
an environment that is very attractive to foreign investors. 
N.INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK 
The Privatisation and Commercialisation Act creates two bodies directly 
charged with implementing the privatization program. The first is the NCp47, 
which is composed of persons holding certain important portfolios in the 
government and others appointed by the President. Its functions48 are 
46 
. ,Examples of companies to be partially commercialized are: the River basin development authorities, the 
. N~gerian Television Authority, the parks etc while examples of those subject to full commercialization are: 
NIgerian National Petroleum Corporation, Federal Mortgage Bank of Nigeria, the development banks etc. 
See generally Parts I and II of the Second Schedule to the Public Enterprises (Privatisation and 
COmmercialisation) Act, No 28, 1999 . 
• 7 • 
Section 9 of the Act 
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policy related and supervisory. It determines the broad guidelines 
effectuating the privatization program.49 It can indeed change the 
classification of an enterprise from one to the other of the four categories of 
: i J full privatization, partial privatization, full commercialization or partial 
commercialization. 50 The second body is the BPE or Bureau,51 which is 
headed by a person designated Director Genera1.52 The Bureau's functions 
are essentially to execute the policies set by the NCP and to provide 
secretarial support to the NCP. Both bodies are to work in tandem to ensure 
48 Section II of the Act enumerates the functions as follows: (a) to determine the political, economic and 
~, social objectives of privatization and commercialization of public enterprises; (b) to approve policies on 
privatization and commercialization; (c) to approve guidelines and criteria for valuation of public 
enterprises for privatization and choice of strategic investors; (d) to approve public enterprises to be 
privatised or commercialized; (e) to approve the legal and regulatory framework for the enterprises to be 
privatized; (t) to detennine whether the shares of a listed public enterprises should be by public or private 
issue or otherwise and advise the Government of the Federation accordingly; (g) to determine the time and 
a public enterprise is to be privatized; (h) to approve the prices for shares or assets of the public 
enterprise to be offered for sale; (i) to review, from time to time, the socio-economic effect of the 
pro~~une of privatization and commercialization and decide on appropriate remedies; (j) to approve the 
lpp()mt:lllelllt of privatization advisers and consultants and their remuneration; (k) to appoint as and when 
necell!1lll'V committees comprising persons from private and public sectors with requisite technical 
COInipete:nce to advise on the privatization and commercialization of specific public enterprises; (I) to 
the budget of the Council; (m) to approve the budget of the Bureau; (n) to supervise the activities 
the Bureau and issue directions on the implementation of the privatization and commercialization 
programme:, (0) to receive and consider, for approval, the audited accounts of the Bureau; (p) to submit to 
President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria in each year a report on the activities ofthe Council and 
bureau; (q) to receive regular and periodic reports from the Bureau on programme implementation and 
appropriate directions; and (r) to perform such other functions as may from time to time be necessary 
its objectives. 
Section 31 provides that it "may make regulations generally for the purpose of giving effect to the 
of the Privatization and Commercialization Act. 
See Sections 1(3) and 6(3) of the Act 
Section 17 of the Act; the Director General is a member of the NCP. 
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all aspects of the privatization program are carried out effectively and 
53 
For all intents and purposes, the BPE is like an agent of the NCP, albeit a 
statutorily appointed one. This is because the BPE is to carry out the 
decisions of the NCP, although the former may make recommendations to 
the latter. Yet, in a curious departure from established drafting tradition in 
the country, the Bureau is statutorily made a body corporate and invested 
53 Sections 13 and 14 of the Act respectively deal with the functions of the BPE in respect of privatization 
and commercialization. Section 13 provides as follows: "The Functions of the Bureau with respect to 
privatization are to: (a) implement the Council's policy on privatization; (b) prepare public enterprises 
approved by the Council for privatization; (c) advice the Council on further public enterprises that may be 
privatized; (d) advice the council on the capital restructuring needs of the public enterprises to be 
privatized; (e) carry out all activities required for the successful issue of shares and sale of assets of the 
public enterprises to be privatized; (f) make recommendation to the Council on the appointment of 
consultants, advisers, investment bankers, issuing houses, stock brokers, solicitors, trustees, accountants, 
and other professionals required for the purposes of privatization; (g) advice the Council on the allotment 
pattern for the sale of the shares of the public enterprises set out for privatization; (h) oversee the actual sale 
of the shares of the public enterprises to be privatized, by the issuing houses, in accordance with the 
guidelines approved, from time to time, by the Council; (i) ensure the success of the privatization exercise 
taking into account the need for balance and meaningful participation by Nigerians and foreigners in 
accordance with the relevant laws of Nigeria; and (j) perform such functions with respect to privatization as 
the Council may, from time to time, assign to it." Similarly Section 14 provides that "the functions of the 
Bureau in respect of commercialization are to: (a) implement the Council's policies on commercialization; 
.. (b) prepare public enterprises approved by the Council for commercialization; (c) advise the Council on 
further public enterprises that may be commercialized; (d) ensure the updating of the accounts of all 
commercialized enterprises to ensure fmancial discipline; (e) ensure the success of the commercialization 
eJCercise and monitor, on a continuous basis for such period as may be necessary, the operations of the 
public enterprises after commercialization; (f) review the objectives for which public enterprises were 
established in order to ensure that they adapt to the changing needs of the economy; (g) ensure that public 
enterprises are managed in accordance with sound commercial principles and prudent financial practices; 
. (h) interface with the public enterprises, and the supervising ministries, to ensure effective monitoring and 
safeguard the public enterprises managerial autonomy; (i) ensure that the board and management of each 
COnunercialized enterprise and the Government of the Federation, keep to the terms and conditions of the 
Performance agreements, if any, between the public enterprise concerned and the Government of the ::e~ation; and (k) evaluate and recommend to the Council whether or not a public enterprise is eligible for 
ding through grants, loans, subventions or equity; and (1) perform such functions with respect to 
COnunercialization as the Council may, from time to time assign to it." 
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perpetual succession. 54 It does also have a common seal and may sue 
be sued. 55 What makes this provision the more significant is that the Act 
silent on whether the NCP has similar attributes. The anomaly is that the 
may not ordinarily56 be amenable to suits while the agent is. An 
ambitious Director General of the Bureau may also exploit this 
apparent oversight to flout the directives of the NCP. The availability of the 
Bureau as the clearinghouse, and with authority to bind the government on 
issues of privatization is salutary. It provides the one-stop shop for the 
foreign investor interested in the privatization program. 57 
.. PUBLIC ENTERPRISES ARB I TRA TION PANEL 
Act creates an ad-hoc body known as the Public Enterprises Arbitration 
which is responsible for effecting prompt settlement of any dispute 
oen1JPl"n an enterprise and the National Council on Privatization ("NCP" or 
Council") or the Bureau of Public Enterprises ("BPE" or "the 
. It is arguable that the Provisions relating the Public Enterprises Arbitration Panel enable NCP to bring, 
to be subject to, proceedings in that panel. 
However under the Nigerian Investment Promotion Commission Act 1995 every enterprise in which a 
'''ll;lllrner has an interest has to register with the Commission. 
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. This is by virtue of Section 28, which provides: 
(1) The Panel shall have power to arbitrate-
(a) in any dispute raising questions as to the interpretation of any 
of the provisions of a Performance Agreement; or 
(b) in any dispute on the performance or non-performance by any 
enterprise of its undertakings under a Performance Agreement. 
(2) A dispute on the performance or non-performance by any of 
the parties to the Performance Agreement shall, in the case of a 
commercialised enterprise, lie to that Panel providing that such 
reference may be made after all reasonable efforts to resolve the 
dispute have been made and have not been proved. 
(3) The ruling of the Panel shall be binding on the parties and no 
appeal shall lie from a decision of the Panel to any court of law or 
tribunal. " 
This is interwoven with the practice of making commercialized enterprises 
sign performance agreements. The Public Enterprises Arbitration Panel is 
~ thus the mechanism for resolving any disputes that might arise in connection 
with the performance agreements. Two perceivable flaws exist in this 
dispute settlement mechanism. First, it envisages that NCP could be a party 
to proceedings before the Panel, since it represents the government. Yet, 
NCP appoints members of the Panel. 59 The basic question of the fairness of 
. any proceedings undertaken by such Panel may be implicated by this method 
, of appointment. And this is not mitigated by the requirement of Section 
$8 
Section 27(1) of the Act 
$98 . 
ectton 27(4) 
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·27(2) that "the Panel shall consist of five persons who shall be persons of 
... proven integrity one of whom shall be the Chairman." Absent a more 
stringent and objectively verifiable qualification, or indeed a more 
independent method of appointment, the Panel, if it is ever constituted, 
would be dogged with questions of its impartiality. A better arrangement 
would have been to subject disputes, relating to performance contracts and 
other aspects of the privatization and commercialization program, to the 
regular disputes settlement procedures including recourse to arbitration 
under existing arbitration and other alternative dispute resolution systems. 
Instead, curiously, the 1999 Act provides that "the provisions of the 
Arbitration and Conciliation Act or any other enactment or law relating to 
arbitration shall not be applicable to any matter which is the subject of 
Arbitration under this (1999) Act.,,6o One feature of the military 
governments, which initially passed the 1999 Act, is the distrust they had for 
existing judicial institutions. As a result, they were wont to introduce parallel 
judicial or quasi-judicial machinery. The Public Enterprises Arbitration 
Panel and the provisions of the 1999 Act thereon are a relic of that 
predilection on the part of the military. Yet, ifit was meant to signal a quick 
------------------
60 See Section 30 of the 1999 Act; but brackets mine 
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and simple dispute resolution mechanism, it also exhibits a tentativeness that 
roay not be attractive to outsiders like foreign investors . 
Besides, the provision that the ruling of the Panel shall be binding on the 
parties and no appeal shall lie from a decision of the Panel to any court of 
law or tribuna161 is constitutionally suspect. While the Public Enterprises 
(Prlvatisation and Commercialisation) Decree remained a decree under the 
military administration, which first passed it, such an ouster of the right to 
appeal to the courts could be sustained. But with the transition to civilian 
administration, and the automatic modification and even re-christening of 
the law as an "Act", deemed to have been pas-sed by the National As-sembly, 
such ous-ter of recourse to the courts- is unconstitutional. 
Secondly, it will prove to be redundant because very few enterprises, if any, 
. , would invoke its jurisdiction. This will be an extension of the shortcoming 
associated with performance contracts, to which we alluded in Chapter 4. It 
will be rare for Managers- of enterprises- to drag the owner of the enterprise, 
the government, to the Panel. 
-------------------61 • 
SectIon 28(3) 
198 
" 
, f 
VI. METHODS OF PRIVATIZATION AND COMMERCIALIZATION 
USED UNDER THE CURRENT PROGRAM 
Utilizing the flexibility, which the Act has given NCP and, by extension, 
BPE, the agencies have adopted several methods in the current privatization 
program. The most popular method has been the core investo()f sale. This is 
an innovation of the current program in the sense that it was not used in the 
first exercise. Figure 1 shows that of about 101 privatizations conducted by 
BPE, from 2000 to July 2006, 41 were done by the core investor sale 
method. 62 The next popular method adopted by NCP and BPE is 
ooncesslon. This- is- not really a privatization method strictu sensu. It is 
similar to a long lease and does not involve divesture. As- applied by BPE, 
"it is a contract that confers- the right to use services- of an asset over a 
defmed period usually ranging from 10-25 years.,,63 The concessionaire uses 
the asset at an agreed fee. They also undertake to grow the asset over that 
~period. About 22 enterprises were dealt with in this fashion. (Figure 1) 
'Another method that has- enjoyed a fair amount of use by BPE is- asset sale . 
. About 9 enterprises have been dealt with in this fashion. This is applied 
~ 
Examples of SOEs privatized in this marmer are: Benue Cement Co Pic to core investor Dangote 
Industries Ltd (May 2000); Ashaka Cement Co. PIc. to core investor Bluecircle Industries Ltd (March 
,2001); Cement Co. of Northern Nigeria to core investor Scancem (July 2000); West African Portland 
, Cement Co. PIc to core investor Bluecircle Indllstries Ltd (October 2000) 
tl See Bureau of Public Enterprises, Privatisation Procedures Manual (March 2006) P. 22 
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where the prospects for the enterprise do not look bright and it is deemed to 
be more beneficial to sell its assets than to sell the enterprise as a whole.64 
Thus, the enterprise might be broken up into various parts, which are sold 
individual1y.65 Also adopted by BPE is the method of public offer. This is 
done through the Stock Exchange. Figure 1 shows that one enterprise66 was 
sold by Management Buyout method. 
LIST OF ENTERPRISES PRIV A TIZED (2000 TO JUL Y 2006) 
SI NAME OF METHOD DATE NAME OF REMARK 
ENTERPRIS OF OF INVESTOR 
N E DIVESnTU SALE S 
RE 
1 FSB Share April Nigerian Transactio 
International individual and n 
Bank Flotation 2001 institutional concluded 
investors . 
Enterprise 
handed 
over 
2 NAL Share April Nigerian Transactio 
Merchant individual and n 
Bank Flotation 2001 institutional concluded 
Investors 
-
Enterprise 
3 International Share April Nigerian Transactio 
Merchant Flotation 2001 individual and n 
Bank institutional concluded 
------------------
6( Prlvatisation Manual supra note 63 at 22 
6S Privatisation Manual supra note 63 at 22 
66 "'TO l~lger Insurance PLC 
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investors 
se 
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Ashaka Core investor March Bkuecircle 
cement Co. sale 2001 Industries Ltd 
, , PIc 
Ashaka Share April Nigerian Transactio 
cement Co. Flotation 2001 individual and n 
Pic institutional concluded 
investors 
Benue Core investor May Dangote Transactio 
Cement Co. 2000 Industries Ltd n 
Plc~ (Nigeria) concluded 
'" 
i'l':!': (':, , 
" 
'" , . 
;.. " 
,~", ,., .. 
Benue Share January Institutional 
I"~ .~~. " , 'i' 
" ,," .:., ~ 
~r_ Cement Co. Flotation 2001 investors 
PIc 
Cement Co. Core investor July Scancem 
of Northern sale 2000 (Norway) " •• , I :;,;r'~'; 
Ple. 
Cement Co. Share April Nigerian Transactio 
of Northern Flotation 2001 individual and n 
Nigeria PIc. institutional concluded 
investors 
West African Core investor October 
Portland Co. sale 2000 Industries Ltd n 
concluded 
Enterprise 
handed 
over 
West African Share January Nigerian 
Portland Flotation 2001 individual and 
Cement Co. institutional 
Pic investors 
Unipetrol Core investor May Ocean and Oil 
. PIc sale 2000 N' . Ltd 
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Unipetrol Share April Nigerian Transactio 
Nigeria PIc. Flotation 2001 Individual and n 
institutional Conclude 
investors d. 
Enterprise 
handed 
over 
African Core Investor October Sadiq 
Petroleum Pic Sale 2000 Petroleum 
. Ltd 
African Share May Nigerian Transactio 
Petroleum PIc Flotation 2001 Individual and n 
Institutional Conclude 
Investors d. 
Enterprise 
handed 
over 
National Oil Core Investor October Conpetro 
& Chemical Sale 2000 Nigeria Ltd 
marketing 
Co. PIc (now ,: ~ 
CONOIL 
National Oil Share April Nigerian Transactio 
& Chemical Flotation 2001 Individual and n 
Marketing Institutional Conclude 
Co. Pic (now investors d. 
CONOILPlc) Enterprise 
handed 
over 
Nigerdock Core Investor Decembe Global Energy Transactio 
Nigeria Ltd Sale r 2001 Co. n 
Conclude 
d. 
Enterprise 
handed 
over 
Assurance Core Investor March ParmexiGense Transaxtio 
BankPlc Sale 2002 c Consortium n 
Ltd Conclude 
d. 
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..... 
Enterprise 
handed 
over 
Calahar Liquidation August Flour Mills Transactio 
Cement Co. 2002 and Holcim of n 
Ltd Spain Conclude 
d. 
Enterprise 
handed 
over 
14 Niger Cement Core Investor October Nigerian Transactio 
PIc Sale 2002 Individual and n 
institutional concluded 
Investors 
Enterprise 
handed 
over 
Niger Management Decembe Management Transactio 
Insurance Pic Buy-Out r2002 Alliance n Ii': 
Group Conclude 
d. 
Enterprise 
handed 
over 
Capital Core Investor October Hans Gremlin Transactio 
Hotels PIc Sale 2002 Limited n 
(Ahuja Conclude 
Sheraton d. 
Hotel) Enterprise 
handed 
over 
Festac 77 Asset Sale on January UAC Transactio 
Hotel Competitive 2002 Properties PIc n 
basis Conclude 
d. 
Enterprise 
handed 
over 
Nigeria Sale of 
Hotels Assets to 
203 
Limited: different 
investors 
(a) Ikoyi Asset Sale on October Beta Transactio 
Hotel Limited Competitive 2002 Consortium n 
basis Conclude 
d. 
Enterprise 
handed 
over 
19 (b) Caterers' Asset Sale on Decembe Relian{;e Transactio 
Court, Lagos Competitive r2002 Estates n 
basis Conclude 
d. 
Enterprise 
handed 
over 
20 (c) Houses Asset Sale on April Chyzob Transactio 
No. S & 9 Competitive 2003 Enterprises n 
Lease Road, basis Conclude 
Ikoyi, Lagos d. 
Enterprise 
handed 
over 
(d) Audit Asset Sale on April Dangote Transactio-
, , Section, Competitive 2003 Group n ' " 
Lagos basis Conclude 
d. 
Enterprise 
handed 
over 
(e) Central Asset Sale on July Broadfields Transactio 
Hotel, Kano Competitive 2004 and NAL n 
basis Assets Conclude 
Management d. 
Enterprise 
handed 
over 
(f) NPA Asset Sale on October Labana Glover Transactio 
Competitive 2004 Ventures n 
basis Conclude 
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(g) Magajin Asset Sale on 
Rumfa, Kano Competitive 
basis 
25 Electricity 
Metre 
Company of 
Nigeria, Zaria 
Electricity 
Metre 
Company of 
N' . Zaria 
Savannah 
Sugar 
Company 
Limited 
National 
Trucks 
Manufacturer 
s, Kano 
Core Investor Decembe Dantata 
Sale r 2002 Investments 
Limited 
Core Investor Decembe Dantata 
Sale r 2002 Investments 
Limited 
Core Investor Decembe Dangote 
Sale r 2002 Industries 
Limited 
Core Investor Decembe Art 
Sale r 2002 Engineering 
Limited 
d. 
Enterprise 
handed 
over 
Transactio 
n 
Conclude 
d. 
Enterprise 
handed 
over 
51% 
acqllired~ 
Transactio 
n 
Conclude 
d. 
Enterprise 
handed 
over 
An 
additional 
17% 
Transactio 
n 
Conclude 
d. 
Enterprise 
handed 
over 
51% 
acquired. 
Transactio 
n 
Conclude 
d. 
Enterprise 
handed 
over 
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National Cote Investor April Art An 
Trucks Sale 2005 Engineering additional 
Manufacturer Limited 24% 
Kano 
28 Nigeria Core Investor Decembe Reinsurance Transactio 
Reinsurance Sale r2002 Acquisition n 
Corporation Group Conclude 
d. 
Enterprise 
handed 
over 
29 MV Abuja Asset Sale on April Simatech Transactio 
(Vessel of Competitive 2003 Offshore n 
Nigeria Unity basis International, Conclude 
Line) Panama d. . , 
Enterprise 
handed 
over 
30 West African Core Investor April Majestic Oil Transactio " 
'I 
Refmery Sale 2004 Services n 
Company Limited Conclude 
Limited, d. 
Sierra Leone Enterprise 
handed 
over 
Daily Times Core Investor June Folio Transactio 
of Nigeria PIc Sale 2004 Communicatio n 
ns Limited Conclude 
d. 
Enterprise 
handed 
over 
Ore-Irele Oil Core Investor Septemb CPL Agric Transactio 
Palm Sale er 2004 Limited n 
Company Conclude 
Limited d. 
Enterprise 
handed 
over 
Sale to Kaduna State .36% sold 
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Automobile existing 2004 Investment to investor 
Nigeria shareholder Co. 
Limited 
Delta Steel Core Investor February Global Only 30010 
Company Sale 200S Infrastructure of bid 
Limited price has 
been 
received. 
Balance 
of 70% 
outstandin 
35 Leyland Revalidation April Eba .. Odan Transactio 
Nigeria of Sale 2005 Commercial n 
Limited and Industrial Conclude 
I' 
d. 
Enterprise 
handed ! j, 
over 
36 Central Core Investor June Gobesh (West Transactio 
Packaging Sale 2005 Africa) n 
Limited Limited cancelled 
as 
preferred 
bidder 
could not 
complete 
payment. 
Negotiatio 
n ongoing 
with other 
bidder to 
be 
concluded 
by 
Nigeria Core 
Bricks and Investor Sale 
Clay 
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37 (a) Ikorodu Core Investor June Temtcorp Only 10010 
Bricks Sale 2005 Limited of bid 
price paid. 
Balance 
of 90% to 
be paid as 
agreed in 
terms of 
sale 
38 (b) Ibadan Core Investor June Realstone Transactio 
Bricks and Sale 2005 Company n 
Clay Limited Conclude 
d. 
i' 
Enterprise h 
handed 
r. '-";. 
over ~. " 
39 (c) Enugu Core Investor June Siljay Concept Transactio 
Bricks and Sale 2005 Limited n ['''' 
" 
Clay Conclude ., 'I) 
. , d . 
Enterprise 
handed 
over 
(d) Kaduna Core Investor June Rahman Transactio 
Bricks and Sale 2005 Brothers n 
Clay Limited Conclude 
d. 
Enterprise 
handed 
over 
(e) Kano Core Investor June Associated Transactio 
Bricks and Sale 2005 Partners n 
Clay Limited Conclude 
d. 
Enterprise 
handed 
over 
Ihechiowa Core Investor July Agrico Transactio 
Oil Palm Sale 2005 Multiservices n 
Limited cancelled 
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as 
preferred 
bidder 
could not 
complete 
payment. 
Negotiatio 
n ongoing 
with other 
bidder to 
be 
concluded 
by 
43 Afribank PIc Share June Various Transactio 
Flotation 2005 Individual n 
Nigerian Conclude 
Investors d 
44 National Liquidation August O'secul Transactio 
Fertilizer 2005 Nigeria n 
Company of Limited Conclude 
Nigeria d. 
(NAFCON) Enterprise 
handed 
over 
Federal Core Investor Septemb Nigerian Transactio 
Superphospha Sale er 2005 Individual and n 
te Fertilizer Institutional Conclude 
Company Investors d. 
Limited Enterprise 
handed 
over 
Nigerian Concessions 
Ports 
Apapa Port 
Terminals 
(a) Apapa Concession May AP Moller Entry fees 
Container 2005 paid. The 
Terminal concessio 
n fees are 
209 
,,", 
to be paid 
annually 
and 
spread 
over the 
duration 
of the 
conceSSlO 
n 25 
years~ 
Enterprise 
handed 
over III 
line with 
47 (b) Apapa Concession May ENL Entry fees 
Port 2005 Consortium paid. The 
(Terminals C) conceSSlO 
n fees are 
to be paid 
annually 
and 
spread 
over the 
duration 
of the 
concesslO 
n 10 
years. 
Enterprise 
handed 
over III 
line with 
(c) Apapa Concession May ENL Entry fees 
Port 2005 Consortium paid. The 
(Terminals concesslO 
D) n fees are 
to be paid 
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--- and 
spread 
over the 
duration 
of the 
conceSSlO 
n 10 
years. 
Enterprise 
handed 
over III 
line with 
agreement 
49 (d) Apapa Concession October Flour Mills of Entry fees 
Port 2005 Nigeria paid. The 
(Terminals concesslO 
A) n fees are 
to be paid 
annually 
and 
spread 
over the 
duration 
of the 
concesslO 
n 25 
years. 
Enterprise 
handed 
over in 
line with 
agreement 
50 (e) Apapa Concession October Flour Mills of Entry fees 
Port 2005 Nigeria paid. The 
(Terminals B) concessio 
n fees are 
to be paid 
annually 
and 
spread 
211 
r- over the 
duration 
of the 
concessio 
n 25 
years. 
Enterprise 
handed 
over In 
line with 
agreement 
51 (t) Apapa Concession October Dangote Entry fees 
Port 2005 Group of paid. The 
(Terminal E) Industries concessio 
n fees are 
to be paid 
annually 
and 
spread 
over the 
duration 
of the 
conceSSlO 
n 25 
years. 
Enterprise 
handed 
over In 
line with 
agreement 
Port 
Harcourt 
Terminals 
52 (a) Port Concession May Ports and Entry fees 
Harcourt 2005 Terminal paid. The 
Terminal A Operators concessio 
Limited n fees are 
to be paid 
annually 
and 
212 
j 
. ! 
: ., ! 
53 (b) Port Concession 
Harcourt 
Terminal A 
Tin-Can 
Island Port 
(a) Terminal Concession 
A 
(b) Terminal Concession 
B 
May 
2005 
BUA 
International 
Limited 
spread 
over the 
duration 
of the 
concessio 
n 15 
years-. 
Enterprise 
handed 
over ill 
line with 
Entry fees 
paid. The 
concesslO 
n fees are 
to be paid 
annually 
and 
spread 
over the 
duration 
of the 
concesslo 
n 20 
years. 
Enterprise 
handed 
over in 
line with 
Septemb Joseph Dam & Negotiatin 
er 2005 Sons Limited g tenns of 
concessio 
n still in 
Septemb Tin Can Island 
er 2005 Container 
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Termincll concessio 
Limited n fees are 
to be paid 
annually 
and 
spread 
o-ver the 
duration 
of the 
concessio 
n 15 
years. 
Enterprise 
handed 
" ' 
over in 
line with 
'1, , 
, , 
56 (c) Terminal Concession Septemb Sifax Nigeria Entry fees ,:," ,1 i 
, " 
C er 2005 Limited paid. The 
concessio 
n fees are 
1\ 
'" 
to be paid 
annually 
and 
spread 
over the 
duration 
of the 
concessio 
n 10 
years. 
Enterprise 
handed 
. 
over In 
line with 
(d) Roro Concession Septemb APMoller Negotiatin 
Terminal er2005 g terms of 
concessio 
still . n In 
214 
Other Ports 
Terminals 
(a) Onne FL T Concession 
B 
60 (b) Onne Concession 
FOTB 
October 
2005 
October 
2005 
Intels Nigeria 
Limited 
Intels Nigeria 
Limited 
Entry fees 
paid. The 
concessio 
n fees are 
to be paid 
annually 
and 
spread 
over the 
duration 
of the 
concesslO 
n 25 
years. 
Enterprise 
handed 
over In 
line with 
Entry fees 
paid. The 
conceSSlO 
n fees are 
to be paid 
annually 
and 
spread 
over the 
duration 
of the 
concesslO 
n 2-5 
years. 
Enterprise 
handed 
over 10 
line with 
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.: i: '~. , f. 61 (c) Warri Old Concession October Intels Nigeria Entry fees 
Terminal A 2005 Limited paid. The 
concessio 
n fees are 
to be paid 
annually 
and 
spread 
over the 
duration 
of the 
concessio 
n 25 
years. ' ,.', 
Enterprise ~'~" , .,'1, 
handed 
over in 
line with 
" , ' 
62 (d) Warri Concession October Intels Nigeria Entry fees " ,'1"", 
New 2005 Limited paid. The 
Terminal B concessio .. ,,,, 
n fees are 
to be paid 
annually 
and 
spread 
over the 
duration 
of the 
concessio 
n 25 
years. 
Enterprise 
handed 
over in 
line with 
Calabar Concession October Intels 
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New 2005 Limited paid. The 
Terminal A concessio 
n fees are 
to- be paid 
annually 
and 
spread 
over the 
duration 
of the 
conceSSlO 
n 25 
years. 
Enterprise 
handed ,-,.' 
over m 
line with 
~ ,. 01_""1 
Federal Core Investor Septemb Hekio Transactio 
Superphospat Sale er 2005 Consortium n 
e Fertilizer Conclude 
Company d. 
Enterprise 
handed 
over 
(a) Kuru Core Investor Septemb Afrimines Negotiatio 
\ Quarry, Jos Sale er 2005 Nigeria n to be 
I Limited concluded with I 
I preferred 
J bidder by 
I ber 
I (b) Suleja Core Investor Septemb Setraco Transactio 
I Quarry, Sale er 2005 (Nigeria) n 
r Suleja Limited Conclude I 
I d. 
I 
~ Enterprise j handed 
217 
over 
Nicon Hilton Core Investor October Capital Transactio 
Hotel Sale 2005 Consortium n 
Conclude 
d. 
Enterprise 
handed 
over 
68 Nicon Core Investor October Assurance Transactio 
Insurance PIc Sale 2005 Acquisition n 
Conclude 
d. 
Enterprise 
handed 
over 
69 Volkswagen Core Investor October Barbedos Transactio 
Nigeria Sale 2005 Ventures n 
Limited Conclude "" ' 
d. 
Enterprise 
'!': 
handed 
over 
70 Ayip-Eku Oil Core Investor October Interstate Negotiatio 
Palm Sale 2005 Investment n ongomg 
Company with 
Limited bidder to 
be 
concluded 
by 
71 Nigeria Sugar Liquidation October Joseph Dam & Transactio 
Company, 2005 Sons Limited n 
Bacita Conclude 
d. 
Enterprise 
handed 
over 
Oshogbo Liquidation Novemb Kura Holdings Transactio 
Steel Rolling er 2005 Limited n 
Conclude 
218 
Limited d. 
Enterprise 
handed 
over 
73 Jos Steel Liquidation Novemb Zuma Steel Transactio 
Rolling Mill er 2005 West Africa n 
Limited Conclude 
d. 
Enterprise 
hand~d 
over 
14 Katsina Steel Liquidation Novemb Nigeria-
Rolling Mill er 2005 Spanish 
Engineering 
Limited 
75 National Public Offer Novemb Various Transactio 
"""-,,,:) 
Aviation er 2005 Individual and n 
Handling Institional Conclude ',c' -," 
Company Investors d. 
Enterprise 
,,',; 
handed ,. ",," 
over 
76 Eleme Core Investor Decembe Indorama Transactio 
Petrochemica Sale r2005 Group n 
Is Company Conclude 
Limited d. 
Enterprise 
handed 
over 
Nigeria Unity Core Investor Decembe Seaforce Transactio 
Line Sale r2005 Shipping n 
Company Conclude 
Limited d. 
Enterprise 
handed 
over 
Nigeria Core Investor Decembe Miramar Preferred 
Machine Sale r200S International bidder 
Tools Limited Miramar 
could not 
219 
pay. 
Reserve 
bidder 
have 
increased 
their bid 
to Nt 
billion 
and have 
so far paid 
about 
40%. To 
be 
concluded 
79 Steyr Nigeria Core Investor Decembe Kaura Motor Transactio 
Limited Sale r2005 n 
concluded 
as 
preferred 
bidder 
could not 
compete 
payment. 
Negotiatio 
." n ongomg 
with other 
bidder 
Sunti Sugar Liquidation March Supertek Ltd Transactio 
Co. Ltd 2006 n 
Conclude 
d. 
Enterprise 
handed 
over 
Niger Paper Liquidation May IMNLLtd NCP 
Mill, Jebba 2006 approval 
received 
29th July 
2006. 
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Payment 
to be 
concluded 
September 
2006 
Other Ports 
Terminals 
82 Koko Port Concession May Gulftainer Bel Negotiatin 
2006 Consortium g terms of 
concessio 
n still m 
progress. 
To be 
concluded 
In 
83 Calabar Port Concession May Ecomarine Negotiatin 
2006 Consortium g terms of 
concessio 
n still in 
progress. 
To be 
concluded 
In 
84 Warri Port Concession May Associated Negotiatin 
2006 Marine g terms of 
Services conceSSlO 
n still m 
progress. 
To be 
concluded 
in 
,-~ ....... ~c: The Privatization act, with forward by Irene Chigbue, Director 
of BPE, http:www.bpeng.orglrdonlyresIDA361996-D953-45CE-
5-32ACC753AE6110IPrivatizationAct.doc (visited 09/24/07) 
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main thrust of the current commercialization program is to provide the 
enterprises with operational autonomy.67 As under the first program, the 
current commercialization program employs the device of performance 
contracts, which is designed to govern the relationship between the 
government and the commercialized enterprise. We had, in Chapter 4,68 
explored the limitations of performance contracting as a reform tool in the 
management of SOBs. Those constraints also apply to the use of 
performance contracts in the current exercise of commercialization. The 
point must be made however that commercialization seems to be a step in an 
enterprise's journey towards privatization.69 For instance, some of the 
enterprises privatized or slated for privatization under the current exercise 
were those commercialized under the first exercise. 70 
67 Others are to provide competitive remuneration system to be able to attract, recruit and retain suitably 
qualified personnel; evolve a more result oriented and accountable management based on perfonnance 
contract; strengthen financiaVaccounting controls at the enterprise level; upgrade the management 
information system of the affected enterprises; ensure financial solvency of public enterprises through 
effective cost recovery, cost control and prudent financial management; remove bureaucratic bottlenecks 
and political interference through clear role defmitions between the supervising Ministry, the Board of 
Directors and the Management of public enterprises. See Privatisation Procedures Manual published by 
BPE, March 2006 PP. 253-255. These are the exact objectives of the 1988 decree with respect to 
commercialization. 
68 See Chapter 4 
69 See Privatization Procedures Manual, P.253 stating that: "Commercialization, whether fuJI or partial, is a 
dynamic process, which ultimately leads to eventual privatization or some fonn of public-private 
J>artnership (PPP)." 
70 These enterprises would include NITEL PIc., NEPA, Nigerian Power, Nigerian Marine Corp., NICON 
Insurance PIc., and Nigerian Reinsurance. 
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ASSESSMENT OF THE CURRENT PRIVATIZATION PROGRAM 
strengths of the current privatization program are similar to the benefits 
accrued from the earlier one. The government has realized money from 
sales of its interests in the SOEs.71 The capital market continues to grow. 
'~ 
irThe explosion in the number of telephone service providers is, perhaps, the 
.i~' 
'-jf 
visible benefit from the reforms of which privatization is a part. The 
numlot:r of people who have access to telephones rose exponentially from the 
criticism that can be leveled against the current privatization program is 
those running it have still not been able to carry the majority of the 
,.,,'1-'''' .... along. There is still considerable opposition to the program, several 
after its commencement. For instance several suits have been 
....... ~ ...... u,""u. mainly by labor, challenging different aspects of privatization or 
Secondly, there have been 
-4""&"U,J.VJ.,l;:) of cronyism. The names of certain individuals, or of companies 
with certain individuals, have been recurring in relation to 
'1 See generally JOHNSON A. AKINBADE, PUBLIC ENTERPRISES AND PRIVATISATION IN 
NIGERIA, 98 -100 (Macak Books Ltd, Lagos, 2004) 
'. '12 For example see a story, by Nkechi Onyedika and Florence Oretade, titled: Govt, workers clash over sale 
of Urban Development Bank, Guardian Newspaper June 06, 2007. 
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1. 
of the SOEs. This is actually one of the reasons that the 
to the program have endured. Recently, the outgoing 
administration sold the interest in the petroleum refineries,?3 which are like 
. the crown jewels of the country, to entities that were alleged to lack the 
technical competence in the area of petroleum refining and at a price that 
., some considered a give away. The protestation against the sale was so 
pronounced and loud that the administration that took over from the prior 
government was forced to revisit the sale. In the end, and sensing that the 
government might reverse the transaction, the purchasers of the interest 
· decided to withdraw from the transaction. 
Thirdly, one of the pitfalls of the earlier privatization program, and one of 
the criticisms of privatization generally,74 was that it was not coupled with 
robust and effective regulations. While governmental regulation has been 
· strengthened in certain sectors, such as communication, there is still no 
comprehensive competition or antitrust regime in the country, and this 
almost twenty years since the inception of privatization in 1988. NCP and 
73 See story, by Yakubu LawaI and Mathias Okwe, titled: Dangote, Otedola, Rivers buy Port harcout 
Refinery, Guardian Newspaper May 18,2007; story, by Okey Ndiribe, titled: Uproar over FG's last minute 
· privatization, Vanguard Newspaper May 25, 2007. 
74 
SeeEze Onyekpere, Challenges for the Privatisation Programme, in READINGS ON PRN A TISA TION 
P.24 at 31 
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BPE have attempted to fonnulate a competition bill, but such bill has not 
seemed to be a priority for the legislature. So there is the real danger that 
". , . public monopolies could become private monopolies, which are indeed more 
deleterious to the economy. 
Fourthly, the conception of the privatization program as a gradual process, 
even though beneficial, has had the effect of drawing out the exercise. This 
has had two effects. It has enabled the introduction of additional 
bureaucracy. The NCP and BPE, even if they are effective, have assumed a 
defocto permanence with all the trappings of a sustained bureaucracy. In 
another vein, the gradualism has made the process so flexible that successive 
governments see it AS another avenue for patronage. Thus we have had the 
spectacle of enterprises, which were thought to have been privatized or 
commercialized, but are still subject privatization or commercialization by 
new administrations. Such administrations arrogate to themselves the power 
to review and reverse what was done by prior administrations in that respect. 
For instance, the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation, was supposed to 
have been privatized under the first program. It was also listed for 
privatization in the 1999 decree. As if that confusion was not enough, the 
cUtrent administration of Musa Yar'adua, which came to office in May 
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2007, recently announced that it would unbundle NNPC and certain 
committees of the National Assembly are gearing to pass new laws to 
validate the "new policy". 75 No reference was made to the fact that the 
NNPC is one of the SOEs slated for commercialization under the ongoing 
program. Granted that NCP has the powers under the 1999 Act to modify the 
lists for partial or full privatization and of partial or full commercialization. 
Yet, it does not seem that the new government's announcement and the 
legislature's seeming preparedness to pass a new law took cognizance of the 
fact that NNPC is already covered under the existing reform framework. 
NNPC is a national treasure and any government would like to, indeed 
device a pretense, to meddle in it even if it is to provide for 
commercialization already covered in existing law. A more worrisome 
aspect of this tendency is the preparedness to reverse completed 
privatization transactions.76 It is doubtful if the government actually has the 
right to reverse these transactions. Absent collusion in fraud on the part of 
.' the Purchaser of the interest, it would seem that a new administration is 
7.5 
See story, by Paschal Nwigwe, titled: Reps prepare legal backing for new gas policy, unbundling of 
NNpc, Guardian Newspaper September 14, 2007; In another report, the new Chairman of the Senate 
C~rnmittee on Privatisation alluded to a decision to probe BPE following petitions from "concerned 
NIgerians". He stated further: "if in the course of our investigation we found out that the process was not 
tl'anst>arent, such exercise could be reversed. If we also discover that the benefiting organisatiion did not 
)lay the right money for these enterprises, then they could be made to pay more. We have received some 
Petitions from interested Nigerians asking us to examine the privatization of these enterprises. The one on 
~y table right now is asking us to examine the privatization of NlTEL." See story, by Azimazi Momoh 
LunOh, titled: Sale of Refineries inevitable, says Senate Panel, Guardian Newspaper September 11, 2007. 
~ See story, by Azimazi Momoh Jimoh, titled: Sale of Refineries inevitable, says Senate Panel, Guardian 
eWspaper September 11,2007 cited in footnote 75. 
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bound by a sale made by a previous administration, and any attempt to 
reverse such sale is like compulsory acquisition or taking. At least that is 
how it could legally be viewed, even though in actual fact the Purchaser may 
/ be helpless. 
That is the more reason that caution must be exercised by the government in 
reversing sales of its interests in SOEs. These enterprises are usually big and 
cost a lot of money. If purchasers of government's interests cannot be 
confident on the security of the interests they are getting they would be 
discouraged. This is especially the case with foreign investors. At a 
minimum, the completed privatization of an enterprise should be immune 
. , from challenge based merely on the fact that a new administration would 
prefer different purchasers. And even in cases of egregious misconducts on 
the part of the privatization agency, any reversal should be preceded by due 
process and the courts should retain the jurisdiction to adjudicate such 
matters. The government is also better advised to adopt the process of legal 
challenges if it must reverse any sale. 
Another problem is that for all the orchestration about privatization, the 
enterprises scheduled for privatization in the most strategic aspects of the 
227 
economy have not been fully dealt with, almost a decade after the current 
program started. Although NEP A has been unbundled, not all the spin off 
entities from NEP A have been sold.77 
77 
See story by Chidi Nnadi and Omodele Adigun, titled: BP E doubts completion of privatization in power 
sector before may 29, Daily Sun Newspaper January 29, 2007. 
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CHAPTER 6 
FOREIGN INVESTMENTS IN NIGERIA 
I. MEANING OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT 
Foreign investment is broadly defined as ''the institutional, individual, or 
governmental acquisition of assets in a foreign country. It includes both 
direct investment and portfolio investment and encompasses both public 
authorities and private firms."} There is a tendency to distinguish this broad 
understanding from the narrower context of foreign direct investment, which 
some see as "any investment in another country which is carried out by 
private companies or individuals as opposed to government aid.,,2 Besides, 
different countries may define foreign direct investment differently. But the 
internationally accepted standard definitions of foreign direct investment are 
rather technical and are contained in the Balance of Payments Manuae and 
1 Osaheni Victor Iyayi, Foreign Investors' Perceptions of Nigerian Public Policy on Foreign Investment, 9, 
1988, Ph.d Dissertation submitted to the Golden Gate University, San Francisco, on file with the Golden 
Gate University Library; See also Adebayo O. Olukoshi, Foreign Investment in the Nigerian Economy: 
Problems and Prospects, 14 (Nigerian Journal of Policy and Strategy, Vol. II No.2, December 1987, 
Published by the Nigerian Institute of Policy and Strategic Studies, Kuru) (defining foreign investment as: 
''the act by which capital is exported by some persons or organization resident in one country to another 
country for the purpose of earning a profit.") 
2 
lyayi supra note 1 at 10 (citing and quoting DAVID W. PEARCE, MACMILLAN DICTIONARY OF 
MODERN ECONOMICS, 159 (1986), London, Macmillan) 
1 
Fifth Edition (BPMS) (Washington, D.C., International Monetary Fund, 1993) 
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the Detailed Benchmark Definition of Foreign Direct Investment.4 
According to the former, foreign direct investment refers to investment made 
to acquire lasting interest in enterprises operating outside of the economy of 
the investor.5 The World Trade Organization sees foreign investment in 
similar light.6 The foreign entity or group of entities that makes the 
investment is called the "direct investor", while the unincorporated or 
incorporated enterprise in which the direct investment is made is referred to 
as a "direct investment enterprise.,,7 The direct investor's purpose is to gain 
an effective voice in the management of the enterprise. Both the Balance of 
Payments Manual and the Detailed Benchmark Definition of Foreign Direct 
Investment suggest a threshold of 10% equity ownership as the stake 
significant or sufficient to give effective voice in the management.8 The 
4 Third Edition (BDS) (Paris, Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, 1996) 
5 See World Investment Directory Definitions, DescriptiOns and Discrepancies in the Data, http:// 
rO.unctad.orglenisubsites!dite/fdistats _files!WIDdefinitions I a.htm (hereinafter "World Investment 
Directory") 
6 See M.O.KA YODE AND O.A. OYERANTI, ATTRACTING FOREIGN INVESTMENT THROUGH 
PRIVATE SECTOR PARTNERSIDP: WHAT HOPE FOR NIGERIA, 8 (Development Policy Centre, 
Ibadan, 2002) (Research Report No. 37) (stating: "The World Trade Organisation (WTO) (1996) observes 
that FDI occurs when an investor based in one country (the home country) acquires an asset in another 
country (the host country) with intent to manage the asset.") 
7 World Investment Directory Defmitions, Descriptions and Discrepancies in the Data, http:// 
rO.unctad.orglenisubsites/dite!fdistats _fileslWIDdefinitions 1 a.htm (hereinafter "World Investment 
Directory") 
8 
World Investment Directory Definitions, Descriptions and Discrepancies in the Data, http:// 
rO.unctad.orglenisubsites/dite/fdistats _ fileslWIDdefinitions I a.htm (hereinafter "World Investment 
Directory"); The percentage of the stock held by foreigners is a mere guide. It is not conclusive of control. 
In fact in the Nigerian industrial Policy of 1988 foreign direct investments included those with foreign 
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BD3 of the OEeD would exclude any 10% ownership if it can be proven 
that it does not allow the investor an effective voice in the management of 
the direct investment enterprise. Similarly, it would include a holding of less 
than 10% ownership if the direct investor nonetheless maintains effective 
voice in the management.9 It is pertinent to note that effective voice in the 
management of the direct investment enterprise does not tantamount to 
control of the enterprise. Of course it is doubtful if ownership of 10% 
interest in an enterprise is sufficient to vest control of the firm, unless the 
other 90% is totally diluted, in terms of lack of homogeneity or cohesion 
among its holders. The test is that of ability to have a voice. In most cases, 
possession of 10% ownership would constitute the holder into a block that 
cannot be easily ignored. Ownership of the requisite interest may be in the 
nature of equity capital, the reinvestment of earnings and the provision of 
intra-company loans. to 
equity ranging from 4million Nigerian Naira. See Akomaye V. Agba, Foreign Direct Investment and 
National Development: An Appraisal and Diagnosis, in 1.B. BELLO-IMAM, AA ADUBI AND AA 
FAJINGBESI, PERSPECTIVES ON NATIONAL ECONOMIC MANAGEMENT AND 
ADMINISTRATION IN NIGERIA, 56, 58 (NCEMA, Ibadan. 2004) 
II See World Investment Directory Definitions, Descriptions and Discrepancies in the Data, http:// 
rO.unctad.orglenlsubsitesidite/fdistats _ files/WIDdefinitions I a.htm (hereinafter "World Investment 
Directory") 
10 See World Investment Directory Definitions, Descriptions and Discrepancies in the Data, http:// 
rO.unctad.orglenlsubsites/dite/fdistats _fileslWIDdefinitions I a.htm (hereinafter "World Investment 
Directory") 
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Portfolio investment is however not thought to entail any interest in the 
management of the enterprise. Instead, the portfolio investment holder is 
more interested in the returns and capital gains accruing from such 
investment. II It is therefore considered to fall outside the purview of foreign 
direct investment. 12 Portfolio investments take the form of new issue bonds 
and debentures, sales and purchase of existing bonds and stocks as well as 
medium and long. term lending. 13 
On this account, some writers would exclude portfolio investment from 
foreign investment. For instance, Sornarajah, in his excellent work on 
international law of foreign investment, defines foreign investment as 
II Akomaye V. Agba, Foreign Direct Investment and National Development: An Appraisal and Diagnosi.y, 
in I.B. BELLO-IMAM, A.A. ADUBI AND A.A. FAJINGBESI, PERSPECTIVES ON NATIONAL 
ECONOMIC MANAGEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION IN NIGERIA, 56, 57 (NCEMA, Ibadan, 2004) 
(hereinafter "Agba, FDI and National Development'); See also LASZLO ARVA, DIRECT FOREIGN 
INVESTMENT: SOME THEORETICAL AND PRACTICAL ISSUES 8 (NBH, National Bank of 
Hungary, Workshop Studies, Budapest 1994) (asserting that: "the primary motive of portfolio investments 
is therefore a profitable investment of savings, whereas in the case of direct foreign investment the investor 
also intends to achieve objectives other than a profitable investment, in some of the cases through acquiring 
partial or full control over the foreign companies."); IMF Occasional Paper No 33 titled, Foreign Private 
investment in Developing Countries: A Study by the Research Dept. (lMF. Washington, DC, January 1985) 
(stating that foreign direct investment can be "new equity capital, reinvested earnings, or net borrowing 
from a parent company or its affiliates. A guiding criterion is that it is investment made to acquire a lasting 
interest and an effective voice in the management of an enterprise, while portfolio equity investment does 
not usually have such an aim.") 
12 World Investment Directory Definitions, Descriptions and Discrepancies in the Data, http:// 
rO.unctad.orglenisubsites/dite/fdistats _ fileslWIDdefmitions 1 a.htm (hereinafter "World Investment 
Directory") 
Il Agba, supra note 11 at 57 
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involving: "the transfer of tangible or intangible assets from one country into 
another for the purpose of their use in that country to generate wealth under 
the total or partial control of the owner of the assets.,,14 This exclusion is 
said to be founded on the view that portfolio investment was not protected 
by customary international law unlike foreign investment, which is afforded 
protection under the principles of diplomatic protection and state 
responsibility. IS It is stated that this differential treatment is informed by the 
fact that in the case of foreign direct investment, the foreign investor takes 
out of their home state resources, which could otherwise have been used to 
advance the economy of the home state. Besides, the foreign direct investor 
enters the host state with the consent of the host state. Hence, the home state 
is justified in seeking protection for the resources or investment. 16 
Accordingly, he argues that foreign investment (by which he excludes 
portfolio investment) attracts the greater attention of international law for the 
simple reason that it involves the movement of persons and property from 
14 M. SORNARAJAH, INTERNATIONAL LAW ON FOREIGN INVESTMENT, 7 (Cambridge 
University Press, West Nyack, NY, 2004, 2nd ed) (contrasting his notion of foreign investment with 
portfolio investment which he sees as represented by a movement of money for the purpose of buying 
shares in a company formed or functioning in another country and which couId include other security 
instruments through which capital is raised for ventures. The distinguishing element is that in portfolio 
investment, there is a divorce between management and control of the company and the share of ownership 
in it.) 
1$ SORNARAJAH supra note 14 at 8 
16 SORNARAJAH, supra note 14 at 8 
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one state to another and such movements have the potential for conflict 
between two states. I7 And because foreign direct investment frequently 
involves such movement, it is possible to link it to the already existing norm 
of diplomatic protection of aliens. IS On the other hand, portfolio 
investments can be made on stock exchanges virtually anywhere in the 
world and, since the host state cannot know to whom the linkages are 
created through the sale of shares on these exchanges, there can be no 
concrete relationship creating responsibility. 19 
The difference in the treatment, by customary intemationallaw, of direct and 
portfolio investment might be justified. Since direct investment aims at some 
form of control or management, it invariably entails some form of presence 
in the host country and, as such, is deserving of diplomatic protection. 
Portfolio investment, by its nature, lacks that contact sufficient to implicate 
diplomatic protection, but this does not make the latter any less an 
investment. It simply means that they evoke different legal reactions. In 
other words, although there is a difference between portfolio investment and 
foreign direct investment, such difference does not detract from the 
11 Ibid at 17 
Ii Ibid at 17 
19 Ibid at 8 
234 
, ',;, 
:~ I I' -, 
"investment" nature of portfolio investments. Granted that customary 
international law might not protect portfolio investment in the manner that it 
protects direct investment. Yet, it does not mean that portfolio investment 
should not be recognized as investment. It is just a different form of 
international capital. 
It has been noted that prior to 1945, portfolio investments constituted the 
dominant form of international capital movement in the world economy. The 
development of foreign direct investment arose with the rise of the modem 
multinational corporations.20 It is noteworthy, though, that although 
multinational corporations are frequently associated with foreign direct 
investments, they are not a prerequisite for foreign direct investments, which 
can, indeed, exist without multinational corporations, as these corporations 
are technically understood.21 It is possible for a person, or a mere group of 
20 Olukoshi supra note I at 15; Some even define foreign direct investment in terms of the role of the 
multinational corporations. See MOSES M. IKIARA, FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT (FDI), 
TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER, AND POVERTY ALLEVIATION: AFRICA'S HOPES AND DILEMMA, 
3 (African Technology Policy Studies Network, Nairobi, Kenya, 2003) A TPS Special Paper Series No. 16 
(citing Mallampally and Sauvant). 
21 See, for example, A.Y. AGBA, DIRECT FOREIGN INVESTMENT AND NIGERIA'S BALANCE OF 
PAYMENTS, 27(hereinafter "AGBA, FDI AND NIGERIA'S BALANCE OF PAYMENTS" (stating that: 
"The multinational corporation is any business organisation, which owns (in whole or part), controls and 
manages income generating assets in more than one country. Indeed, there is the further condition that the 
income-generating assets should be located in at least five or six countries. It is necessary to note that the 
choice of the number of countries is rather arbitrary, and not based on any sound theoretical underpinnings. 
In doing so, it engages in international production, namely production across national boundaries financed 
by direct investment.") 
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persons, in one country to establish an enterprise or acquire a controlling 
interest in an enterprise in another country, without the vehicle of an existing 
company in their home country. In such a situation, their interest is clearly a 
foreign investment since they have some measure of control in the firm. But 
the enterprise can hardly be described as a multinational corporation. This 
point is not to underestimate the role of multinational corporations in foreign 
investment,22 but simply to underscore the fact that foreign investment is not 
coterminous with the concept of multinational corporations. 
II. CLASSIFICATIONS OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT 
A foreigner may invest in a country by acquiring a controlling stake in an 
existing company. 23 They may also do so by forming a new company. 24 
Another method by which foreign investment may arise is where the 
foreigner reinvests profits earned in the company or through long or short-
22 Indeed multinational corporations are central not only to foreign investments, but have proven to be 
central players in the quest for development amongst developing countries. There are some who suggest 
that they should be subjects of intemationallaw. The activities of some multinational corporations exceed 
those of certain states. See generally SORNARAJAH, supra note 14 at 4 (asserting that: "The multinational 
corporations themselves must be seen as distinct bases of power capable of asserting their interests through 
law. Their individual economic resources far exceed those of sovereign states. Their collective power to 
manipulate legal outcomes must be conceded.") 
23 KA YODE AND OYERANTI supra note 6 at 8; ARV A supra note I J at 8 
24 ld 
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term net loans from the foreign to the host company. 25 
Similarly, foreign investment may be classified by the motive on the part of 
the investor or the driving force behind it. Three classes are generally 
discussed. The first is what is called export oriented foreign investment. 
Here, the foreign enterprise would be seeking for new inputs, such as raw 
materials or component parts.26 This is illustrated by the foreign investments 
in the mining and petroleum sectors of Nigeria. Typically, the foreign 
investor, usually a multinational corporation, extracts the raw materials.27 
The underlying motive on the part of the foreign investor is to reduce its cost 
of production and enhance its exports. The availability of lower cost of labor 
sometimes accentuates the export oriented foreign investment. A second 
class of foreign investment is the market development oriented one. The 
foreign investor's motivation is to produce for the local market in the host 
country.28 The attraction is usually the size of the local market and its long 
run potential and local production costS.29 The third class is the government 
16 AGBA, FDI AND NIGERIA'S BALANCE OF PAYMENTS, P. 16 
27 Agba, FDf and National Development, P. 59 
28 
Agba, FDI and National Development, P. 59 
29 Agba, FDf and National Development, P. 59; Another approach, to the export oriented - market 
development dichotomy, is the demand oriented - supply oriented classification. The demand oriented 
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driven kind. The government of the host country might implement various 
incentives to attract investments from abroad.30 It does this because of the 
perceived benefits of foreign investments. We shall return to the incentives 
available in the case of Nigeria as well as the identified benefits of foreign 
investments generally. The government initiated foreign investment is 
common in Third World countries, which are struggling with the challenges 
of development and have been persuaded that foreign investment is a 
necessary ingredient in the development matrix. 
Other scholars identify another classification into three broad kinds. For 
instance Anderson observes that: "three broad kinds of direct investment can 
be identified: First, horizontal multi-plant enterprises with production abroad 
of the same line of goods; Second, vertically integrated subsidiaries which 
serve the purpose of enabling transfers of intermediate products; Third, 
diversified affiliates which are neither horizontally nor vertically related to 
foreign investment concentrating on the local market of the host country while the supply oriented foreign 
investment exploits the local resources for export from the host country to the investor's home country or 
even a third country. See NWABUEZE H. ACHIME, INVESTMENT POLICY ANALYSIS AND THE 
NIGERIAN ECONOMIC SYSTEM, 10 (Zwei Consort Publications, Enugu, Nigeria, 1996). The demand 
oriented foreign investment would seem to equate the market development oriented foreign investment 
while the supply oriented foreign investment would equate the export oriented foreign investment. 
30 Agba, FDI and National Development, P. 59 
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the rest of the organization."}! This classification is based on the relationship 
or interaction amongst different parts of a multinational or, rather, the place 
of an enterprise (located in a host country) in the multinational group. A 
multinational company might comprise of similar enterprises, in different 
countries, engaged in the production of the same or similar products. This is 
the so-called horizontal multi-plant enterprise. Such enterprises, in most 
cases, are drawn by market potentials in their locations. The second group, 
according to this classification consists of enterprises, which are vertically 
integrated but are located in different countries. Each enterprise might be 
devoted to a certain aspect of the production process. They are, thus, 
interdependent. The third group refers to multinationals engaged in different 
lines of business or in the production of varied products and having affiliates 
in different countries. The affiliates are neither horizontally nor vertically 
integrated. The relationship among them is simply that they are affiliates of 
the same multinational group. The problem with classifying foreign 
investment in this manner is that its focus is on the multinational corporation 
and not on the investment. As we noted earlier in this chapter, although 
multinational corporations are deeply involved in foreign investments, the 
latter can exist without the former. To that extent, the classification based on 
31 THOMAS ANDERSON, MUL TINA TIONAL INVESTMENT IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: A 
STUDY OF TAXATION AND NATIONALIZATION, 24 (Routledge, NY, 1991) 
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narrow. 
among the affiliates of the multinational corporation IS 
HI. DETERMINANTS OF FOREIGN INVESTMENTS 
Several factors affect and determine the decision on foreign investment. A 
foreign investor may be motivated by one or a combination of these factors, 
which sometimes are referred to as determinants of foreign investment. The 
most important and most often discussed factor is the market size of the 
economy.33 Indeed, this cuts both ways. The relative small size of the home 
market, of the multinational corporation, in comparison to the size of the 
multinational corporation, will invariably push the corporation, or indeed 
any other investor faced with such scenario, to explore how to expand its 
market beyond what is available at home. The United Nations Conference 
32 Another categorization of multinationals is into multinational producing enterprise (one that owns and 
Controls production facilities in more than one country), multinational trading enterprise (one that 
Specializes in selling domestically produced goods to individuals, groups or enterprises in other countries), 
multinationally owned enterprise (one owned by nationals of different countries) and multinationally 
Controlled enterprise (one controlled by the economic agents of many nationalities). See ACHIME supra 
note 29 at 81-82 
33 See Nasiru Musa Yauri, Foreign Direct Investment and Technology Transfer to Nigerian Manufacturing 
Firms - Evidence from Empirical Data, Central Bank of Nigeria, Economic and Financial Review, Vol. 
44/2 June 2006 P. 18 at 20; Anupam Basu and Krishna Srinivasan, Foreign Direct Investment in Africa-
Some Case Studies, IMF Working Paper, WP/02/61 , P. 12 (published by the International Monetary Fund, 
2002); Maria Pigato, The Foreign Direct Investment Environment in Africa, (hereinafter (FDI Environment 
in Africa") PP. 3-6 (The World Bank); United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, World 
Investment Report 2006 (hereinafter WIR 2006), PP. 155-158 
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on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) calls this a "push factor,,34, a term it 
uses to describe any circumstance, in an investor's home country, that has 
the consequence of prompting them to invest abroad. The corollary to this is 
that once an investor is, as it were, ~~pushed" abroad because of the small 
size of the home market, it will be attracted to a country, or an economy, that 
has a large market. The availability of the market thus becomes, in the words 
of UNCTAD, a "pull factor". The role of market availability, of course, 
depends on the type of the product and is enhanced when the country market 
allows the exploitation of economies of scale.35 This is one of the positive 
factors in the Nigerian foreign investment equation. With a population 
estimated to be over one hundred million, the country presents a huge 
market for several products. It is worthy of note, though, that it is not only 
the population of the country that determines the market size. Other 
ingredients like the wage earnings and disposable income are relevant.36 But, 
the sheer size of the population is an important consideration. 
34WIR2006P.155 
35 Basu and Srinivasan, supra note 33 at 12 
36 WIR 2006 P. 155 (noting that: "Some product markets might be relatively large even in "small 
economies" (e.g. because of per capita incomes in the case of consumer goods)") 
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Another frequently discussed determinant is the cost of production.37 Again, 
this can be a "push" or "pull" factor depending on where the advantage lies. 
Cost of production is expansive, and will include labor costs, transportation 
and ancillary aids to production. A foreign investor will weigh all the costs 
and the relative weight one investor would attach to anyone factor would of 
, course vary depending on the line of production. If the cost of production in 
the home country is high, it acts as a push factor and will likely make the 
investor to look abroad. In doing so the investor will look to the countries 
that have low costs of production, and in this case it will be a pull factor, 
attracting investment. The question of cost of production is the more 
important if the investment is export-oriented.38 In the case of labor it has 
been noted that the important thing is not just the availability of cheap labor 
but also, the availability of highly productive labor.39 The reduced cost 
might also be in the nature of natural resources or other inputs. This explains 
37 Yauri supra note 33 at 23; Pigato, FDI Environment in Africa, supra note 33 at 3; WIR 2006 supra note 
33 at 155; Basu and Srinivasan. supra note 33 at 12 
38 Basu and Srinivasan, supra note 33 at 12 
39 Yauri supra note 33 at 23 (noting that: ''the reality in most African countries is that lower labour costs 
though widely prevalent, is not a sufficient inducement for the inflow of FDI, as labour productivity in 
most of these countries is usually low.") 
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the prominence of foreign investments in the mining and petroleum sector in 
Nigeria and other developing countries endowed with natural resources.40 
Others identify country conditions as yet another determinant.41 This would 
be a generic term to cover the question of how open the country is.42 
Whether openness of the economy will conduce to more foreign investments 
depends on the kind of foreign investment. Export seeking investment would 
be attracted to an open economy since the perceived openness will inure to 
the benefit of the investor who can easily sell their products abroad.43 On the 
other hand, market oriented investment would more easily be attracted to a 
less open economy, since the restrictions on importation would ensure a 
greater availability of the local market. Other considerations would be 
whether there are infrastructures, such as social services that are necessary 
and conducive to investment operations in the country. "A high level of 
economic development as reflected in the availability of adequate 
infrastructure, both physical and human, and a relatively high per capita 
40 A greater percentage of the foreign investment that goes to Africa go to mainly resource endowed 
countries. 
41 Basu and Srinivasan, supra note 33 at 13 
42 Some writers use the term "openness". See for e.g. Yauri supra note 33 at 21 
43 Yauri supra note 33 at 22 
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income would be expected to be beneficial for foreign investment.,,44 The 
existence of supportive institutional structures such as well functioning 
banking and financial system and a reliable legal system also attract foreign 
investment.45 A World Bank study found that government instability, 
political violence, policy volatility and uncertain enforcement of laws all 
have a negative impact on foreign investment and that the two factors that 
reduce investment most are corruption and the absence of a credible rule of 
law.46 The World Bank's Country Policy and Institutional Assessment 
(CPIA) , which assesses the quality of countries' policies and institutional 
frameworks, shows that African countries scored poorly compared with 
other developing countries.47 A similar performance is reflected in the 
International Country and Risk Guide Index (ICRG)48, prompting a 
suggestion that overall it would appear that Sub-Saharan Africa continues to 
44Basu and Srinivasan, supra 33 at 13 (citing Kravis and Lipsey (1992), Wheeler and Mody (1992), Mody 
and Srinivasan (1998» 
45 Basu and Srinivasan supra note 33 at 13 
46 A YMO BRUNETTI AND BEATRICE WEDER, INVESTMENT AND INSTITUTIONAL 
UNCERTAINTY: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF DIFFERENT UNCERTAINTY MEASURES (The 
World Bank, Technical paper No.4 by the 1FC, Washington, DC, 1997) 
47 Miria Pigato, Foreign Direct Investment in Africa: Old tales and New Evidence (hereinafter, "FDI in 
Africa: Old Tales and New Evidence"), 9 (World Bank, Africa Region Working Paper Series No.8, 
November 2000) (noting that: "the CPIA shows that Africa's rating have marginally improved since 1997 
but remains the worst compared with other developing countries.") 
4! For the period 1987-1998, Nigeria scored annual averages of 48.5 in ICRG political risk index, 31.9 in 
ICRG corruption index, and 37.5 in ICRG rule oflaw index. The maximum attainable score was 100. See 
Miria Pigato, FDI in Africa: Old Tales and New Evidence, supra note 47 at 32. 
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be viewed as a risky investment location.49 Corruption and other social ills 
often discourage investors because they increase the cost of doing business. 
So does a perception of insecurity, both of person and property. These tend 
to have a negative impact on the flow of foreign investment. 
An important new determinant is the availability of information 
technology.5t} The world is gradually becoming a global village courtesy of 
the Internet and information super highway. Unfortunately, some developing 
countries are not yet fully wired into almost monolithic super highway. Such 
situation is a major constraint on the inflow of foreign investment. 
49 Miria Pigato, FDI in Africa: Old Tales and New Evidence, supra note 47 at 11 
50 Tony Addison and Almas Heshmati, The New Global Determinants of FDI Flows to Developing 
Countries: The Importance oj leT and Democratization, (United Nations University, World Institute for 
Development Economics Research, Discussion Paper No. 2003/45, May 2003) (arguing that 
democratization and information and communication technology (lCT) increase foreign direct investment 
inflows to developing countries and that more assistance should be given to poorer countries to help them 
adopt ICT and to break out of what they term their present 'low equilibrium' trap); The issue of democracy 
is not an entirely new determinant, and is interwoven with the rule of law and protection of property. 
Investors are wary of going into countries that do not have well functioning legal institutions or where 
property rights are not respected. It must be noted that even absence a democratic setting, foreign investors 
do go into countries if the profit margin can cushion the adverse effects of lack of democracy. It is assumed 
that that explains the continued presence of many multinational corporations in Nigeria during the military 
administrations. Some even suggest that the multinational corporations collude with the dictatorial 
governments to further suppress the people. Nonetheless, democracy continues to be a predominant 
consideration in the decision of foreign investors. See Jo Jakobsen, Does Democracy Moderate the 
Obsolescing Bargain mechanism? An empirical AnalYSiS, 1983-2001,65 (Transnational Corporations, Vol. 
IS, No.3, December 2006) (probing the nexus between democracy and foreign investment and noting that 
"evidently democracy and international capital flows are compatible.") 
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IV. ARGUMENTS FOR AND AGAINST FOREIGN IN-VESTMENTS 
There is hardly any phenomenon in international law or economics that is 
whole-heartedly accepted without controversy. For most of the twentieth 
century the world was divided along ideological lines, essentially between 
the pro capitalist west and the socialist leaning countries of the old Soviet 
Union and East Europe. Thus, most concepts were viewed through 
ideological prisms. Foreign investment was no exception. The West 
championed and trumpeted it, while socialist inclined countries lampooned 
the notion as exploitative. It is pertinent to note that even the orchestrated 
fall of the Berlin Wall and the celebrated end of the cold war have not 
completely eradicated the ideological divide. Granted, countries of the 
former Soviet Union and the eastern bloc have embraced market economy 
and opened their economies to foreign investment. Yet, scholars are still not 
agreed on the utility of foreign investment. That is the reason we examine 
here the common arguments for and against foreign investment. We start 
with the perceived benefits. It must also be noted that foreign investment 
involves two countries or, at least, entities in more than one country: the 
country recipient of the investment (host country), on the one hand, and the 
country, which is the source of the investment (home country), on the other 
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hand. And true to capitalism, the interests of the home country, or of the 
foreign investor, and those of the host country, do not necessarily coincide. 
Our emphasis is on the benefits accruing, and drawbacks applying, to the 
host country. This is especially so, as the subject of our study is not only a 
net recipient of foreign investment but is also a developing country. 
A. Benefits of Foreign Investments 
Foreign investment is a source of capital.sl Most developing countries are 
said to suffer from poor or insufficient capital for development. Thus, they 
have to resort to foreign aid or borrowing to supplement their capital base. 
But the latter two have dwindled in recent years and foreign investment is 
increasingly stepping up to the plate. 52 It is argued that foreign investment is 
preferred to borrowing because borrowing requires regular repayments and 
saddles a country with debt servicing burdens for a long time. 53 On the other 
hand, foreign investment does not entail any regular repayments by the host 
51 LOUIS N. CTETE, DETERMINANTS OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN NIGERIA, 1 (NISER, Ibadan, 
1998) (NISER Monograph Series No.7, 1998) 
52 IMF, FOREIGN PRIVATE INVESTMENT IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: A Study by the Research 
Department, Occasional Paper, No. 33, P.2 (IMF Washington DC, January, 1985) 
S3 IMF, FOREIGN PRIVATE INVESTMENT IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: A Study by the Research 
Department, Occasional Paper, No. 33, P.l (IMF Washington DC, January, 1985) 
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country. Instead, the foreign investor acquires equity, and shares in the risks 
involved in the investment. 54 They can only be paid if the investment earns a 
positive return. Besides, it is said that foreign investments have longer-tenn 
beneficial impacts on the host country's development than do debts. 
Furthennore, it is contended that in addition to the capital, encapsulated in 
foreign investment, the host country's public revenue is also improved by 
the taxes associated with the investments. 55 The foreign investor brings not 
only capital but also pays royalty which add up to the revenue base of the 
host country. 56 
The most controversial benefit associated with foreign investment, 
especially in the developing world, is the claim that it facilitates the transfer 
of technology.57 It is axiomatic that developing countries lack technology 
54 IMF, FOREIGN PRIVATE INVESTMENT IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: A Study by the Research 
Department, Occasional Paper, No. 33, P.9 (IMF Washington DC, January, 1985) 
55 Tony Addison and Almas Heshmati, supra note 50 at 2; M.I. OBADAN AND F.A. DIMOWO, ESSAYS 
ON NIGERIAN ECONOMY, 41 (Mindex Publishing Coy, Benin City Nigeria, 2000); ACHIME supra 
note 29 at 73; G.E. EDAME, DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS AND PLANNING IN NIGERIA, 138 -
14() (hannony Books, Benin City, Nigeria, 20(1) 
56 Hassan A. saliu, The Politics of Foreign Investment, in HASSAN A. SALIU (ED), ISSUES IN 
CONTEMPORARY POLITICAL ECONOMY OF NIGERIA, (Sally and Associates, llorin, Nigeria, 1999) 
57 "Technology is defined as any tangible or tangible resource that can generate economic rent for the host 
country firms by, for example improving total factor productivity." See IKIARA , supra note 20 at 8 (also 
noting that "technology is generated by R&D, most of which is conducted in industrialized countries, 
making technology transfer very important for economic prosperity of countries with weak R&D and 
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and that they badly need to acquire that, one way or the other. Essentially, 
they have to develop theirs or receive it from the West by purchase. Unlike 
non-proprietary assets such as finance, capital goods and intermediate 
inputs, which can be obtained from the international market, proprietary 
assets like technology can be obtained only from the firms that make and 
possess them. 58 To purchase technology will of course be very expensive. 
Similarly, the multinational corporations, who may own the technology, 
might be reluctant to license because of the fear that such licensing might 
dissipate the technology. 59 As an alternative, they prefer to internalize 
technology transfer through foreign investments.60 They do this by 
establishing affiliates in other countries. That way they can still control their 
technology. This also allows the developing countries to have the benefit of 
the technology. At the same time, this may result in the development of 
technology in the developing countries through the so-called spillovers. 
innovation capacities", and further that "in the 16th and 17th centuries, for instance, deliberate technology 
transfer policies of King Henry VIII made Britain a leading manufacturing nation.") 
58 WIR2006 P. 184 
59 IKIARA supra note 20 at 9 
60 IKIARA supra note 20 at 9 
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Vertical Spillovers refer to the effect of a foreign investor's technology and 
know how on their local subsidiaries.61 Essentially, the foreign firm makes 
its technology available to the local affiliate, and this enhances the affiliate's 
production. Horizontal spillover refers to the effects of the foreign investor's 
use of technology on other domestic firms, usually in competition with the 
foreign investor, in the host country.62 The interaction between a foreign 
finn and domestic finns takes different forms and at each level, the belief is 
that, the foreign firm's technology rubs off on the local firms. Domestic 
finns can watch and imitate the way foreign affiliates operate. There may 
also be a labor turnover, where employees of the foreign firm may move to 
domestic firms bringing with them the knowledge of the technology 
acquired while at the foreign firm. The acquisition of technology, on the part 
of the local firms, might also be spurred by the competition from the foreign 
firm through its affiliates. In order not to lose their market share to the 
competition from foreign firms, the local firms are forced to be more 
efficient in using existing technologies and resources or to introduce new 
technologies by themselves.63 The spillover might also result from training 
6\ Yauri supra note 33 at 26 
62 Yauri supra note 33 at 26 
63 Yauri supra note 33 at 27 
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and collaboration under joint venture arrangement between a foreign firm 
and a local firm, or from backward and forward linkages.64 
The next major argument advanced in support of foreign investment is that it 
provides employment.65 Foreign investment, in essence, is a new business 
being brought to the host country. Like all businesses, it would need to be 
staffed. It would not be realistic for the foreign investor to bring in all the 
staff for the firm from the home country. Even if they could do so, there are 
usually host country immigration or other restrictions. So, the foreign 
investment would have to be staffed by employees from the host country.66 
It is noted that this benefit particularly applies more to host developing 
countries than it does to host developed countries, and is especially manifest 
in the manufacturing sector.67 It is also pointed out that whether foreign 
investment generates employment depends on several factors: the nature of 
the investment, trade and industrial policies of the host nation and the labor 
64 Yauri supra note 33 at 28 (explaining that foreign affiliates may be forced to engage in transactions with 
local suppliers and customers and thus may provide technical assistance and training to local suppliers) 
65 Saliu supra note 56 at 297 
66 Saliu supra note 56 at 297; see also EDAME, supra note 55 at 140 (asserting that: "the importation of 
capital creates more employment in the urban sector. This leads to the migration of surplus labour from the 
rural to the urban sector. The pressure of popUlation on the land is reduced and disguised unemployment 
may disappear. This the social gain offoreign capita!.") 
67 WIR 2006 P. 192 
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institutions of the host country. 68 Other benefits attributed to foreign 
investment are that: it leads to the production of better quality goods at lower 
COSt,69 it enhances competition70 and that it leads to development.7} 
B. Arguments Against Foreign Investments 
Against the practice of foreign investments, it is argued that they make the 
so-called developing countries perpetually dependent on the sources of the 
foreign investments and this deepens their state of underdevelopment. 72 
Scholars of this dependency school note that foreign investment is motivated 
68 Pigato, FDI in Africa: Old Tales and New EVidence, supra note 44 at 8 (noting that: "employment 
generation of FDI is normally higher in green field FDI, while M&As often lead to labor shedding. It is 
also higher within export-oriented regimes with abundant cheap labor.") 
69 C.T. Tyokase, The PoliTical Economy o/Foreign Capital in Nigeria, in S.A ADESINA, S.S OGBONNA, 
R.A ADETORO AND C.T. TYOKASE, REFLECTIONS ON THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF 
NIGERIA, 107 (Goad Educational Publishers, Abeokuta, 1999); A. Fabayo and lA. Alade, Foreign 
Private investment in Nigerian Cotton Textile Industry: An Impact Analysis, 47 Quarterly Journal of 
Administration, Vol. XVIII Nos. 1& 2 October 1983/January 1984; KAYODE AND OYERANTI, supra 
note 6 at 9 
70 Fabayo and Alade supra note 69 at 47-48; IKIARA supra note 20 at 4 
71 Olukoshi supra note 1 at 15 
72 SaHu supra note 56 at 298; Olukoshi supra note 1 at 15 (asserting that: ""But against orthodoxy, scholars 
working within the underdevelopment/dependency school have argued that the real problem faced by 
developing economies is not the shortage of capital as such but the draining away of their meager resources 
to the West by foreign investors. Far from being a factor necessary for the development of the 'Third 
world', foreign investment is, in fact, a major burden the overall effect of which is to reinforce the 
underdeveloped state of these countries. In evidence, many dependentistas have conducted studies showing 
the negative balance of payments effects of the activities of foreign investors on Third World economies."; 
WIR 2006 P. 195 (noting that "if a large share ofFDI originates from one particular country, it may create 
a perception in the host economy that it has become too dependent on and dominated by the home economy 
concerned. ") 
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by profits and are motivated to invest in an economy by the prospect of 
higher returns, and it would seem contradictory that they would sacrifice 
their capital in order to develop a country far removed from their home 
countries. They deny that foreign investors bring in capital. Instead, they 
raise the capital within the host economy and then declare huge profits, 
which enable them to repatriate the capital and thereby worsen the balance 
of payments equilibrium of the host country. 73 Opponents also note that 
when it is asserted that foreign investment offers employment, it is forgotten 
that the jobs that foreign investment offers are only those that further 
entrench the foreign investors in the host country and therefore intensify the 
country's dependence on the foreign investor. They note that the foreign 
investors do not offer substantive, and decision making, positions to the 
locals.74 Indeed, most of the decisions are made in the home countries or 
headquarters of the foreign investors. 
There is no denying the tension between foreign investors and the host 
country.75 Both are motivated by interests that seem at odds with each other. 
73 Saliu supra note 56 at 298 
74 Saliu supra note 56 at 299 
75 See also J" Ade Oyelabi, The Developing Countries' Point of View:!, in DON WALLACE, JR "' AND 
HELGA ROUF-KOCH, INTERNATIONAL CONTROL OF INVESTMENT (The Dusseldorf Conference 
on Multinational Corporations), 101 at 106 (Praeger Publishers, NY, 1974) (asserting that: "It has become 
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Yet, that is the core of the capitalist or liberal economic system to which 
these developing countries aspire. The solution to the seeming contradiction 
lies in the freedom to negotiate, or market forces, which is the hallmark of 
economic liberalism. Thus, advocates of the Bargaining Schooe6 argue that 
a country has bargaining strength vis-a-vis foreign companies and should be 
able to negotiate an agreement in which the social profitability of the 
proposed foreign investment is substantia1.77 The host government seeks to 
protect its interests through the use of laws and regulations and by direct 
negotiations with the foreign investors. The real problem is that these 
mechanisms are often times subverted and the process remains skewed in 
favor of the multinational corporations. Sometimes, the public officials who 
generally recognized that the primary objectives of the multinational corporations are to make profits and to 
grow. Ifwe accept these objectives as perfectly rational and legitimate - and there is no good reason not to 
• then it becomes clear why one must assume that the relationship between LDCs and MNCs is one of 
inherent conflict. Unhappily, the conflict is no more one in which a poor solitary foreign investor is 
maltreated by an ungrateful host country. Rather, it is one where a nation-state is virtually at the mercy of 
one or more giant MNCs") 
76 Other schools of thought on the issue are the pro-foreign investment school (which believes that national 
and foreign private sector enterprises operating in competitive market conditions offer the best possible 
prospects for speedy national economic growth in developing countries), dependency school which rejects 
the arguments of the pro-foreign investment school, and maintains that foreign investments lead to 
dependence, on the part of the host country, on the foreign investors), and the structuralists school, which 
challenges the optimism of the bargaining school) See S.A. Olomola and T.O. Akinbobola, Foreign Direct 
Investment and Economic Growth in Nigeria: Is there a Long -Run Relationship? The Quarterly Journal of 
Administration, Vol XXXI, Nos. 1&2, September J999/January 2000, PP. 59-71 
77 S.A. Olomola and T.O. Akinbobola. Foreign Direct Investment and Economic Growth in Nigeria: Is 
there a Long =Run Relationship? The Quarterly Journal of Administration, Vol. XXXI, Nos. 1&2 
September 1999/January 2000 P. 59 at P.64 (also noting that the bargaining school discovered that ''the 
cleavage between the host government and foreign firms remain very deep and that the former do seek, 
with ever greater levels of success over time, to extract increasing significant gains from multinational 
corporations (MNCs)") 
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are supposed to enforce the regulations become compromised directly or 
indirectly by the foreign investors, thereby essentially leaving the 
corporations to do as they please.78 So, the fault is not in the notion of 
foreign investment, per se. Instead, the challenge should be how best to 
regulate and, in the view of the bargaining school, negotiate the admission of 
foreign investors in such a way to ensure optimum benefit for the host state. 
In a direct attack on the role of foreign investment in the development of the 
Third World, critics argue that foreign investors bring in outdated and 
inappropriate technology 79 and they do not even try to pass the technology to 
the locals. Sometimes they fail to adapt the technology to local 
circumstances. Technology is such a prized possession on the part of 
foreign investors that it is a little ambitious to expect that they would easily 
transfer it to the developing countries. Indeed, we saw earlier that one of the 
reasons the multinational corporations resort to foreign investments is to 
control their technologies. Otherwise they can simply sell or grant licenses 
78 It has been noted that this situation is "compounded by the practice of public servants retiring into 
multinational corporations as directors in which capacity they serve only a little more than as 
intermediaries." See OBADAN AND DIMOWO supra note 55 at 41 - 42 
79 J.A. Alade, The Role of Multinational Corporations in Economic Development: The Nigerian 
Experience, Quarterly Journal of Administration, Vol. XXV Nos. 3 & 4 April/July 1991 P. 291 at 293 
(asserting that: "it has been observed that little technology is being transferred by the M~Cs. More often 
than not the technologies being transferred are inappropriate to the local conditions prevalent in the 
LDCs."); Fabayo and Alade supra note 69 at 48; IKIARA supra note 20 at 5 
255 
for the developing countries to use them. But they are reluctant to do this. 
Some theorists actually contend that the reason a foreign firm can compete 
with local firms is that the former have certain attributes such as technology, 
which kind of counteract the obvious advantages enjoyed by the local firms. 
Such advantages on the part of the local firms include knowledge of the 
local conditions. So, by its very nature, the expectation that foreign investors 
would bring their technology and transfer it to the developing country is not 
entirely realistic. In most cases, where they are forced to undertake to train 
local staff, they pay lip service to that undertaking. This is not to deny the 
impact of foreign investment in the acquisition of technology, but only to 
underscore the point that its role is marginal. Realistically, the developing 
countries can pick some aspects of the technology indirectly through 
interaction with the foreign firms as discussed earlier. Outright and 
deliberate transfer from the foreign investors to the local firms seems a tall 
order. 
A similar criticism is that foreign investments encourage alien tastes. It is 
alleged that multinational corporations encourage inappropriate and alien 
patterns of consumption.80 One wonders why this criticism can legitimately 
so Alade supra note 79 at 293; OBADAN AND DIMOWO, supra note 55 at 43 
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by leveled against foreign investment. It is true that the introduction of 
foreign investment leads to the introduction of different or foreign ways of 
life. But the influence of the alien pattern of consumption is dependent on 
the people. The developing countries understand their state of 
underdevelopment vis-a-vis the developed ones, and essentially see the 
march towards development as a march towards the ways of the West. This 
seems to pervade all aspects of life. The penchant for alien tastes is not 
necessary the fault, or even the result, of foreign investment. It is more the 
result of the interaction of the citizenry with people from outside. If such 
social and commercial intercourse leads to a quest for alien patterns of 
consumption, foreign investment is not to blame. 
Another criticism directed against foreign investment is that it leads to 
"de capitalization of the host country through the transfer of enormous 
amounts of the nation's economic surplus abroad for foreign 
development.".81 It is also alleged to lead to a marginalization or 
displacement of domestic firmS.82 This is the perennial dilemma. The 
unleashing of foreign investment entails that the foreign firms will compete 
81 OBADAN AND DIMOWO supra note S5 at 43; Alade supra note 79 at 292 
82 Alade supra note 79 at 293; Obadan supra note 5S at 43; KA YODE AND OYERANTI supra note 6 at 10 
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with the local finns, and given the fonner's superior technology, they are 
more likely to do better than the local finns. Depending on the extent of the 
competition, the local firms might be crowded out. It is also stated that 
foreign investment fosters neocolonial domination83 and leads to uneven 
income distribution.84 
V. HISTORY AND OVERVIEW OF FOREIGN INVESTMENTS IN 
NIGERIA 
It is noted that foreign investments date back to time in memoriam, and is 
not peculiar to the developing nations, but was also a feature of the 
developing process of the advanced countries.85 It must be observed, though, 
8:; Tyokase supra note 69 at 108, 109 & 110, Obadan supra note 55 at 43. In the same vein the foreign firms 
are accused of protecting their subsidiaries by avoiding competition with them. Thus they produce only for 
the local market and this hurts the host country's balance of payments. See Alade supra note 79 at 292. 
84 KA YODE AND OYERANTI supra note 6 at to 
85 See Edame, supra note 55 at 138 (stating: "In the 17m and ISm centuries, England borrowed from 
Holland. The rapid growth of America had been due to large supplies of men and money from Europe in 
the 19m century. This is also true of the USSR. The development of Russia has been in no less degree to 
liberal supplies of capital during 1890-1914 by Western Europe. Though the Russian economic 
development followed the October Revolution, the ''take-off'' goes back to the years preceding the First 
World War", and further that: "It is generally contended that the Western European nations including 
England received little foreign capital for their development during the "take-off". But this is not a correct 
view. In actuality, by exploiting their colonies, these countries extorted a kind of involuntary aid from 
them."); FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT. P. 11 (A Publication of the International Finance 
Corporation and Foreign Investment Advisory Service, Washington, DC, 1997) (hereinafter simply referred 
to as "IFe, FOI") (noting that the story of development almost every where involved foreign direct 
investment and that itt the early 20th century a large part of the world's ittfutstrUcture WllS developed 
through foreign investment); The publication further noted that by 1914, the world stock of foreign direct 
investment was estimated at $15billion. The UK was the largest source followed by the US and then 
Gernany, while the US was the largest recipient. But after World War II, the US became the largest source 
of foreign direct investment and manufacturing investment became most prevalent. See PP. 11-12. 
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that such investments lacked the sophistication of present day transnational 
investments. Nonetheless, in their basic forms of capital moving from one 
country to another, those transactions cutting across countries could clearly 
be classified as foreign investments. Pre- colonial Nigeria was made up of 
distinct groups. There was certainly some form of trading and other 
commercial activities among the several groups. Whether one would 
categorize those as foreign investments would depend on one's view of the 
status of those entities. Besides, the prevalent commercial activity was 
trading. Be that as it may, the history of foreign investments in Nigeria is 
traced to the advent of Europeans, to the place now called Nigeria, sometime 
in the 19th century. 86 Of course, the activities of the traders from Europe 
were a precursor to the full-scale colonization of the country. As we saw in 
Chapter 1, the infamous Berlin conference, on the partition of Africa, 
allotted the territory of Nigeria to Britain, an allotment that Britain initially 
maintained through the Royal Niger Company. As we saw in chapter 2, 
colonial economic system was mercantilist. And all over the world, in the 
height of colonialism, investment was largely made in the context of 
86 Olukoshi supra note 1 at 16; Olomola and Akinbobola supra note 76 at 66 (asserting that: "the 
Development of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) started with the flrst contact of Nigerians over a century 
ago with European traders in the coastal areas of the country and Trans-Saharan caravan routes with the 
Arabs in the north.") 
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colonial expansion.87 Nigeria's expenence was no different. With the 
colonial conquest, and the integration of Nigeria's legal system into the 
British legal system, which protected the foreigners, the flow of foreign 
investment began in earnest. 88 The main beneficiaries were British, as most 
of the foreign investment came from Britain.89 It has been noted that of the 
102 firms that were operating in Nigeria by 1921, 94 were of British origin 
and ownership, and 5 others had joint British owner.90 Some of the 
prominent multinational corporations that operated in Nigeria during the 
colonial era were the United African Company (UAC) of Nigeria Limited; 
John Holts; A. O. Leventis; Patterson Zechonics (PZ); CF AO and SeOA 
(which were French firms); UTe (a Swiss firm); Aluminum Limited of 
Canada (ALCAN); and Pfizer (a USA drug company).91 Initially, most of 
the foreign investment was in mining and resources extraction.92 Later, the 
87 SORNARAJAH supra note 14 at 19 (observing that in consequence of the colonial context in which the 
investments took place, the investments did not need protection as the colonial legal systems were 
integrated with those of the imperial powers and the imperial powers gave sufficient protection for the 
investments which went into the colonies); Somarajah noted further that where investments were made in 
areas which remained uncolonized, a blend of diplomacy and force ensured that the states did not interfere 
with foreign investors too adversely. See SORNARAJAH supra note 14 at 20. 
U Alade points out that "the colonial administration adopted a laissez faire policy towards the operation of 
multinational enterprises in the country" and "that although the enterprises were to operate within the 
framework of government regulations, in actual practice, government regulation of business activities were 
virtually absent." See Alade supra note 79 at 294 
89 QJukoshi supra note 1 at 20 
90 Ohlkoshi supra note 1 at 20 
III 01omola and Akinbobola supra note 76 at 66 
92 Olomola and Akinbobola supra note 76 at 66 
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emphasis shifted to manufacturing following the development of import 
substitution.93 This focused attention away from imports to the 
manufacturing of consumer goods. However, most of the multinationals 
merely changed from importing finished goods to importing parts. This is 
the reason they are sometimes accused of subverting the development of 
local industries. Instead of adapting the production of consumer goods to use 
local raw materials, they still used foreign parts in the production of what 
were local consumer goods. 
Amongst the newly independent countries, the prevailing sentiment 
following independence was that of nationalism as reflected in antagonism, 
at least rhetorically, against any appearance of continued foreign 
domination. This skepticism was extended to foreign investment.94 The 
post-colonial era in Nigeria began in 1960. Although the feelings of 
93 Olukoshl supra note 1 at 22 (noting that "it was only in the period from about 1945 that an appreciable 
level of foreign capital began to go into manufacturing activities in Nigeria to mark the commencement, in 
eamest, of import-substitution industrialisation in the country") 
94 Mulatu Wubneh, Patterns of Foreign Investment in Africa, 1970-1988, in REXFORD A. AHENE AND 
BERNARD KATZ (Eds), PRIVATIZATION AND INVESTMENT IN SUB SAHARAN AFRICA, 55, 65 
(Praeger, NY, 1992) (noting that foreign investors were often viewed as extensions of colonialism in the 
early years following independence" and that "nationalization of foreign-owned companies was extensive, 
and where there was no outright expropriation, foreign investors were required to accept minority state 
participation") lFC, FDI supra note 85 at 12·13 (noting that during the 1950s and 1960s most developing 
countries pursued "inward-oriented" development strategies which emphasized the growth of domestic 
industries and that most governments were wary of foreign direct investment and did not want to create 
economic dependency. It also noted that even though such policies deterred foreign direct investments, they 
also made foreign investors to shift production into the countries instead of trying to export to them.) 
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nationalism were no different than in other emergent African states, it would 
seem that Nigeria embraced foreign investments since it continued the open 
door policies inherited from the colonial administration.95 It also introduced 
many incentives aimed at attracting foreign investments.96 The country also 
signed on to the Convention on Settlement of Investment Disputes,97 in 
1965, and thereby signaled its intentions with respect to the protection of 
private foreign investments in the country. 98 The period immediately 
following independence also witnessed the broadening of the sources of 
foreign investments in Nigeria, to include sources in the United States of 
America and other European countries, in addition to Britain.99 The 
emphasis remained on the commercial and mining sectors, with the latter 
given added impetus by the discovery of oi1.1OO But the political upheavals 
95 Alade supra note 79 at 294; Olomola and Akinbobola supra note 76 at 66-67 
96 Some of these were income tax relief (t958); import duty retiefon raw materials and components (1957); 
exchange and investment guarantees; the provision and continued expansion of economic and social 
overhead capital. See Alade supra note 79 at 294. 
97 This Convention provides a mechanism for the settlement of investment disputes between states and the 
nationals of other countries. 
91 Alade supra note 79 at 295 
99 Olukoshi supra note 1 at 20 (noting that: "at the time of independence in 1960, the British still accounted 
for well over 50 percent of all private foreign investments flowing into the Nigerian economy. It was only 
in the period from the mid-1960s that the British hegemony began to be challenged by American and other 
West European private investors.") 
100 Otukoshi supra note t at 22 
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and resultant civil war of the late 1960s took a toll on foreign investments. IOI 
This picked up again after the war.102 
However, the single most monumental policy of the 1970s, relating to 
foreign investment, was the enactment of the indigenization decrees, titled, 
Nigerian Enterprises Promotion Decrees of 1972 and 1977, the latter 
amending the former. 103 The decree restricted the participation of foreigners 
in businesses in Nigeria. It did this by creating three schedules of businesses. 
Those in Schedule 1 were reserved exclusively for Nigerians, meaning that 
foreigners could not participate in them. Schedule 2 contained businesses in 
which foreigners could not hold more than forty percent ownership. Thus, a 
minimum of sixty percent ownership was guaranteed Nigerians in Schedule 
2 businesses. Foreigners could hold no more than sixty percent interest in 
Schedule 3 businesses, meaning that Nigerians must hold not less than forty 
percent stake in those businesses. It has been suggested that it was the 
euphoria of the oil wealth that gave Nigeria the confidence to promulgate the 
lOl Olomola and Akinbobola, supra note 76 at 67 
IOl Ibid 
lOJ For a detailed analysis of the political economy of the decrees see THOMAS 1. BIERSTEKER, 
MUL TINA TIONALS, THE STATE AND CONTROL OF THE NIGERIAN ECONOMY (princeton 
University Press, Princeton, NJ, 1987); Biersteker argues that the state did not initiate the fIrSt decree (the 
1972) decree, but rather collaborated with local capital in its formulation but that the second decree (1977 
decree) was written with the experience of the first decree in mind and this time the state was the initiator. 
See PP. 52 and 159. 
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indigenization decrees, the motive of which was to reduce the scope of 
foreign participation in the country's economic development efforts. 1M 
There is no denying the fact that the discovery of oil and the resulting boom 
of the early 1970s fortified the desire of the state to take its economic 
destiny in its own hands, as the indigenization policy was thought to 
represent. It would appear though that the exercise was borne out of fear of 
neocolonialism. Ironically, though, given the level of the country's 
technological development, the discovery of oil entailed the need for both 
foreign capital and expertise required for exploration and mining. Maybe, 
the indeginization decrees were an attempt to balance the clear need for 
foreign investments and the fear of foreign domination of the economy. 
Whatever the true motivation, the indigenization decrees had the effect of 
reducing foreign investments in the country. 105 Many foreigners, however, 
devised ways of circumventing the decrees by using local fronts, and it is 
still thought that the economy is dominated and controlled by 
multinationals. 106 
104 Saliu supra note 56 at 296 
lOS Otomola and Akinbobola supra note 76 at 67; Achime supra note 29 at 50 and 88 
106 Olukoshi argues that "it was the inability of the Nigerian state to compel foreign investors and their 
indigenous collaborators to create a more internally balanced domestic economic base that provided the 
background to the economic crisis of the 1980s," and that "the consequenceof the crisis was mademore 
severe by the fact that Nigeria was almost solely dependent on oil exports for the sustenance of domestic 
economic activities." See Olukoshi supra note 1 at 34·35 
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The decline in resources and the oil glut of the early 1980s added urgency to 
the country's need for foreign investment, if only to alleviate the resulting 
economic crisis. Thus, the restrictions on foreign investments were relaxed 
by the continuous amendment of the indigenization decrees. t07 Similarly, the 
government started a debt equity swap program, which aimed to convert 
debts to investments, and to increase the level of foreign investments in the 
country.l08 The introduction of the structural adjustment program (SAP), in 
1986, aimed to liberalize the economy and that has been the thrust of the 
country's policies to date. That objective encourages foreign capital and 
indeed has the attraction of foreign investments at its core.109 It must be 
noted though that despite the country's deliberate efforts to attract foreign 
investments in the 199Os, a combination of the political instability that 
prevailed within the period and the displeasure of the West over the political 
107 There were the Nigerian Enterprises Promotion Decree 1987 and the Nigerian enterprises Promotion 
Decree 1989. Currently the restrictions have almost all been removed. By the Nigerian Investment 
Promotion Commission Act 1995. 
lOS Olomola and Akinbobola, supm note 76 at 67 
109 The International Finance Corporation notes that developing countries are now courting foreign direct 
investment, shifting the criterion for measuring the value of foreign direct investment from its direct 
contribution to local value to its longer-ten» consequences for the competitiveness of domestic resources 
and capabilities. See IFC, FDI supra note 85 at 14. 
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and other situations in the country negatively impacted the foreign 
investment situation in the country.IIO 
A conspectus of the economic terrain reveals that foreign investments have 
been rising in Nigeria. The country was one of the five highest recipients of 
foreign direct investment in Africa in 2005. 111 The inflow of foreign 
investments was more than $3 billion for that year, the country being one of 
only three African countries to receive more than that amount. 112 The 
dominant field remains mining, and especially oil. 113 Between 1980 and 
2005, Nigeria concluded more than 20 Bilateral Investment Treaties.1I4 
Table 1: Inflow of Foreign Private Investment into Nigeria, 1965-1985 
(million Nigerian naira) 
Years Total Inflow 
1965 176.0 
1966 101.2 
1%7 107.0 
110 SaIiu supra note 56 at 301-302 
III WIR 2006 P.4I; The country was the highest recipient in West Aftica, accounting for 7oo/o of foreign 
direct investment inflows into that region, and 11 % of foreign direct investment into Aftica. See P. 42. 
III Others were South Africa and Egypt. See WlR 2006 P.42 
113 Oil represented too/o of the country's foreign direct investments in 2005. See WIR 2006, P.4S See WIR 
2006, P.45. Occasionally the manufacturing and processing sector dominate. This was the situation in 1990, 
1991 and 1992. See SaUu supra note 56 at 302-303 
114 WIR 2006 P.49 
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1968 106.4 
1969 150.6 
1970 251.0 
1971 489.6 
1972 432.8 
1973 577.8 
1974 507.1 
1975 757.4 
1976 521.1 
1977 717.3 
1978 664.7 
1979 704.0 
1980 786.4 
1981 584.9 
1982 2193.4 
1983 1673.4 
1984 1385.3 
1985 1423.5 
Source: J.A. Alade, the Role of Multinational Corporations in Economic 
Development: The Nigerian Experience, Quarterly Journal of 
Administration, April/July 1991, Vol. XXV Nos 3 and 4, P. 291 at 306 
Table 2: Foreign Direct Investment in Nigeria, 1990-2007 (millions of 
dollars) 
1990 .. 2000 (Annual Average 1477 
2003 2171 
2004 2127 
2005 3403 
2006 5445 
Source: World Investment Report 2007 
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VI. INCENTIVES FOR FOREIGN INVESTMENTS IN NIGERIA 
It must be pointed out, from the outset, that a foreign company is required to 
register under the Companies and Allied matters Act before it can do 
business in Nigeria.us Generally, Nigeria is a member of most of the 
multilateral trading and fmancial institutions of the worId.116 It makes a 
deliberate effort to attract foreign investors. As a result, it provides several 
forms of incentives geared toward the attraction of foreign investments. As 
discussed above, initially, the Nigerian Enterprises Promotion Act had put a 
limit on the percentage of shares, which a foreigner might hold in a Nigerian 
firm. This has been relaxed. Subject to a few exceptions relating to sensitive 
issues of national security, a foreigner may now wholly own a Nigerian 
company.1l7 Besides, the Nigerian Investment Promotion Commission Act 
1995 has provisions assuring the protection of investment by foreigners. 118 
By that Act, no enterprise shall be nationalized or expropriated by any 
Government of the Federation and no person who owns, whether wholly or 
in part, the capital of any enterprise, shall be compelled by law to surrender 
liS Section 54 of the Companies and allied Matters Act; Section 56 of the Act provides for exemptions in 
respect of certain foreign companies. 
116 Such as World Trade Organization, United Nations International Monetary Fund, ICSlD etc 
117 Nigerian Investment Promotion Commission Act, 1995, Section 17 
liS Nigerian Investment Promotion Commission Act, 1995, Sections 25 and 26 
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their interest, in the capital, to any other persons. Similarly, the Federal 
Government may not acquire an enterprise unless the acquisition is in the 
national interest or for a public purpose under a law which makes provision 
for (a) payment of fair and adequate compensation and (b) a right of access 
to the courts for the detennination of: (i) the investor's interest or right, and 
(ii) the amount of compensation to which they are entitled. Such 
compensation shall be paid without undue delay, and authorization will be 
given for its repatriation in convertible currency where applicable. Aliens 
may bring money into the country through authorized dealers and obtain a 
certificate of capital importation.1l9 Such capital is guaranteed unconditional 
transferability and repatriation of funds with regard to both earnings and 
capital. In conjunction with the privatization exercise, these incentives open 
Nigeria to foreign investment and, all things being equal, promote capital 
inflow to the country. 
The Act also establishes the Nigerian Investment Promotion Commission 
(NIPC) to replace the Industrial Development Coordination Committee. The 
NIPC serves as a one"stop forum for coordinating with all the approvals 
required of a foreign investor. One of the problems of previous investment 
119 Foreign Exchange (Monitoring and Miscellaneous Provisions) Act No. 17 of 1995 
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agencies was that their roles tilted more to enforcement of investment laws 
and regulations, and less to promotion of investments. The NIPC is 
conceived to be more of a promotion agency. It is responsible for granting 
business permits and expatriate quotas. The Commission undertakes 
proactive investment generation programs and embarks on image building as 
part of its promotion functions. In addition, it provides other forms of 
services to investors. 
Nigeria also offers a series of tax incentives to foreign investors. For 
instance tax holidays are available to qualified companies, mainly 
companies in industries, which have been designated to have pioneer status. 
The basis for such classification could be the nature of the industry or the 
location. There could also be tax relief for research and development. This 
renders deductible, for tax purposes, the cost of conducting such research 
and development. There are numerous other tax incentives available to 
foreign companies in Nigeria. 
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CHAPTER 7 
IMPACT OF PRIVATIZATION ON FOREIGN INVESTMENTS IN 
NIGERIA 
I. FOREIGN PARTICIPATION IN PRIV A TIZA TION 
Some contend that the dominance of SOEs in any economy is not friendly to 
foreign investments. l This is because, in a sense, SOEs were created to avoid 
what was perceived to be the domination of the economy by foreign 
interests. At the inception of self-rule, most developing countries especially 
in Africa were faced with a shortage of private capital. They thus faced a 
dilemma - fully embrace foreign capital or forego the urgent developmental 
needs confronting them. Being apprehensive that an unrestrained embrace of 
foreign capital would result in neocolonialism, the states sought a way to 
undertake their developmental projects without surrendering the economy to 
foreign interests. A way out was in the establishment of many SOEs. As a 
result, the states became the engines of development. Thus, the view that 
state domination of the economy is not foreign investor friendly arises from 
both the antecedents of the SOEs as well as the conventional wisdom that 
1M. o. KAYODE AND O.A. OYERANTI, ATIRACTING FOREIGN INVESTMENT THROUGH 
PRIVATE SECTOR PARTNERSHIP: WHAT HOPE FOR NIGERIA? 28(Development Policy Centre, 
Ibadan, 2002) (Research Report No. 37) 
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state control of the economy IS antithetic of free markets, under which 
foreign investments thrive. 
It is therefore not surprising that there would be a certain ambivalence 
toward the participation of foreign investors in the privatization of state 
enterprises. Most of the enterprises are seen as national patrimonies. "Thus, 
the sentiment often is that these enterprises belong to the people and should 
not be given away to foreign interests, amounting to 'selling the family 
jewels. ,"2 And, while the developing states are persuaded of the benefits of 
privatizing them, they may still be unsure of the wisdom of involving 
foreign investors. The same nationalistic sentiments that led to the creation 
of the SOEs seem to be present still. Foreign investors' participation in 
privatization programs is, therefore, politically sensitive.3 The governments 
thus face a quagmire. They generally acknowledge the benefits of foreign 
participation, but oftentimes succumb to political pressure and thus skew the 
process against foreign investors.4 Some do this by imposing a limit on the 
percentage of shares that could be sold to foreigners or by prescribing 
2 Kally Megyery and Frank Sader, Facilitating Foreign Participation in Privatization, 3 (The World Bank, 
Washington DC. 1996) 
3 Frank Sader, Privatizing Public Enterprises and Foreign Investment in Developing Countries, 1988-1993, 
13 (The World Bank, Washington, DC) 
4 Megyery and Sader, supra note 2 at 3 
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minimum number of shares that must go to nationals or domestic firms. That 
is the reason initially most privatization programs in Africa had scant foreign 
participation. 
Nonetheless, the initial reluctance to involve foreign investors in 
privatization has softened, and there are appreciable reasons in support of 
foreign investors' involvement in privatization programs in the developing 
countries. First, it is said that foreign investors' participation in the 
privatization program raises the degree of competition in the sell-off process 
by increasing the number of bidders. 5 Absent foreign bidders, the local field 
may not offer sufficiently competitive prices for the SOEs. The result would 
be that the enterprises might be undersold. But the participation of 
foreigners, in the privatization program, increases the options available to 
the government by improving the number and enhancing the quality of 
offers available to the government. Besides, it increases the probability of a 
successful privati71ltion and ensures that the government would receive the 
maximum prices for its SOEs.6 
5 Sader supra note 3 at 13 
6 Megyery and Sader, supra note 2 at 4 
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Secondly, and more important, sometimes foreign investors are best suited 
to solve the problems of the SOEs. Most ailing SOBs need the injection of 
substantial capital and the introduction of technology. In some cases, only 
such steps can revamp the SOB or make its privatization worthwhile. So if it 
is sold to a foreign investor, it can more easily be turned around. Despite this 
obvious advantage, some countries instead use the privatization program as a 
mechanism to develop its domestic private sector. This might further the 
cause of domestic accumulation, but it hardly aids the overall developmental 
cause. Rather, the local capitalists would continue running the enterprises in 
the same manner as the government had done. 
While the participation of foreigners improves the odds that a privatization 
program would be successful, a privatization program also improves the 
inflow of foreign investment.7 This symbiotic relationship is reflected in two 
ways. Foreign investors' purchases ofSOEs, in and of themselves, constitute 
inflows of foreign investments. This would primarily be by the device of 
foreign direct investment. Such involvement might also be in the nature of 
portfolio investments. In a World Bank study on privatizing public 
enterprises and foreign investments in the developing countries, covering the 
7 See generally Sader supra note 3 
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period 1988-1993, it was found that sixty-nine privatization transactions 
involving foreign investors were completed through portfolio equity 
investments for a total of $10.6 billion dollars.8 Foreign direct investments 
accounted for six hundred and nineteen such transactions for the same 
period, although in Africa the number of portfolio investments were said to 
be few owing to the inadequacy of the capital markets in that region. 
The second mechanism by which privatization enhances foreign investments 
is through what is called the signaling effect whereby foreign investors tend 
to gravitate towards states that have very good privatization programs. They 
do this not necessarily to participate in the privatization programs 
themselves (even though that is sometimes also the case) but to invest in 
other sectors of the economy outside the privatization program. The 
rationale is that an effective and successful privatization program entails the 
effective withdrawal by the state of those impediments which militate 
against a proper functioning of free market. 
The other sense in which a successful privatization program might facilitate 
the inflow of foreign investments is that it creates a conducive infrastructural 
8 Sader Supra Dote 3 at 16. 
275 
I 
environment for businesses, or indeed investments, to thrive. This is 
especially apposite in the developing countries in Africa where the 
infrastructural facilities are usually within the domain of SOEs. Usually 
those infrastructures are dilapidated or even nonexistent. Thus the successful 
privatization of those SOEs will render them more efficient in discharging 
their functions of maintaining the infrastructures. The result is that foreign 
investors realize that a successful privatization invariably means the 
improvement of the business and other infrastructures in the country in 
question. It seems a fairly and widely accepted logic that there is a 
correlation between privatization and the inflow of foreign investments in a 
country. 
II. IMPACT OF PRIVATIZATION ON FOREIGN INVESTMENTS IN 
NIGERIA 
The intentions reflected in the privatization program are lofty. However, the 
Nigerian experience reveals that the theoretical and legal frameworks are but 
a starting point in using privatization to attract foreign investment. Other 
important variables must be present before privatization can have the desired 
positive effect on foreign investment. Among these variables are political 
stability and democracy. As indicated in Chapter 4, the military 
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administration in Nigeria first started the privatization exercise around 1989. 
In 1990, the exercise resulted in sixteen million dollars revenue.9 This 
increased to thirty five million dollars in 1991 10, one hundred and fourteen 
million dollars in 1992,11 five hundred and forty one million in 199312 and 
then declined to twenty four million in 1994.13 There was virtually a 
complete absence of any foreign investors in the first privatization program 
(the 1988 version).}" The data for the years 1995 through 1998 are not 
available. For those familiar with the political history of Nigeria, one recalls 
that the latter years were the height of the military dictatorship and 
represented a period during which the country suffered the worst 
international isolation, owing to the repressive regime that ran its affairs. 
The lesson is that absent a credible and stable polity, privatization laws and 
programs are not worth the paper on which they are written. 
9 Privatization in Sub-Saharan Afiica (Region Fact sheet), 
http://www.ipanet.netfdocumentsfWorldBankfdatabases/plinkifactsheets/SSA.htm 
14 Frank Sader, Privatization and Foreign Investment in the Developing World, 1988-1992,42 (The World 
Bank, Washington, DC) 
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For the exercise, which started in 1999, foreign investors have lately had a 
modest involvement in the program. 15 Although there has been a reasonable 
improvement in foreign participation, the number is still few relative to the 
volume of privatization already concluded. It would seem that initially, 
foreigners were still wary of the political climate in the country. This was 
not helped by the various crises, which the country witnessed shortly after 
the inception of civilian administration in 1999,16 The president embarked 
on numerous trips overseas with the declared purpose of wooing investors. 
Yet, it would seem that the latter were still cautious. The Director General of 
the Bureau of Public Enterprises lamented that foreign investors were slow 
in participating in the exercise.17 The privatization exercise took a long time 
15 These foreign investors include: Scancem (Norway) (which acquired interest in the cement sector), 
Holcim of spain (which acquired interest in the cement sector), Simatech Offshore International, which 
acquired interest in MV Abuja (Vessel of Unity Line), AP Moller (which acquired interest in the ports), 
ENL Consortium (which acquired interests in the ports), Hekio Consortium (which acquired interest in the 
fertilizer sector); Lafarge of France (which acquired interest in the cement sector), Flour Mills of Greece 
(which acquired interest in the ports), Global Energy CompanylMcDermott (which acquired interest in the 
ports), Indorama of Indonesia (which acquired interest in the petrochemical field), Rusal Aluminum 
Smelting of Russia , M1N of South Africa, and Celtel of Netherlands. This listing is based mainly on 
correspondence the author had with the Privatization agency, Bureau of Public Enterprises (BPE) dated 
May 30, 2007. 
16 There have religious crises and tensions regarding the introduction ofsharia in some parts of the country; 
there have also been ethnic crises in the Niger delta region; in 2002, the Miss World beauty pageant which 
had commenced in the country had to be moved to the United Kingdom where it was completed. 
17 See interview published in the Guardian newspaper Sunday April 27, 2003, where the Director General, 
Mr. Nasiru el Rufai stated: "I clearly want to see new monies coming into the Nigerian economy, which is 
one of the objectives of the programme. But you see, you cannot force that, because President Obasanjo has 
gone on several foreign trips to woo foreign investors, that has not forced foreign investors to come. So 
what are you going to do? Are you going to say because I have no foreign investors I will not do 
anything?" 
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to find core investors for the three most prominent SOES.18 The electricity 
company NEPA was embroiled in controversy. The opposition of its 
employees to the exercise was sufficient to discourage any foreign investors. 
No one would like to use their capital to acquire a controversy. The Bureau 
received a bid from a "foreign finn" for the telephone company, NITEL. 
Yet, the prospective core investor could not pay up, and the Bureau claimed 
it had forfeited its deposit, which was actually sourced from a local Nigerian 
bank. In the interim, the Bureau entered into a contract with a firm 19 for the 
management of NITEL pending its privatization. The Nigerian Airways 
issue illustrates the problem of administrative fight for turf. The supervising 
Ministry for that SOE and the Bureau both laid claims to the authority to 
privatize the Nigerian Airways.20 One wonders how foreign investors were 
to be attracted to such a finn. 
The privatization program enunciated by the 1999 law, that is the second 
legislation on privatization of SOEs, resulted in an overall gross revenue of 
18 NEPA, NITEL and Nigeria Airways 
19 Dutch fIrm Pentascope International, but this may not be treated as foreign investment, since the fIrm is 
just to tum NITEL around and perhaps make it more attractive to investors 
20 This factor of lack of cooperation from bureaucrats and politicians is not an insignificant problem. Ernst 
&Young warn that: "Between the possibility of war and civil disorder on the one hand, and heavy handed 
government interference on the other, lies the possibility that local politicians will treat privatization as 
political football in order to further their own ends to the detriment of the investment. See ERNST & 
YOUNG, supra note 12, 63. 
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60.2 billion naira and an overall net proceed of 58.04 billion naira as at the 
end of 2002.21 This was with the conclusion of the second phase of an 
anticipated three-phased exercise. Significantly, of the 43 enterprises 
privatized under the two phases, none was acquired by a foreigner or other 
foreign entity. The nearest was the failed attempt by a "British" firm to 
acquire NlTEL.22 That firm lost its deposit when the sale could not go on, 
and it was discovered that the deposit was actually sourced locally. Even if 
the deal had materialized, it would still not have marked a true foreign 
investment being a foreign acquisition only in principle. The sad conclusion 
then is that on the first of the two dimensional nexus between privatization 
and foreign investment, that is the direct injection of foreign capital through 
direct acquisition by foreigners of the SOEs, the first two phases of the 
Nigerian exercise did not have any positive impact. However, the third 
phase witnessed a smattering of foreign investors.23 The result is that the 
only inquiry left is whether the privatization program has indirectly boosted 
foreign investment in Nigeria. 
21 Unofficial report from the Bureau of Public Enterprises 
22 BPE is in the process of again putting forward NITEL for sale. See News report titled "NITEL for Sale 
Next Month, Says BPE Chief', Guardian Newspaper, August 17, 2004 (quoting the Director of BPE as 
stating that BPE will put NlTEL up for sale in September 2004) 
23 See the list at footnote 15 
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This second aspect of the inquiry is hamstrung by the paucity of data on 
these investments. The National Investment Promotion Commission is the 
agency charged with promoting investments in the country. 24 Ideally, as part 
of its statutory duties, the Commission should keep record of and track 
foreign investment inflows into the country. Therefore, it should be a ready 
and available source of authentic data on foreign investment trends in 
Nigeria. Unfortunately, statistics and data-keeping do not seem to be a prime 
issue for the agency.25 Happily, there are other sources and available records 
showing that until 1960 over ninety percent of total investments in Nigeria 
were under foreign ownership.26 With independence and the nationalism 
surrounding the new status, local participation continued to increase. This, of 
course, led to a reduction in the percentage of foreign investments in the 
country. In 1967, the value of total cumulative foreign direct investment in 
Nigeria was 64.2 million naira.27 This continued to increase, and by 1977, 
the value was 519.7 million naira.28 By 1978, it was 323.9 million naira, and 
24 See the Nigerian Investment Promotion Commission Act. 1995. Section 4(e). 
25 This writer made several attempts to collect such data from the agency but was only advised that the 
agency registered 119 foreign companies since 1999 with a total of $586 as of May 2003; See email from 
NlPC on file with author. 
16 1.K. ONOH, THE NIGERIAN OIL ECONOMY, 4 (1983) 
2B Id at 13, citing the Central Bank of Nigeria, Economic and Financial Review Vol. 6,00.2, December 
1968; vol. 14 no. 1 Match 1976; and vol. 17, no. 2, December 1979 
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by 1981, the inflow of direct foreign investment in Nigeria was valued at 
492.8 million naira.29 
From 1985 -1995 the annual average of direct foreign investment in Nigeria 
was $921 million.39 By 1998 the value had increased by 14 percent to $1051 
miIIion.
31 
Ironically, 1999, which was the year of the reinvigorated 
privatization program, witnessed a reduction with the foreign direct 
investment inflow to Nigeria declining, by 4.4 percent, to $1005.n This 
decline continued in 2000 with the country receiving $930 million worth of 
foreign investment33, a 7.5 per cent decrease in the value received in 1999. 
Significantly, the next two years, 2001 and 2002, saw increases of 18.7 
percent in 2001 and 16 per cent in 2002. The value of foreign direct 
investment in 2001 was $1104 million and $1281 million in 2002.34 The 
values offoreign direct investment in Nigeria in 2003,2004,2005 and 2006 
29 THOMAS J. BIERSTEKER, MULTINATIONALS. THE STATE AND CONTROL OF THE 
NIGERIAN ECONOMY, 262 (1987), Princeton Press, NJ. 
3() United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, World Investment Report 2003; 
www.unctad.orglfdistatistics 
31 id 
34 id 
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were $2171 million, $2127 million, $3403 million and $5445 million 
respectively.35 
A pertinent comment on the data is that although the inflow of direct foreign 
investment into Nigeria suffered a decline somewhat in the year that the 
privatization program was re-Iaunched (1999) and the immediately 
succeeding year (2000) following such reinvigoration, it seemed to improve 
substantially in the third and fourth years (2001 and 2002 respectively). It 
is, therefore, arguable that although foreign direct investment in the nature of 
acquisition of the privatized firms remained unaffected by the privatization 
program, the latter has continued to exert a positive impact in the broader 
area of general foreign investment in the country. Critics may charge that the 
improvement could be owed to the return of democracy in the country in the 
same year as that during which the second privatization program was 
instituted; and that the increase seen in 2001 and 2002 reflected a gradual 
return of international confidence in the Nigerian polity. Such an assessment 
may not substantially detract from the influence of the privatization 
program. This is because the deregulation, contained in the economic 
policies of the civilian administration, is but one strand in the over all reform 
35 UNCTAD World Investment Reports 2007 
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I of the political economy of Nigeria. The privatization program is a 
j 
concomitant strand, which complements the deregulation program. Besides, 
it is a well-accepted notion in international economics that international 
agencies act as catalysts for foreign investments. In other words, the attitude 
of such agencies toward a particular country provides a barometer on the 
suitability of investments therein. The World Bank:, the International 
Development Agency, the United Kingdom Department for International 
Development and the United States Agency for International Development 
have actively participated in the Nigerian privatization program.36 They 
have not only provided substantial grants for the smooth and efficient 
implementation of the program, but have also assisted with technical 
resources and manpower. Foreign investors are known to track the activities 
of multilateral agencies and those of the leading developed countries such as 
the United States and the United Kingdom. Such investors allow their 
investment decisions to be informed substantially by the activities or attitude 
of such prominent agencies, or at the very least they take such attitudes into 
consideration when deciding whether or not to pursue an investment in a 
country. It does not, therefore, require complicated analysis to conclude that 
36 For instance in 2001 the World Bank made available a grant of$1l4 million to support the privatization 
program. See World Bank Endorses BPE, Others, hUp:/www.bpeng.orgilO/news-item last visited 
09/13/04. The UK Department for International Development made $10 million grant to BPE; the United 
States Agency for International Development made a $1 million grant in 2000 and $8.2 million in 2001. 
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the pronounced and active support of the World Bank and other agencies 
toward the privatization program in Nigeria has been interpreted by 
investors as a positive, even if tacit, endorsement of the exercise and of the 
broader economic climate in the country. Thus, the surge in foreign direct 
investment in Nigeria in the second and third years (2001 and 2002, 
respectively) following the reintroduction of the privatization program is not 
surprising. In consequence, the answer to the question, whether the 
privatization program has had any impact on foreign direct investment in 
Nigeria, is in the affirmative. It has provided a positive and enabling 
environment, which has conduced to improved foreign investments in 
Nigeria, even though such impact on investments in the privatized 
enterprises have been relatively modest. 
Perhaps one way that foreign interest can be significantly aroused in direct 
acquisition of the SOEs is for the government to reconsider the approach of 
partial privatization. Given the controversies inherent in government, and 
among departments, foreign investors may not be comfortable with an 
arrangement in which they are partners with such disorganized body. 
Similarly, the regulatory framework such as competition rules or regulations 
on standards should be introduced or strengthened. Unfortunately, Nigeria 
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still lacks a competition regime. Although both the Bureau and the Council 
are working hard to push an antitrust statute, their proposed bill is still a 
draft and is yet to make it to the National Assembly almost two decades after 
the country started the privatization program. One cannot overemphasize the 
need for a coherent and effective competition law. It should be at least an 
adjunct, if not a precursor, to a successful privatization exercise. Had such a 
regime been in existence, the initial opposition to the privatization program 
could have been substantially softened. Foreign investors are comfortable 
with a predictable and stable environment. They are aware that the absence 
of clear and tested standards will, in the future, entail a posteriori, ad hoc 
and, indeed, ad hominem regulations. Such retrospective enactment and 
application of rules will detract from the assurances contained in the laws 
and distort the economy. 
CONCLUSION 
The above discussion reveals that although privatization is controversial, it is 
necessary for revamping the Nigerian economy. The structural and 
institutional frameworks established by the Nigerian government for 
achieving that objective appear sound. However, those frameworks are but a 
first step in the long journey of attracting foreign capital by transferring 
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SOBs into private hands. The implementation of the arrangement is equally 
important. 
The economic crisis that faces Nigeria cannot be solved only by adopting 
policies. The real crisis has been that of leadership. The existence of SOEs 
was based on developmental needs. Those needs have not been fully met, 
even though one cannot say that all the SOEs have not lived up to their 
responsibilities. But the solution does not necessarily lie in selling them. It 
lies in an honest leadership willing to hold the SOEs accountable every step 
of the way. Unfortunately, such leadership seems to have so far eluded 
Nigeria, hence, the seeming acceptance that privatization is not only here to 
stay, but that it is also desirable. 
Having embarked upon the program, Nigeria seems to be making giant 
strides. Initially, foreign investors were hesitant to be involved in the 
program. Later, they seem to be persuaded on the prospects of the program. 
Thus the increased foreign participation witnessed in the third phase of the 
second privatization program. The country has still not completely allayed 
the reservations of foreigners, and there is need for increased foreign 
confidence in it. 
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If confidence is lacking in it, or if it is mired in unnecessary controversy, the 
lofty objectives may remain a will-o-the wisp. In this respect, other 
fundamental factors, apart from the integrity of the process, relate to social 
and political stability. The government should act promptly to resolve 
outstanding controversies regarding some of the SOEs. In addition, it should 
strengthen regulations. Above all, it should improve the security situation in 
the country. These are desiderata if the privatization program is to have the 
desired goal of attracting foreign investments into the country. With the 
transition in 2007 of the civilian administration to another such 
administration37 it is hoped that the international community will now banish 
every misgiving about politics in Nigeria. Finally, the most populous 
country in Africa is ready, able and willing to take its position in the comity 
of free and stable nations. This should give foreigners additional assurance 
on the viability, durability and profitability of investments in Nigeria. 
37 Some critics however charge that the transition was fraught with electoral fraud and that the ruling party 
is on the verge of making Nigeria a de facto one party state. 
288 
